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Abstract

UNTHINKING FAITH AND FNLTGHTENM FNT
HEGEL AND THE IMPASSE OF MODERNITY*

(

Jane

February 1986)

Elizabeth Bennett, E.A.,
Ph.D.,

Siena

College

University of Massachusetts

Directed by:
Professors Jean Bethke Elshtain,
Jerome King and George Kateb

Guided by Hegel's understanding in the Phenom eno logy
of the encounter between two paradTgmatic modfes
of modern thought, Faith and Enlightenment, the dissertation first explores the boundaries of contemporary debates
surrounding the natural environment and the- theory of the
state.
It then argues that the orientations to nature and
freedom embodied in these debates are flawed--they derive
from either an exaggerated faith in human mastery or from
an exaggerated faith in the extent to which the world is in
ontological
harmony with humans.
Drawing critically upon
the work of Michel Foucault and Charles Taylor, the
dissertation concludes with the attempt to articulate a
"fractious holist" orientation to nature and freedom that
seeks to escape these flaws.
o f
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CHAPTER

I

EXILE AND HOMECOMING

The intellectual motif of the 19th century has been

described as "exile and homecoming,"
that the self is

ex

i

st

en

t i a 1 1 y

1

that is,

the sense

estranged and the quest to

unite the self with the larger cultural and natural worlds.
A

re-union was deemed necessary,

new and humanly imposed

a

order was sought to replace the decaying synthesis effected
by religion and

tradition.

Thus, the motif of exile and

homecoming can also be expressed as the problem of the
relation of self, nature and order.
Because this motif is emblazoned
and

because

in

Hegel's thought

believe its significance extends beyond the

I

19th century European experience*?

I

was drawn to Hegel's

attempt to confront and resolve homesickness.
is

for

Hegel

Alienation

positive good, necessary to the development

a

of the reflective,

s e 1

f-

d e f i n i ng

modern subject.

And only

this self-conscious being will be able to recognize £ej_st
and thus transcend
I

do not

his portrayal

alienation.

endorse Hegel's solution to alienation.

But

of modes of thought -- Faith and

Enlightenment -- as variations on the theme of exile and
homecoming is

a

rich source of insight into the nature of

contemporary political debates.

1

Chapter II, "The Dialectic of Faith and Enlightenment," begins the exploration of this insight by sum-

marizing the classical dialogue between Faith and
Enlightenment in the

Ph en om e no lo g_y__o £_Sp_i

r i t

Faith and

.

Enlightenment are modes of thought which can neither accept
nor dispense with each other.

Faith seeks

a

with divinity; Enlightenment seeks freedom in

chanted world.

world filled
a

disen-

Enlightenment demands knowledge certain of

itself, lacking the resources to achieve it; it views

reason as

a

tool

for ordering the

world and rendering it

predictable, understating the world's resistance to its
order; and it understands nature to be

a

deposit of

resources for use, underplaying human implication in
world larger than itself.
this dialectic,

Faith,

a

the defensive voice in

strives to appreciate the mysteries

surrounding human knowing, sacrificing the contribution

self-consciousness makes to freedom; it resists the spread
of

instrumental rationality, underestimating the necessity

of technology and administration; and it seeks respect for

nature,

exaggerating its beneficence.

According to Hegel, the Faith and Enlightenment
attempts to reconcile self and world are both faulty.

While the flaws of each are readily exposed by the other,
neither offers an affirmative position free of theoretical
and practical

other

—

each

difficulties.
formed

in

Because the two engender each

contrast to its perceived opponent

3

—

neither is able to transcend itself.

Hegel

insists that

debates conforming to the Faith-Enlightenment dynamic will
arrive at an impasse, until they accept the dialectical

resolution of this impasse inscribed

in

Hegel's own theory.

Chapter IT highlights several characteristics of

modern discourse:

its desire to overcome alienation,

its

recognition of political impact of theories of language and
knowledge; its ambivalent stance toward rationality and

utilitarianism; its preoccupation with order; and the

inevitability of protest against this preoccupation.
Euilding upon Hegel's understanding of the encounter
between Faith and Enlightenment, the study then moves,

in

Chapters III and IV, to an exploration of contemporary

attempts to relate self, nature and order.

It

identifies

characteristic formulations of this relation and
characteristic flaws

in

them.

One set of formulations,

inspired by Enlightenment,

emphasizes the human creation of order; re-union or

homecoming requires

a

strenuous exertion of rational will.

Another set, the heirs of Faith, emphasizes the order
already within nature; re-union requires
human will to natural

structure.

I

an

attunement of

argue that the first

overestimates the pjw»r jf human reason and will; the
second, the beneficience of the extant natural order.

Moreover, both ov ere st ima t ions result

in

an

inability to

acknowledge that within the self and ^hat within nature

that declines to attend the reunion,

"otherness."

i.e.,

To

rail against that which escapes unification with ever more

insistent attempts at humanization (as Enlightenment does)
has been ecologically and psychologically dangerous.
the

of

r

a

e- con s t

i

tut

i

on

of this resistance as

But

mysterious part

a

world designed in our best interests (as in Faith) is

increasingly hard to believe, running too much against the
grain of contemporary experience.
The aim of Chapters III and IV is not to prove that

contemporary discourse must be enclosed within the

Faith-Enlightenment problematic

—

for Faith-Enlightenment

one of many interpretive frameworks.

is only

Rather, my

intention is to reveal dimensions of contemporary debates
normally unthematized when these parameters are ignored.
Chapter III,

"Environmental Management and Natural

Holism," applies the Fa i

environmental debate.

t h

-En

1 i

ghte

en t

environmental

management, with its enlightenment faith
an d-con

f

in

human technique

idence that nature can be humanized; and natural

holism, with its emphasis on the
and

dynamic to the

Contemporary orientations to nature

rather neatly into two groups:

fall

nm

nature

i

n t erc on n

ec te d

n e s s

of self

.

Environmental management, as exemplified by environenvimental economists Allen Kneese and Charles Schultze,

ronmental
icist

John

lawyer Christopher Stone,

and environmental

Passmore, gives primacy to human reason and

eth-

.

5

will.

Natural holism, as exemplified by natural philoso-

phers Erazim Kohak and John Compton, gives special status
to nature,

conceiving

it

as

a

moral guide for human

conduct.

Environmental management and natural holism are

opponents intimately involved with each other, and this
intimacy confines them to
and

a

debate between an instrumental

teleological view of nature.

a

According to natural

holism, environmental management is incapable of realizing

environmental quality,

for

its

nature is at base destructive.

Promethean orientation to

According to environmental

management, natural holism is Utopian,

necessity for

for

it

evades the

Promethean orientation by fantasizing about

a

the extent to which self and nature can be reconciled.

Although the charges each makes against the other are
on

target,

neither solution is satisfactory.

Chapter III

thus establishes an agenda to be pursued in Chapter

development of

an

V:

the

orientation to nature more tenable than

natural holism and less destructive than environmental
m an ag

ement
The organization of Chapter

IV,

"The Juridical State,

the

Consensual State, the Attuned State," is more complex,

for

Enlightenment theories of the state present

individualist and

a

collectivist face.

I

both,

an

examine three

contemporary theorists of the state -- Theodore Lowi,
Jurgen Habermas,

and

Charles Taylor

—

by

focusing on their

conceptions of freedom.

Lowi

and

Habermas, disagreeing on

much, nonetheless share the Enlightenment inheritance and

conceive political freedom as rational mastery of the
natural and social world;
faces of Enlightenment,

Taylor protests against these two

claiming that freedom requires

respect for the "natural bent" of the self and the world.
Lowi and

Habermas advocate

a

powerful state with an

increasing realm of responsibility while Taylor argues for
a

more decentralized steady-state.
The focus of the Habermasian attack on Lowi's ideal

state is that its commitment to

a

basically capitalist

economy undermines its commitment to democracy.
ideal is

a

Habermas's

consensual state where rational norms rather

than unreflective tradition or corporate imperatives govern

social life.

From the perspective of Taylor, however,

Habermas shares with Lowi an exaggerated confidence in the
ability of human reason to order individuals, collectivThis ov er con

ities, or nature.

f id

ence leads them,

even

against their will, to define their targets more and more
in

terms of use-value and to enlarge the scope of social

rationalization.

Taylor seeks

an

attuned state with

a

diminished need to administer citizens and social life.
His

ideal,

then,

is

a

state where social institutions

acknowledge the limits of the world they inhabit.

Such

acknowledgement reduces the extent to which natural limits
function as obstacles to human will.

7

Chapter IV concludes with
tion to nature
too great

a

implicit

in

a

critique of the orienta-

Taylor's ideal.

Taylor assumes

degree of attunement between humans and the

natural world.

His theory,

insightful in its critique of

these two modernized theories of the enlightened state,
ends by recapitulating defects in the Faith view of the
wo

r

Id

.

One of the aims of Chapter IV,

then,

is

to elucidate

the connection between orientations to nature and

conceptions of freedom.
be

Because nature must to some degree

experienced as outer, as

a

barrier to will,

boundary conditions for action,

an

as

setting

orientation to nature

enables some conceptions of freedom and disables others -helping to decide,

for

example, whether freedom is

understood as requiring transcendence of boundaries or
The orientation to nature also has

acceptance of them.

implications for the treatment of troublesome or resistant
elements of the population.

Because nature is,

in

a

sense,

the paradigm "other," an approach to nature helps to

constitute the range of ethical or not-so-ethical

orientations to human "others."
This study allows Hegel to set the agenda for the

examination of contemporary political debates (Chapters III
and

IV),

but

it

is

not

itself Hegelian.

Hegel's

philosophical solution to alienation, the ontology of
Geist,

is

untenable.

Moreover, the Phenomenology

8

encourages the contemporary reader

this conclusion.

in

By

relentlessly exposing the complexities, anomalies, and
flaws

in

every extant theory of self, morality,

freedom,

or

nature, it teaches us to be skeptical of any theory that

purports to be complete, consistent,

and unified.

Hegelian

philosophy embodies the flaws of Faith and Enlightenment
so carefully

it

identifies, but its attempt to provide the

definitive solution to homesickness

is

subtle and

so

complex that its very failure recommends

more tentative

a

political and theoretical stance.
Chapter
such

a

stance, one that places its faith neither in human

mastery nor
needs.

"Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment," seeks

V,

It

in

a

seeks

world predisposed to harmonize with human
a

political theory, or better,

a

philosophical anthropology, that acknowledges dissonance
'

-V.

between humans and the world while appreciating our

interdependence with it.

Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel

Foucault inspire this attempt, although they are not the
authors of it.
This philosophical

anthropology of "fractious holism"

strives to acknowledge the integrity of intractable

elements of the self, of non-humans, and of places not
ordered according to principles of human design.
importantly,

it

More

seeks to accept this resistance to human

ordering without grounding acceptance

in

ontological concord jf humans and nature.

a

belief

in

the

9

Fractious holism makes the point that the world is
best understood as neither intersubjectively constituted
nor objectively given.

The investigation of contemporary

attempts to feel at home
the world

is

to

in

some extent

the world has shown that while
a

human construction, the

result of the imposition of human form or order,

it

also

escapes subjective and intersubjective control.

In

seeking

to articulate the nature of this world,

fractious holism

continues the Faith and Enlightenment quest to return from
exile

—

but

it

acknowledges that there can be no fully

satisfying homecoming and that the quest itself is not
without imposing effects.

1

ENDNOTES

See

George Steiner,

University Press,

Antigones (New York:

1984), Chapter One.

Oxford

o

CFAPTFP

II

THE DIALECTIC OF FAITH AND ENLIGHTENMENT

Wjia. t _i_s

_ E n light e nm e n

t ?

Enlightenment was the de-mystification of
robust faith,

meaning, and
nat

ur e-

a

s-God

a

world filled with divine signs,

intelligible order.
'

rational izable

s

,

a

world of

intrinsic

Enlightenment transformed

text into nature as

a

set of

mechanical, potentially useful parts.

In

the face of the rigid religious structure that grew up

around the beautifully enchanted world, Enlightenment

asserted

a

political freedom and self-determination where

God has retreated
in

to

a

more distant location in the cosmos;

the face of unreflective allegiance to tradition,

it

asserted the integrity and power of reflective and

reflexive reason; in the face of

mysterious hints from God,
of certainty;

asserted

a

in

view of knowledge as

pursued

it

the face of

a

a

a

transparent science

sacra.lized nature,

it

potentially predictable, controllable fund of

natural "resources."

According to Hegel, the self-consciousness within this
new human self-assertion was infectious:

the protest

against Enlightenment could not retreat (or could retreat

11

1

only upon pain of nostalgia)

unreflective form, but
defensive)

voice.

it

to

its

2

earlier robust and

could find another (albeit more

Modern faith could protest against the

reduction of human reason to instrumental rationality; it
could criticize Enlightenment's pursuit of

a

transparent

knowledge by showing knowledge to be historically situated
and

limited by the finitude of the human mind;

it

could

show how Enlightenment's utilitarianism leads to the

treatment of humans as means and thereby undermines the
desire to install new dignity and respect for humans; it
could stand

as

a

witness to the human submersion in and

dependence upon nature and insist that nature's inherent
order be respected even if it is no longer possible to read
it

as

a

text.

Fnl ightenment

its adversary;
and

,

then, defines itself by reference to

its self-image is that of destroyer of myths

archaic social

institutions.

Its critique

of the

robust faith applies as well to the modern version of faith
-- for

Enlightenment exposes,

in

the cold

light of reason,

the foundation of the new faith's moral claims to be the

same old religion or teleology that was the source of the

moral power of the robust faith.
by reference to

its

critique, however.

adversary and
It

Faith too defines itself
it

too has success

in

its

persistently exposes the narrowness,

overconfidence, and contradictions within Enlightenment's
exaltation of the rational, autonomous human being.

1?

The structure of my exploration of the
dynamic between

Enlightenment and Faith
First,
pr e-Enl
(

provide

T

ightenment

glauben

)

is

a

follows:

characterization of the

robust, version of Faith, for the Faith

,

Hegel describes

has already been

as

in

the Ph

e

nom eno 1 og y __^_SpJ_rU.

infiltrated by Enlightenment categories.

This characterization of Robust Faith, along with the

characterizations of all "modes of consciousness,"
ideal

as

a

I

call

Robust Faith, but because it is intended

set of contrasts

world, nature,

it

is

to

a

to

post-Christian but
Hegel of the

Ph

modern orientations to self,

difficult and beside the point to give

precise historical

it

the

an

There are many historical examples of the

type.

orientation

is of

location.

pr e-Enl

Roughly,

it

corresponds

ightenment times, although for

ilosophy of

H is

tory

,

who is thinking

more in terms of changes in religious consciousness, the

Reformation rather than the Enlightenment marks the demise
of Robust Faith.

The point of my elaboration of Robust

Faith is not that it exhausts pre-Enl ightenment or
pr e-R e f o rm

at i on

orientations (neither are "modern faith" or

"Enlightenment" monolithic categories'), but that
be our

orientation.

T

significant version of

try to capture the sense of
a

of Hans Blumenberg.

We

a

non-modern ontology.

The account of Robust Faith ends with
the transition to modern

cannot

it

Faith.

Here

I

a

description of

draw upon the work

then arrive at the Faith of the

1

Phenomenology,

a

modern Faith that confronts and

confronted by Enlightenment.

This Faith,

4

is

still resonant

with the enchanted world, is both the target
of

Enlightenment's critique and
the now dominant mode.

a

critique of Enlightenment,

The modern age appears as the

continuation of the mutually engendering debate between
Faith and Enlightenment.

Robust Faith

Faith in its prime embodies an enchanted view of the

world.

1

Nature is filled with mystery and meaning and

every item within it is interconnected with every other.
The world

is

resemblance.

vast web whose threads are those of

a

This similitude of each with all is an

ontological likeness due to the divine source of all things
created, but it is also

a

literal connection among things.

There are links of physical proximity (e.g., moss on trees,

ticks on dogs);

links of the identity, analogousness

complementarity of function or form ("Just

as

,

or

man's

intellect is an imperfect reflection of God's wisdom, so
his two eyes, with

their limited brightness, are

a

reflection of the vast illumination spread across the sky
by sun

and

moon...");

and

links of natural affinity (e.g.,

plants toward the sun) or repulsion (e.g.,
water)

.

fire toward

15

Knowledge is organized around the principle of

resemblance, but

would be misleading to think of

it

resemblance as the epistemology of Robust Faith.
Resemblance

is

investigate

a

nature.

not

a

conceptual scheme employed to

physical world; it is

a

property inherent in

Nature speaks and says that it coheres through

relations of resemblance.
part of its meaning,
its purpose and

Every rock,

tells what it

is_,

every plant reveals
and what

it

is

is

place within the order of creation.

There exists a sympathy between aconite and our
eyes.
This unexpected affinity would remain in
obscurity if there were not some signature on
the plant, some mark, some word, as it were,
telling us that it is good for diseases of the
eye.
This sign is easily legible in its seeds:
they are tiny dark globes set in white skinlike
coverings whose appearance is much like tha^t of
eyelids covering an eye/

Knowledge here is knowledge of divine intention as
is

embodied in the natural world.

in

general

is

knowledge of God.

necessity something is lost

in

In

it

this sense, knowledge

Mature speaks, but by
the translation; nature

cannot pronounce an unambiguous directive.

God

provides

only hints, or rather, his intentions must appear to

mortals as cryptic clues.

This opaqueness is not only

a

result of the limits of human reason; it is also bound up
with the temporality and

Nature,

finitude of material things.

therefore, whispers, but the whisper only

concentrates our attention, draws our ears even closer,
enhances the appeal of that which speaks.

16

Knowledge must have an element of mystery, for
were it
unambiguous, man would have no role to play.
More
precisely, man would cease to be man and instead become
God, because

an

in

enchanted world the only being with

access to unambiguous knowledge is God.
part of creation,

universe,

a

knowledge.

is

a

integral

part of the ordered

universe that includes the "objects" of human
Man is related to these objects precisely in

his office as interpreter of them.

man and

Man, like every

the world --

i.e.,

The relation between

knowledge -- consists then

in

interpretation; interpretation makes audible the world's
voice

.

Moreover, the veiled messages in nature are

susceptible to

a

range of interpretations.

The truth is

gleaned only through multiple, partial attempts and even
the final compilation of interpretations can only

approximate truth.

The range is not infinite, however,

for

the messages are grounded and the interpretations bounded
by real

divine intentions

—

even while this ground and

these limits are not fully transparent to us.

Writings and speech

in

the enchanted

other naturally appearing thing.

function as

a

world are as any

Language does not

medium privileged by its proximity to nan;

language has not yet become -- as

it

will

in

vastly richer and deeper source of truth than
natural environment.

modernity -a

neutral

Language, like nature, is simply

a

.

17

another site where resemblances connect earthly
existence
to

the divine cosmos.

Ancient texts, contemporary

writings, theological treatises, ravings of the mad, art,
music, and miracle plays were all subject to constant
and

relentless commentary,

for overlapping

interpretations were

required to reveal the oracle within texts.
of commentaries were encouraged:

All

varieties

those which elaborated

shape, structure, mythical history, medicinal application,

smell, likenesses to other things,

potential, tendencies,

accidental or necessary events associated with the thing,
etc.
is

More importantly, "none of these forms of discourse

required to justify its claim to be expressing

a

truth

before it is interpreted; all that is required of it is the

possibility of talking about it."
the text is not

a

The oracular nature of

specific divine command to be translated
Language does not here "represent"

into human practice.

some real content

U

in

the world, but rather

...words group syllables together and syllables
letters, because there are virtues placed in
individual letters that draw them towards each
other or keep them apart, exactly as the marks
found in^nature also repel or attract one
another
It

is

the secret w o r ki

of these movements, more than

ng s

designative message (human or divine), that commentaries
tirelessly seek.
Historians have had

a

difficulty explaining the

coexistence, in the late Medieval period, of magic or

a

1

divination (used to cull meaning from nature)

and

8

scholarly

erudition (used to examine the re-discovered Greek and
Roman texts).

The former is often viewed as an element
of

superstition incongruous with the theoretical strides made
in

the field of textual

exegesis.

more than complementary.

But these two

forms are

integral parts of the

As

epistemic configuration of Pobust Faith, divination and
textual commentary are the methods appropriate to the

production of the incomplete knowledge that

appropriate to
of meaning.

a

world

is

in

turn

filled everywhere with divine hints

The model

reading nature is the same as

for

that for reading texts.

"God

is

revealed

Scripture; his

in

works are also visible in the world. ..The book of nature

becomes

a

commentary,

of the revealed

Just as

a

word

further substantiation of the truth

.

poet conveys

a

message through the medium of

words (a medium that precludes the possibility of

transparent transmission)

and

just as

it

a

the reader's

is

job to participate in reconstructing that message, the

author of the world speaks through signs inscribed

in

the

world and it is the human role to interpret those signs.
It

now becomes clear how the ouestion of truth presented

itself.

For those of the enchanted

world,

it

is

useless to

demand the title to authority of interpretations of natural
signs or of texts,
truth.

for

God

was the guarantor of their

Both commentary and division possess
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...an ageless affinity with the things that
it
unveils ... The truth of all these marks
whether they are woven into nature itself or
whether they exist in lines on parchment and in
libraries
is everywhere the same:
coeval
with the institution of God.

Underlying all human attempts at deciphering

is

a

more

primal discourse, the divine text of origin, the macrocosm.

Things hide themselves

in

nature and in the word but

then offer themselves up for interpretation.

recalcitrant but not silent.

The world is

From the time when the order

of things that "bear witness" to some trend or to some

origin "without its being possible to indicate causes and
effects."

g

Here is knowing where relationships are loose

but secure, both flexible and strong; where the threads
that link are more along the order of family resemblances
than efficient causes.
Let us review the elements which constitute the world
of Faith in its robust phase.
(1

is

)

Holism

:

There is

ordered or designed in

a

a

deep sense that the universe

coherent and purposeful way.

Each part of that whole is interconnected to every other

through relations of resemblance.

microcosm,

a

The earthly world

is

category which

...provides all investigations with an
assurance that everything will find its mirror
and its macrocosm ic justification on another
and larger scale; it affirms, inversely, that
the visible order of the highest spheres will
be fou^d reflected in the darkest depths of the
earth
.

a
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(2)

Incompl eteness

:

All knowledge is of relations

relations between persons and their world and
among things
that co-exist in the world.

Those relations have

a

necessary element of opacity; knowledge can be certain
or
rather, secure, without having to be complete, i.e.

opacity and mystery need not be purged.
(3)

Interpretation

interpretation.

:

knowledge is therefore

All

Although the world of Robust Faith is

microcosm, the human relation to the world

completely given,

is

—

not rigidly fixed

is

it

a

not
is

the place

of the self to participate in forming that relation through

interpretation

.

This characterization of Pobust Faith emphasizes what
was unique about

its ontology;

it

draws

a

sharp contrast

between modern understandings about the self, knowledge,
and

nature and those of the enchanted view of the world.

Eut

now it is appropriate to amend this first

characterization.
to

The ontology of Robust Faith attempted

create an integrated world where the fit between humans

and their natural environment was neat.
at

This attempt to be

home in the world (behind which stood the divine

homemaker) was to

a

large degree successful, but only

romantic could say it was

a

a

complete success.

The different beings of the cosmos did

part intertwine through resemblances to form

whole, but the cosmos always remained

a

for the most
a

coherent

puzzle with

a

few
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pieces still missing.

For example,

God's intentions but was in essence
them.

general, all the signs

In

imperfect,

in

language approached
a

defiled version of

the text/nature were

indicators and resemblances could never fully

overcome the distance between self and other, between human
and

thing, between body and soul.

From outside the ontological horizon of Robust Faith,
this distance reflects the resistance of the world to

creationist mold.

A

a

creationist ontology first posits

telos and divine intentionality in nature and then

"discovers" them in "signs."

A

creationist ontology

underwrites (i.e., sets one's name to

a

policy of insurance

for the purpose of becoming answerable to
or damage)

a

designated loss

the world of Robust Faith.

From inside the ontological horizon of Robust Faith,

however, the imperfections in the schema of world-as-text
are simply the necessary limits appropriate to material or

mortal being; they are worrisome flaws within
sound structure.

place to grow.

But

inside this worry

al

Pobust Faith is complex:

a

basically

ienation found
it

expresses

a

a

tranquil and orderly world content to explain anomalies as
divine mysteries, but upon closer inspection

it

also

reveals an uneasiness regarding the depth of that

tranquility.

The question "From whence comes the modern

world of alienation?" can thus be given

answer:

a

preliminary

the seeds of the characteristically modern
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experience of estrangement were sown
of Robust

estr ang ed

Faith.

This is the world

in

the enchanted world

from which the self is

.

H ege

l

Robus t Faith

and

This insight brings us to

a

further concern:

what is

the relationship between Hegel's view of the world of

Robust Faith as dark and alienated

and

my account of the

happy and beautiful era of Robust Faith?
with the Hegelian

Fa

i

th-F.n

1

ig

it

Is

compatible

htenm ent dialectic to say that

Robust Faith is the predecessor to the modern Faith of the
Yes, for although Hegel's lectures on the

Ph enom e n ol og y?

philosophy of history seem
the enchanted

to

provide an interpretation of

world at odds with the one developed here,

the incongruity is only apparent.

contentions
(1)

This claim relies on two

:

that alienation existed withi n the attempt to

secure an integrated world of resemblances.

T

have under-

played this element in order to draw the sharpest contrast

between Robust Faith and the modern world;

nonetheless.

I

it

is

there

have suggested the outlines of such an

argument above.
(?)

that Hegel

was drawn

to

accentuate the unhappy and

irrational character of Robust Faith because of the

teleological nature of his philosophy.
second contention.

We

turn now to this
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The Philos ophy of Histor

provides Hegel's developed

y

interpretation of Medieval Faith as well as an explicit
contrast between the religious orientation of the world
of

Catholicism and the Faith of Enlightenment.

The contrasts

he chooses to make,

along with the character of his

interpretation as

whole,

a

are tied to his fundamental

"principle of division" for historical periodization:
relation between Church and State.

The categories that

flow out of this principle are "Christendom"

times

-

800

A

.

D

.

)

,

"Feudalism" (800

"Reformation" (1500

Church/State split

-

is

1800).
as

In

the

(patristic

1500), and

-

Christendom the

yet undifferentiated;

Feudalism is

the development of the antithesis between the theocracy of
the

Church and the monarch of the State; with the

Reformation the critical moves toward the harmonization of
religion and reason are begun.

characterized

in

This triadic scheme is also

terms of the Trinity:

Kingdom of the Father [Christendom] is the
consolidated, undistinguished mass, presenting
a self-repeating cycle. ..the Kingdom of the Son
[Feudalism] is the manifestation of God merely
shining
in a relation to secular existence
The Kingdom
upon it as upon an alien object.
of Spirit [Reformation] is the harmonizing of
the antithesis.
The

—

The Reformation

is

nothing of value is lost

an
in

unequivocal good
the transition

for

from

Hegel;
a

world

opulent and bloated with miracles and magic to the

reasonable world of Luther.

Pr e-r e

fo

rm

? t

i

on

religious

consciousness is "the long, eventful and terrible night,"
necessary because its irrationality is the precondition
for
a

re-formation.
Let us take

for

a

step back and look at Robust Faith --

Hegel the periods of Christendom and Feudalism.

Hegel

For

they were radically incomplete, mere moments of

yet-to-be-realized synthesis.

a

This incompleteness stems

from the fact that consciousness was able to make certain

categorical distinctions but unable to conceptualize the
rel atio n between opposing

categories.

This can be seen

most clearly in the lack of integration between the
Medieval notions of the sacred and the secular.

The

central project of the Medieval Age was, according to
Hegel, the attempt to overcome this lack.
A

major part of that attempt was the Church.

The

Church was both to embody religious beliefs and insights
and

control.
to

and

agent of political, economic and social

to be an

effect

Hegel will show, however, that the Church fails
a

true reconciliation between sacred and secular

instead only contaminates each realm with the worst

aspects of the other.

For example,

the

Church corrupts,

through the sale of indulgences and ecclesiastical office,
its authentic
for

spiritual insights with the secular hunger

power and wealth, at the same time that

it

introduces

fear and superstition into everyday material existence.
The only institution capable of achieving the precarious,
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complex, and differentiated unity
of sacred and secular (or
of faith and reason) is the State, in
Hegel's special use
of the term.

But because

reconciliatory hopes

the Medieval

the

in

Church

.

Pge invested

its

"we see everywhere

vice, utter absence of respect for conscience,

shamelessness

,

and

a

distracted state of things, of which

the entire history of the period

detail."

is

the picture in

11

Spiritual concerns and the ethical prescriptions that

follow from them have no comfortable place within available
forms of political

economic organization.

and

the

In

Medieval Age, says Hegel, religious life is estranged from

secular life.

principles

—

The Church here failed

because its guiding

chastity, poverty, and obedience --

contravene those crucial

social

to

and

economic life.

Marriage, necessary as the foundation of secular social

interactions, was deemed inferior to celibacy; "pauperism,
laziness, inactivity, was regarded as nobler" than activity
where "the workman has to perform for his subsistence";

1

2

slavery as blind obedience to Church doctrine, replaces
freedom or "obed ience

.

.

1

which
good

I

recognize as just",

political

Moral and

.to the
7

a

Rat ion al

.

.

.

to laws

freedom integral to the

state.

Moreover, in the absence of this freedom, the self
cannot be integrated:

reason is opposed to belief.

Reason

here means the self-conscious consideration (endorsement,
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rejection or reformulation) of the standards
governing
way of life.

a

Robust Faith, says Hegel, does not subject

its principles to critical

reflection but accepts them as

given by the Church hierarchy.

The development of

reflective conscience is, therefore, stunted by the

overwhelming presence of the Church as institutional
conscience.
dogma.
ex

Norms and principles become commands and

Robust Faith is deficient for Hegel because of its

ternal character:

its relation to the divine relies on

pronouncements of Church councils, on intermediates called
?aints or clergy, and upon formalistic rituals.
such,

is

declared incapable of recognizing the Divine and

approaching thereto."
In

"[Mian, as

sum,

1

t|

the pr e-R e

fo

rm

at

i

on

attempt to reconcile the

sacred and the secular -- an attempt that culminates in the

establishment of an authoritative religious institution

—

only fosters alienation at the level of the self.

Alienation consists in this, that men. ..accept
their identification with external social
reality... but they experience this social
reality as other, they do not feel b i s i c h i n
it. ..This sense that the substance of their
lives lies beyond them is the essence of
alienation.
<e

For Hegel, alienation

is

exacerbated

although it has been present

in

all

in

the modern age,

periods of history.

Alienation is necessary to develop human subjectivity:

the

individual must first separate himself from his natural

surroundings and then create

a

new relation to the larger
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whole that replaces the immediacy of

a

submersive

identification that belonged, for example, to the
ancient
Greeks.

This new relation must be one where there is
both

identification with the whole and the self-conscious assent
of the

individual.

move from
being.
Hegel

a

Alienation enables the individual to

natural being to

By bringing out

a

reflective, cultivated

the alienation within

Robust Faith,

shows us the sometimes latent but always present

underside of the happy enchanted world.

Later,

in

the

transition to the Modern Age, this split between self and
world widens radically.

Although the Church failed to reconcile sacred and
secular, it was able somewhat to unify the sphere of the
sacred.

For

Hegel, the insights of Faith cannot exist

without institutional embodiment; even
is

superior to

a

privatized religion.

flawed embodiment

a

fl
.

n

institution is

needed to replace personal and therefore arbitrary will
with abstract, general

laws.

The Church was at least

a

partial success at this; there existed no comparable
sec ul ar

institution to enforce universality.

Monarchy,

especially the reign of Charlemagne, was the last attempt
to

rationalize and unify the political realm.

Hegel speaks

disparagingly of the successor of monarchy, feudalism:
authority of Law and Pight is valid any
the crude
longer; nothing but chance power
opposed
to
particularity
as
caprice of
Right...
universally valid

Ho

—
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All right vanished before individual
Might- for
equality of Rights and rational legislation
where the interests of the political Totality,
of the Sta^g. are kept in view, had
no
ex i stence
.

One further point must be made regarding the
outcome
of the struggle of the
in

Church to present divinity "as not

any sense an other-world existence, but as in unity
with

Human

Nature in the Present and Actual."

17

Here we

approach Hegel's interpretation of the natural environment
of

Robust Faith.

question:

T_n_

Robust Faith became preoccupied with this

wh at

wa y

is

"actual," i.e., sensual?
its

practical expression

the sacred

made "present"

and

The doctrine of the Trinity (and
in

the Eucharist)

was the

officially prescribed answer to this question, "but when
is

it

once granted that God exists in external phenomenal

presence, this external manifestation immediately becomes

infinitely varied;
infinite."

1

8

for the need of this presence is

The point here is that once Robust Faith was

committed to the view that the Spiritual has

expression, it became difficult to

c

a

sensual

onfine the instances of

this expression to those authorized by the Church.
for example,
in

did

Why,

the spiritual mingle in the material only

the Fucharist 9

V?s it not possible that God provided

instances of this co-mingling within our selves or within
nature?

For Hegel,

it

was

a

kind of excessive enthusiasm

for realizing the unity of human and divine that

nature to become filled with miracles.

allowed

.
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The Church, partially because of the
decentralized

character of pre-modern times, was unable to homogenize
all
versions of its doctrines and was therefore unsuccessful

in

establishing the hegemony of theological explanation of the
unity of human and divine, i.e., the doctrine of the
Trinity.
to

Ordinary religious consciousness had tenuous ties

this official doctrine and

instead

improvised its own:

Thus innumerable instances will occur. ..in
which Christ has appeared to one and another,
in various places. ..In all pi aces ... there will
occur manifestations of the He av en 1 y - a nd the
Divine will be realized in miracles ...
.

.

Unable to restrain or channel this zealousness for unity on
the part of the believers, the Church eventually

incorporated this enchanted view of nature into its own
canon

.

This is, for Hegel, an unfortunate turn of events.
Tn the period in question the Church presents
the aspect of a world of miracle; ...natural
existence has utterly lost its stability and
certainty: rather, absolute certainty has
turned against it, and the Divine is not
conceived of... under conditions of universality
as the law and nature of Spirit, but reveals
itself in isolated and detached phenomena, in
which the rational form of existence is utterly

pervert ed
Hegel makes it clear that it is only from "our,"

i.e.,

the

Hegelian, point of view that the irrationality of Robust
Faith is so lamentable:

Medieval

the

faithful

participants of the

Age experience "a state of satisfaction and

enjoyment."
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For Hegel,

Faith is always held accountable

to the standard

of absolute knowledge, that is, the
model

of transparent, conceptual knowledge.
by which consciousness

The complex process

supposed to achieve this

is

knowledge is the Pher^enolo&y_ of Spirit and Geist
is the
Hegelian term for the authentic reconciliation of matter
and

spirit.
The Medieval

Age is irrational

and

Robust Faith is

superstitious to the extent that this model for knowledge
is

tenable.

Some have argued that it is not:

Hegel has a notion of conceptual thought as
self-transparent which we find hard to share
today.
Much of contemporary philosophy has
been concerned wit* showing how the clarity of
our most explicit conceptual formulations
reposes on a background of which we are not
fully aware and which we can perhaps never
exhaustively explore. Much that is implicit,
for instance, in the very system of concepts or
classifications that we use to formulate our
clearest thought remains unstated and possibly
unstatable
.

Once we become aware of the historicity of knowledge
and begin

existence of absolute knowledge,

to doubt the

once we no longer believe that the mystery expressed

through religion can be raised to the level where its

speculative content

fully uncovered, Hegel's discussions

is

of Faith can be seen

in

a

new light.

Faith is no longer

merely an insightful though naive precursor to absolute
knowledge; it becomes

a

repository of historical evidence

through which to question the possibility of transparent
knowledge.

Robust Faith becomes not the undisciplined,
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soon-to-be-incorporated/superseded attempt to realize
Geist, but a sign of the irreducible element
of opacity
the world.

this reading,

On

a

in

reading which is consistent

with the analysis of the Robust Faith as predecessor
to

modern Faith and

Enlightenment, Faith can be shown to

symbolize and convey our dark sense of that unstated or

unstatable background necessary to the explicit
formulations available to us.

And

the persistence of

Faith-like expressions across epochs reinforces the
judgment that

transparent knowing

a

We see now why

is

a

chimeral pursuit.

Hegel's account of Robust Faith, an

account that always focuses on its "progressive" insights,
is dominated by the discussion of the

doctrines.

Church and its formal

Although Hegel understands that there was

time when nature was

a

filled with divine signs, he dismisses

this belief as "a credulity of the most absurd and childish

character." 2 3

The moments of truth in Robust Faith, to the

extent that they existed, were embodied in the

view of nature as enchanted.

Ch u r

ch

,

This choice of emphasis

in

a

in

turn leads Hegel to see the self of Robust Faith as
the self is either an over zealous

anything but robust:

producer of silliness or an unthinking slave to dogma.
if we

peel

away the view of the Medieval Age as

but deficient stage
we

had

are opened
a

up

to

not

in

the

a

But

necessary

progress of absolute knowledge,

the

interpretation that the self that

lived experience of

a

miraculous natural text was

an
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active, creative self

-

self that allowed

a

for

ambiguous

relations within its knowledge.
The

Hegelian desire for unambiguous knowledge, its

pursuit of

a

thoroughly intelligible nature,

i_s

Enlightenment's pursuit of scientific certainty.
there is

a

sense

in

Thus,

which Hegel's very characterization of

Robust Faith is always already in Enlightenment terms.
Hegel, as we shall see later, provides
of Enlightenment.

way be construed as
but

is

instead

of Faith and

a

powerful critique

Although ambiguity or mystery can
a

moment of truth

its de fect

Yet

in

Faith

for

in

no

Hegel,

the subtlety of Hegel's analysis

,

Enlightenment itself provides considerations

capable of converting the putative defect into an important
insight

.

The interpretation of Faith as robust, therefore, lies

within Hegel's texts;

it

seems to be there in spite of his

philosophical crusade for clarity.

2 U

Glimmerings of it are

present in his critique of Enlightenment and

qualified defense of Faith.

I

have given

a

his

in

generous

reading of Hegel's own account of Faith and then
with an ideal-type account of Robust Faith,

supplemented

it

for Hegel

too anxious to

is

the higher rationality of

Enlightenment.

To

a

t r

an sc end

/

pr e

s e r v e

Fait^ into

philosophy made possible by

reject the view of history as the

movement of increasing rationality requires more openness
to

the

question of Faith's tenability or truth.

The

Transitio n from

R

o b u _s

W aU ^^H^rnj-^j
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th

Hegel's account of the age of Robust Faith
provides

a

coherent account of the religious, political and economic

conditions of the period.
from the Medieval

the

to

Put

Modern

his treatment of the shift
Age is less satisfying.

seems as though it is the Reformation that ushers

It

in

modernity, and it is the Reformation that sets the stage
for Enlightenment, but how did

and vulnerable to the

attacks?

Robust Faith become so weak

Reformation and Enlightenment

abuses of the Church alone cannot account for

The

its demise.
To

answer this question it is necessary to make one

more stop before encountering the Faith of the

Phenomenolo gy
Mo

d

er

n

.

Blumenberg

Hans

in

The

L

egitim acy

the

o f

Age offers an account of the transition from the

late Medieval period to the early modern period that can be

interpreted as an explanation of how Robust Faith loses
sway and assumes

more modern, defensive stance.

a

The

affinity between Plumenberg and Hegel can be seen

especially when one interprets the Phenom eno logy as
analyses, analyses that seem

series of historical

capture the core of

sometimes troubled

a

way of life

internal

—

a

to

sometimes smooth,

transformations, and its

relations with opposing ways of life.
case history of

its

a

Hegel gives us

mode of consciousness and

in

so

a

doing can

illuminate the latest expression of that
mode.
too, has

a

Blumenberg,

sense of the way historical modes of life

articulate and perfect themselves, realize internal
tensions and then re-form.

Blumenberg's account of

Medieval ontology enables us to understand Hegel's
account
of Faith more
Tn

fully.

short, Blumenberg's thesis is this:

Robust Faith's preoccupation with divine will and its

attempt to preserve the omnipotence of that will, lead to
the doctrine of the absolute and therefore possibly

arbitrary character of that will.
absolutism" opened the space for

orientation to the world.

Tt

This "theological
a

radically different

was no longer reasonable to

suppose that the signs of divine will are legibly inscribed
in

nature.

If

God

can create

in

ways not penetrable by

human reason, then the world available to reason may be one
of contingency, perhaps even sheer

arbitrariness.

The

world as text thus disintegrates and the world slowly takes
the plastic
Tn

form of the mathematizable.

my exploration of this Blumenberg thesis,

I

will

address two questions:
absolutism arise?

(1)

How did theological

(2)

What were the consequences of theological

absolutism?
According to Blumenberg, an important Medieval concern
was the attempt to overcome gnosticism.

Gnosticism of the
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early Christian era had addressed the problem
of evil by
positing two gods:
a benevolent creator and
a demiurge

responsible for suffering, deception and evil.
retrieve the world as the creation from the
negative role assigned to it by the doctrine of
its demiurgic origin, and to salvage the
dignity of the ancient cosmos for its role in
the Christian system, was the central effort
all the way fr^ Augustine to the height of

To

Sc hoi a s t ic

i

sm

.

Augustine's efforts to preserve the power of the
unified Christian god were definitive for all later

attempts.

He

repudiates the existence of

a

demiurge and

thereby heals the gnostic dualism by making hu manity

responsible for evil.

The source of evil

stems from the

presence of sin, sin that God allows in order that the
human be

a

free, willing

and

reasoning being.

This

formulation has the potential to unburden God and thereby

restore him to benevolence, omnipotence and omniscience,
but only if some human sin can be identified that is great

enough to absorb the wickedness of the demiurge.
could

find

no

actual and

this weight and

Augustine

individual sin that could bear

this, says

Elumenberg, leads him to posit

"the uniquely great original guilt of mankind and.. .its

mythical inheritance."

Eventually in the development of Christianity, this
primordial guilt, because it is not the direct

responsibility of an individual but
humanity,

a

congenital

flaw of

finds its possibility of absolution primarily

in

e

.
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an

act of divine grace and only marginally,

through good works.
some and not others.

God

can choose,

if at

all,

therefore, to absolve

This selective absolution must in

fact be the case, as we see that the world is not rid
of

the consequences of that guilt.

A

chosen few are saved;

the majority remain blameworthy and their taint explains

the persistence of evil.

original

The

implication of Augustine's

formulation is the emergence of

a

"hidden God"

with "inconceivable absolute sovereignty." 2 ^

Throughout the Middle Ages this Augustinian theme of
the primacy of divine will was pursued in many ways.

One

significant example is the theological absolutism of
Medieval nominalism where the world was "the pure

performance of reified omnipotence
unlimited sovereignty of
be

addressed..." if

God

a

is

...

demonstration of the

a

will to which no questions can
n

om

i

n

al

i

st ic

:

we

can know the

bare fact of his creation, but can know no more about him
or

the mysterious, gratuitous nature of his creation.

Th

intent here was to shore up God, to underscore His power,
to

preserve the enchanted world by making the individual

feel

all

the more awed by it.

Put

although nominalism

sought to bring man "to the point of inevitable resignation
and thus of submission to faith. ..the

imminent dynamics of

the situation led to the contrary result."

29

absolutism was the final rally of Robust Faith

theological
in

its

attempt to preserve the title to hegemony, but it also

weakened Faith in its struggle with

Fn

1

ightenm ent

U7

asserts itself in the face of the
dominating force of
Enlightenment.
One consequence of this confrontation

is

that modern Faith no longer has the degree
of

self-confidence appropriate
Robust Faith.

While

to

still

it

the hegemonic

position of

attempts to preserve the

unique insights into the human condition expressed

in

Robust Faith, modern Faith is the mode of religious

expression best suited to coexist with

a

secular reason,

modern science are

s e

f-

1

con

sc io us n e

and

ss

world where

comingtothefore.
For Hegel

*

there are both internal

and

external sources

of this loss of confidence, this mutation in Faith.

Like

Plumenberg after him, Hegel shows how Faith -- of its own
accord and through the course of the logical development of
its thought

—

understandings.

comes to confront limits
Faith, like all

its own

in

Hegelian modes of

consciousness before absolute knowing, is drawn
and

conclusions that it

is

to

issues

unable to incorporate into the
This is one important impetus

context of its way of life.

for the dialectical movement of history.

alone in the modern age; alongside

it

Put

Faith is not

has grown

a

way of

life that poses what can be legitimately termed an external

challenge:

Enlightenment.

T his

internal

realization of

tensions and this external critique combine
nm en

in

the

criticizes Faith by

Ph

enom enol og

CO

unter-posing the clear, reflective scientific ideals of

y

:

En

1

i

g h

t

e

t
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Enlightenment to the

p ic t

ur e- t ho ug h

counter-posing is at the same time

Faith, and this

t

of

a

public

articulation of

weaknesses that already haunt Faith itself.
Two

examples will illustrate this:

(1)

Faith asserts the existence of an ever-present yet

not wholly comprehensible unity of the supe

sensuous realms.

This unity is expressed

Absolute Being

present

is

This unity is both

indeed

a

in

sen suo us

the

in

and

Eucharist:

tangible bread and wine.

the

symbolic one and an actual one --

sacrament is as well

the

r

identity of symbol and fact.
this characteristic:

a

celebration of the

Pict ur e- tho ught

the knowledge gained

picture-thoughts lacks

a

s

also have

through

dichotomous distinction between

ideational representation and actual presence (the for-us
and

the in-itself).

v

Faith believes in the unity of human history and

(2)

the atemporal order of the universe.

History reflects not

only the course of human events but also the rationality of
Faith does not dissociate the life of

the divine Spirit.

a

mortal, Jesus, from His divinity and the timelessness of
his

wo rd
In

s

.

both cases,

Fn

1

ightenment steadfastly charges that

Faith has confused two logically distinct categories -- the

material and the spiritual -- and demands

a

theoretical articulation of their relation.
probl emati zes and

more precise

Enlightenment

dissociates the simple unities of Faith

.

'
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and

Faith cannot reply, for its affirmations,
by

definition, are not suscept ible to the sort of

justification Fnlightenment demands.

Fnlightenment

condemns Faith's stance as irrational
The crux

of Fnlightenm en

t

s

.

critique is that Faith

results not

in

of body and

soul)

world.

Enlightenment, the confidence of Faith relies

on

For

the

r

econc

but

in

deliberate naivete,

a

il

iation of matter and spirit (or

a

repudiation of the sensible

a

stubborn refusal to perceive

evidence disruptive of its worldview.
Just as it sees Faith in general to be a tissue
of superstitions, prejudices, and errors, so it
further sees the consciousness of this content
organized into a realm of error in which false
insight, common to the mass of peop^, is
immediate, naive, and unr e f 1 ec t i v e
The

price Faith must pay, then, for its "solution"

homelessness felt by post-Robust consciousness,

is

the

to

the

denial of the historicity of Jesus and the materiality of
bread and the affirmation of only

"spirituality."

a

vacuous and mysterious

Faith's retreat to the world beyond

expression of its pathetic inability to come
human embodiment (and mortality)

and

to

to

is

an

terms with

acknowledge

a

measure of human responsibility for personal, social and
political

conditions.

Faith might respond of these charges
wa ys

:

in

a

variety of

50
It

(1)

might reply with

a

shrug of indifference,

content to live out its understandings

in

blissful

ignorance of any narrowly theoretical critique

Enlightenment may provide.
It

(2)

might attempt

refute the charge of

u

nr e

a

f1

deconstructive reply:
ec

t iv

en e

s s

it

by showing how no

position can achieve full clarity of expression.
it could

could

Further,

expose the naivete of Enl ightenment regarding the

falsifications necessarily within any position that claims
to

have achieved full
It

(3)

based on

articulation.

might reply that Enlightenment's critique is

fundamental misunderstanding of Faith.

a

the reply that Hegel

himself presents to

"Enlightenment distorts all the moments
them

into

rr a t

ion al

jof

in

the

In
i

sm of

its

text:

Faith, changing

something different from what they are

[Faith]."
i

us

This is

in

it

frenzy to free society from the

religion and tradition,

Enlightenment

misses the crucial core of Faith:

Faith sets aside the

particularity of the individual

order to assert the

ontological

in

interpenetr ation of humans, things and God.

faith, its absolute Being, while it is
possessed of intrinsic b eing for the believer,
is also at the same time not like an alien
thing which is just fo und in him, no one
On the
knowing how and whence it came.
contrary, the faith of the believer consists
just in his f inding himself as this particular
personal consciousness in the absolute Being
and his obedience and service consist in
producing, through his own ^a c t iv ity that Being
as his own absolute Being.
To

,
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Enlightenment was right, says Hegel, to bring out the
hidden element of sensuousness and historical contingency
in

Faith's beliefs and practices, but wrong to view those

beliefs as nothing but the reification of historically
produced norms and to interpret those rituals as nothing
but

the celebration of earthly goods.

Fn

1

ig

htenm ent

"regards the object of the believer's veneration as stone
and

wood, or else as something

pnic."

46

finite and anthropomor-

Faith may have only an uncanny hunch that the

human condition involves

a

spirituality and that individ-

uals are inherently bound up with
and

a

larger social, natural

Enlightenment mistakenly

even universal whole, but

attributes the murky and sometimes tradition-bound characfalsity of its insights.

ter of Faith to the utter

It

can

because its own inability to realize its own aspira-

do so

tions through the vehicle of abstract reason has not yet

become apparent to it.

Although Faith at one time or another has responded

in

each of these three ways, the overall tendency of its

replies has been something else:

Faith attempts to

"rationalize" itself along the Enlightment model of reason
and

in

so

doing depreciates its own insights.

Why does Faith respond in

question here is this:

Enlightenment terms?
by and

for

The key

How is it drawn into

Enlightenment?

In

a

game designed

order to understand the

seduction of Faith, more needs to be said about the modus

operandi of the

Fn

1

i

gh te

nm en

t

critique of Faith.
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It

is

not.

true

that the

reason, embodiment and

perspectives of theoretical

hi stor ic al it y

are

simply absent from

Faith and that Enlightenment arrogantly imposes
its own

standards upon Faith.

Faith already contains these, but

they exist as implicit moments of its understandings
and
practices.

What is absent

in

Faith is the

conceptualization of these moments as discrete, dichotomous
cat egor ies

.

For Enlightenment does not emply principles
peculiar to itself in its attack on Faith, but
principles which are implicit in Faith itself.
Enlightenment merely presents Faith with its
own thoughts which Faith unconsciously lets
fall apart. ..it merely reminds Faith when one
of its own modes is present to it, of the
others which it also has, but which it^lways
forgets when the other one is present.

Enlightenment
upsets the housekeeping of Spirit in the
household of Faith by bringing into that
household the tools and utensils of t his world,
a
world which Fpirit cannot deny is its own,
because its consciousness likewise belongs to
i

£s

of the

t

.

the discussion of picture-thougrt

and

the examples

Eucharist and the role of Jesus have shown, Faith

posits large, diffuse categories.
not

s

But

these categories are

without their specificity; they are concerned to show

how religious

insights are situated within

historical context.

Trinity

is

a

For

a

finite

example, the doctrine of the

theoretically sophisticated theological

argument that acknowledges embodiment

in

its

preoccupation
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with the mortality/death of Jesus and contains

dimension

in

a

historical

that the unity of the Trinity is realized
when

the savior is born.

Faith,

thus subscribes to the

in

its doctrine of the Trinity,

standards for which Enlightenment

holds it responsible.
And

the

type of understanding

expressed

also relevant to no n- t h eol og ic al areas.

is

will

in

the Trinity

The example

explore here is Faith's view of nature.

I

Faith

recognizes that embodiment requires that humans use and
transform nature, that we relate to nature

in

point of view of technical effectiveness.

After all, the

part from the

similitude Robust Faith saw between the aconite seed and

a

human eye was partly for the sake of improving human
vision.

But

Faith also has insight_into the way nature
"""*""*

jkm

provides the conditions of possibility for our existence
and

it

acknowledges that we express our sense of this most

intimate relation to nature through symbolic or religious
means.

These two sorts of understanding

—

"instrumental" and the "expressive" moments
to

nature

—

are

intermingled

in

Faith:

of the
in our relation

hence the Robust

Faith notion of nature as imbued with telos and spirit.
The very terms "instrumental"

fully appropriate to
a

a

and

"expressive" are not

discussion of Faith, for they embody

distinction best suited

to

Enlightenment sensibility.

Faith resists the dichotomy between instrumental and

expressive as well as the split between animate and

51

inanimate being, and this resistance is both
its weakness
and

its

strength.

The

strength ought to be obvious by now,

though Hegel himself only saw it imperfectly:
us

a

glimpse into another world,

a

Faith gives

pre-modern world where,

for example, the relation to nature may not result
in

the

masterful attitude of modern science and technology.

Tt

also glimpses the way in which the Fn

1

ightenm en t project of

freedom, rationality and control underplays limitations

inherent in its project.
is

weakness because

Faith's resistance to dichotomies

prevents Faith from achieving

it

level of clarity of expression,
to

the achievement of

sophistication.

a

a

a

clarity that is the key

high level of theoretical

Faith's simple and harmonious holism also

makes it vulnerable to the charge that its insights cannot
have practical or political

application.

These are the weaknesses to which Enl

appeals.
hold

ig

h-t

enm en

makes

t

Enlightenment charges that Faith's unities can

together only if left unexamined, that once the

individual parts of these unities are isolated and exposed
to

the light of critical reason they are seen to be

a

hodgepodge of obscure insights and confused ideas, not
coherent wholes.

Because Hegel understands the way this

weakness of Faith is tied
of

to

its strengths, he

is

critical

Enlightenment's wholesale condemnation of Faith.

Hegel

Yet

shares Enlightenment's visionary commitment to the

precise concepts that result from

a

systematic,
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self-reflective
make

e pi s t

em ol ogy

its philosophical

Enl ig h

.

t e

nm en

t

strives to

categories as well as its social

practices fully susceptible to rational analysis and
pursues

a

theoretical articulation of those categories and

practices that is clear and precise and sophisticated
enough to capture their complexities.

development of self-consciousness
Although
the

Fnl ightenment gives

potential

for

says

moment of

o n-

separated

r e f1

ec

t i

i

Hegel.
n

to- se 1

calls this the

.

primacy to this pursuit,

sel f- con sc io usn ess

of consciousness,

Hegel

is given

in

Faith "has within it the
f

,

or of

se1

f- co n sc io usn e

from its naivete,

in

the shape of an

which remains independently

in

the background..."

Hegel describes the

all modes

s s

,

insight
HQ

Thus,

Enlightenment critique of Faith as one

whereby Enlightenment discloses to Faith the presence of
its own latent, underdeveloped

consciousness.
of Faith

for

powers of self-

Enlightenment draws on this inner affinity

Enlightenment and exposes

an

aspect of the

self of Faith of which Faith was only darkly aware.
is

Faith

impressed by the disclosure as it recognizes itself

the critique; the legitimacy
pi c tur e- tho ug ht

knowing

is

in

Faith's own eyes of its

weakened.

Enlightenment, then, holds an irresistible
authority over Faith because, in the believer's
own consciousness, are found the very moments
which Fn 1 ightenm en t has established as valid.
Examining the effect of this authority more
closely, its behavior toward Faith seems to rend
asunder the b ea ut i f ul unity of trust and
immediate certa inty to pollute its sj) i r tual
,

i

in

.
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consciousness with mean thoughts of sensuous
reality, to destroy the soul which is composed
and s ecu r e in its submission, by the vanity
of
sel f-will and self-fulfillment.
But as a
matter of fact, the result of the Enlightenment
is rather to do away with the thou ghtless
separation which is presented in Faith. The
believing consciousness weighs and measures by a
twofold standard; it has two sorts of eyes, two
sorts of ears, speaks with two voices, has
duplicated all ideas without comparing the
two-fold me an i ngs
The Enlightenment
illuminates... Tthe] heavenly world with ideas
belonging to the world of sense, and points out
this finitude which Fait^cannot deny because it
is self-consciousness...
.

.

.

.

.

We

the

to

Faith.
are

.

.

.

see now why none of the

above mentioned responses

Enlightenment critique is readily available
Faith's own capacities for theoretical

to

reflection

aroused by Enlightenment, thus indifference toward

Enlightenment's critique

is

impossible once Faith

recognizes itself therein.. .For both Faith and

Enlightenment subscribe"
for

knowledge.

yet developed
d

econ str uc

t

iv e

well,

As

to

the criterion of articulation

Faith's self-consciousness is not

enough for it to offer either the
or

Hegelian replies.

Enlightenment charges Faith with

a

stubborn refusal

perceive evidence disruptive of its world view.
see why modern Faith is so
a

defensive technique.

merely vestigal;

it

stubborn.

Its

t e n

to

Now we can

ac io us

n es s

is

The enchanted view of the world is

has to assert itself much harder.

Faith is properly insistent

in

that Enlightenment's conceptual

some ways

—

it

does see

confidence stems from

a
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systematic oversimplification of reality.
flaw and

Faith sees this

itself acknowledges the complexity of realit

even

y

while it is unable to articulate this richer
understanding.

Because of the latent affinities between Faith and

Enlightenment, the distinction between
"external" critique becomes blurred.

"internal" and

an
On

Enlightenment acts upon Faith as would

an

the one hand,
sel f-

a

cr

i

t i

que

:

Enl ightenment

...is comparable to a silent expansion or...
diffusion, say, of a perfume in the unresisting
atmosphere.
Tt is a penetrating infection which
does not make itself noticeable beforehand as
something opposed to the indifferent element into
which it insinuates itself, and therefore cannot
be warded off.
On

the other

to

Faith, mounts an

Enlightenment, since

hand,

independent challenge

Enlightenment is also "a

d

ev el o ped

,

^s e 1 f- d

to
i

it.

ffe r

movement which... must appear on the scene as

a

violent struggle with its antithesis."

5 2

and

T he

a

H e gemony

en

The result of

a

ti a ti

ng

sheer uproar

Enlightenment and the Persis ten c

of

identical

is not

it

e

Faith

of

struggle between Faith and

Enlightenment is that Enlightenment establishes itself as
the dominant mode of consciousness.

expelled

from

its

kingdom,"

says

Faith "has been

Hegel, and

is

a

"yearning

...which mourns over the loss of its spiritual world."
Faith, however,

still

"lurks

in

the background"'

to

haunt

58

Enlightenment.

Although modern Faith will have

a

multiplicity of guises and although it will lose
the
unified appearance enabled by

historical position of

a

hegemony, the insights of Faith endure.
in

They endure both

positions that are recognizable as direct heirs of

Robust Faith and

as

they are incorporated

Enlightenment itself.
directions:

The

into

infection spreads

two

in

Faith infiltrates Enlightenment while

Enlightenment internalizes elements of Faith.
"

Fnl ightenment

is caught

up

in

the

same.

.

.confl ict

that it formerly experienced in connection with faith,"

only now "it contains within itself the principle it is
a t t

ac k

i

ng

.

.

.

a nd

the other party is forgotten."

"forgotten," however, only

the

in

5H

Faith is

sense that its key

insights -- holism, essential incompleteness of

Enlightenment knowledge, and interpretation as the role of
humanity -- now reside

i_n

c

og

n

i

to

inside Enlightenment.

Faith no longer is the spirit of the age but neither is it

absent from the emerging historical self-understanding.

Enlightenment incorporates and re-appropriates moments
o n

is

as much

transformation of those moments as

it

is

of Faith but this

them.

r

e-

a

ppr o pr

Faith's concern with

i a t i

a

in

this

focus as it,

too,

preservation of

realm of non-human reality,

with the enduring essence of Eeing, was

specific divine person, God.

a

a

focused around

a

Enlightenment follows Faith

attempts to conceive Eeing

in

.

.
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theological terms.

The difference in the effect on the

role of God of these two approaches to the "same"

issue is,

however, profound.
Faith, through its

p

i

ur e-

c t

tho

ug h

t

understandings and

practices, was able to integrate God and earthly existence
and

to

found workable epi st em ol og

principles upon God.

As

i

c

al

and

technical

long as this integration was

successful, the world of Faith could include

a

reality

irreducible to human intentions, creation or by- pr od uc t i on

Enlightenment, on the other hand, was from the start unable
to sustain that

of theoretical

integration.

treatment

This was due to both the type

gave the concept "God" and its

it

exposure of the flaws inherent

in

Faith's perspective.

Thus Enlightenment diminishes the efficacy of God.

This

means not only that the theological world-view was given
another, perhaps fatal, blow, but also that it becomes

increasingly difficult for

Fn

existence of any

being

no

n-h

urn a n

1

ig h t e nm e

n t

to consider the

Enlightenment internalizes Faith through two distinct
but connected moves:

Deism affirms

Deism and Materialism.

the existence of absolute Being but insists upon purifying

the notion of this being through philosophical analysis.
The attempt here is to take the mysterious God of Faith and

Deism aims to transform Faith's loose

to de-mystify him.

picture- thoughts

,

to distill

into clear concepts.

them,

to have them

Enlightenment arrives

roughly the following way:

at

congeal

Deism in

,
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The essence of the concept God is the
otherness of his

nature when compared human nature -- his
super sen suousn ess
infinity, immortality.
Because this is so, there
is

practically nothing we can know or say about him, for
any
knowledge claim or descriptive assertion would entail the

attribution of perceptible, sensible, determinate, i.e.,
human, characteristics to him.

assigned

to

extreme:
in

wh

a t

predicates can be

No

God, hence knowledge of him is limited

at

the

one can only know that he is, not how or why or
way.

Deism does not deny Faith's God;

rather Deism, in its

refusal to defile God with predicates, sees itself as
according God his proper respect.
To let nothing of that

sort [of particularity and
limitation] appertain to absolute Being. ..is the
prudent behavior of Rea son
wh ich knows how to
put itself and its finite riches in their proper
place, and how^o deal with the Absolute in a
.

.

.

worthy manner."
The result, however, of this respectful
of

God

is his

"absolute Being

eventual de-throning:

becomes. ..a vacuum." 5

6

one can know nothing

in

consciousness or

in

Hegel

purification

shows how

a

God

about which

particular cannot loom large

human

Indeed, this God cannot

affairs.

continue to be understood as

ex

i

st

in

i

ng

in

any real

sense.

Materialism, the other side of Enlightenment, takes the
step from

e pi s t

em ol og ic

completes the Deist

d

a 1

e- mys

skepticism to atheism and
t i fi c a t

i

o n

process.

Why hold on

6

to

the

now merely formal

1

profession of God's existence?

Materialism denies God, disregards the possibility
of

a

supersensuous or spiritual realm and instead turns
its
attention toward finite reality.

Here it is useful

that Elumenberg's account of the way theological

to

note

absolutism

brings forth its own counter-world of modern atomism is in

many ways parallel

to

Hegel's description of the mutual

engendering of Deism and Materialism.
world

and

reducing

it

made Deism possible.
The God

Py disenchanting the

contingency, Medieval nominalism

to

There are, of course, differences.

of nominalism was intended

to

be an

awesome,

powerful being whereas Deism from the start conceived of

a

cool, efficient but distant God.
Hegel

shows how Materialism and

same defect:

The

o n to

1

og ic al

1

y

Deism suffer from the

privileged realm, whether

that of spirit or matter, is conceived too abstractly.
This charge of abstractness means that neither notion is

intelligible,

for

neither can be embodied

theories or practices.
"pure matter"

Ry

are opposed

in

words,

definition, "absolute Being" and
to

any such embodiment.

...it is important to bear in mind that p ure
m atter is merely what is left over when we
seeing, feeling, tasting, etc.
a bstr act from
...what is seen, felt tasted is not matter but
rather
Matter
colour, a stone, a salt, etc.
pure abs tr _3 c__t _io n ..." a pure in -itsel f "

^

,

.

Like

Deism's God,

non-being.

Hegel

Enl ightenment

is

Materialism's matter
will

is

conclude that, as

a

a

vacuum,
whole,

a

a

t

6?

...undiluted platitude and the con fessio n
of
platitude; because it consists in kno wi
ng~no
t h i ng
of absolute Being or, what amounts
to the same
thing, in knowing this quite flat tr ui sm
tha
it is only a bsolute Being; and, on
the other
hand, in knowing only what is finite and...
thinking that this knowledge of the finite'as
true is the highest knowledge attainable. 58
,

.

.

.

while Materialism sees readily the emptiness
of

But

Deism's conception of the divine realm and thus aims
to

deny that residual God, it is blind to the essentia]

abstractness of its reality,
the realm

a

reality that is limited to

of finite, sensible beings.

Rather, Materialism

conceives itself as having no choice, as having the only
understanding possible once Faith's struggle
the world as
the most

a

not

s u

part taken over by, and

was said

per

s

en

s

experience

mysterious unity of spirit and matter is for
to

that extent rendered

Deism.

innocuous through,
As

to

above, what counts for Enlightenment is

uo u sn e

s s

but

finite reality.

But

what is the

precise character of this turning toward

finite reality or

of the claim about its significance?

the claim of

t s

Enlightenment that matter is all we can know?
claim that matter is all there
that it is both.
is determined

The

i_s?

Hegel

Or

is the

seems to suggest

Enlightenment theory that knowledge

by sense data -- that only with regard

to

things of sense can knowledge claims be articulated, or

predicates be assigned -- Hegel calls sense-certainty.

ontological claim of Enlightenment that finite being has

The

y. y
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its ground

in

substratum called "matter" Hegel calls

a

philosophical materialism.

The

figure of consciousness

called Enlightenment is this conjoining of se
n se- c er
and

5 9

materialism.

ta in t

Reality is now exhausted by things

which immediately and indifferently confront human senses.

"Enlightenment.

.isolates the actual world as...r s heer]

.

determinateness [and].
The emergence of

finitude." 60

.unmoved

.

sen

se-

c

er t a

i n t

y

brings to light

another instance of the Enlightenment's opposition to the

imprecision of

pi c t ur e- tho ug ht s

Sense-certainty as

.

theory of knowledge presupposes

a

sharp split between that

a

which is the cause of sense data (objects)

that which

and

receives and interprets the data (subjects').

"Consciousness
n

egative

in ter

o f

pene tr a

..

.here.

se

1 f

i

t

t

io n

,

.

.is .. .a

or of

knowledge of what is

t_h i_n g_s

o_f

sens e ..."

Th

p ur el
e

of the human, the natural-physical and the

divine that was the essence of the enchanted world is,

in

the early stages of the Faith-Enlightenment dynamic,

refined/reduced into two distinct realms:
the

and

h er e-o n-e ar

t

h

further pur

i

fi e

that transcends

s/

1

im

i

t h

t s

h urn an

er e-be yo nd

.

Mow,

the

Enlightenment

reality by dismissing everything

essence and

h urn an

representation.

Finite reality is now exhaustively made up of two types

beings and

a

new dichotomy crystallizes:

We must note that

Deism is replaced

for

Hegel

by Materialism,

it

is not

s

ub

j

ec t/ ob

j

ec

so much that

as it is the case the

o r

t
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they function together to crystallize subject
and object.
The character of Enlightenment is not

so

neat as the

discussion above, for the sake of clarity, tends to make
appear:
n

eg atio

Enlightenment never succeeds completely
of everything

n

non-human.

consciousness is always
of being.

Faith,

in

the

Every figure of

struggle with competing modes

a

The relationships between

Deism,

in

it

Robust Faith, modern

Materialism, and later utilitarianism and

will, do not constitute

linear progression.

a

Father, the

model is one of parry and thrust, of advance and retreat,
of variable degrees and

predominance.

kinds of success in

fight for

a

This is not to say that it is impossible to

discern any historical trend.

eventually loses sway

to

Tt

is possible:

Enlightenment.

Yet

Faith

elements

generally understood" as distinctive of Enlightenment, e.g.,
the

s

ubj ec t/ obj ec

t

dichotomy or,

in

the discussion to

follow, utility, are produced only against the backdrop of

persistent no n -Enl

ig h t e nm en t

modes.

Ut ility,

ason

Re

a_nd

Will

The principle of utility is the outcome of

Enlightenment's attempt to answer the question of the
sta tu s

of finite reality, now conceived

as "object."

Utility becomes "the predicate of all real being."
is

the relationship between

6?

What

finite reality and human being?

f,
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What ought to be the human posture toward
finite reality?
A standard of usefulness emerges
that provides
the

conceptual link between subject and object

necessary to seek

Enlightenment's consideration

status of finite reality proceeds simultaneously in

two directions, both influenced still by
ab so

1

ut e

(1)
to

is

new link once the old relation of

a

permeation begins to recede.
of the

it

the

Be ing

concern with

a

.

The moment of atheism latent within Deism comes

fore wherein

abstraction.

absolute Being is exposed as an empty

Finite reality can have no meaningful

relation to this void and must therefore be conceived as
pure be ing- in- it s elf
i

Finite reality is

.

ndepend ent of God and determined by
(2)

s

el

f-con ta in ed

in tern al

laws.

The moment of the believing consciousness latent

within Deism comes to the fore and

finite reality can be

conceived only in comparison

eternal

to

an

Here finite reality is defic ient
absolute Being, although
God

is

b eing-

himself

un spec

for- another

a

an

un

s

urn

pec

bl ed
i

fi

,

and

abl e

ind eb ted

dual

way because

Finite reality is thus

fi

abl

a

whole understands finite reality as

e

.

nature and concludes that

...everything is thus as much something i n-i t s el
in other words, everything
as it is f o r- an- othe r
is at the mercy of
Everything
is use f ul
itself be used by
lets
now
everything else,
is
its hind legs,
..on
stands.
now
others. ..and
turn.
its
in
other
for itself, and uses the
;

.

to

.

Enlightenment as
having then

i

in

h

,

spiritual realm.

t
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The unique thing

about

finite reality is that it is what

is only insofar as it is instrumental or

else.

means

Tts essence is its usefulness;

.

.

.

[

,

We

toward

someth ing

for

its end

is

be

to

a

with an enduring
be

g-

i n

i

n-

i

t s el f

is

moment; hence it is
equally, is for an
itself.

saw above how Enlightenment turns its attention

finite beings, toward "things" that have both

moment of autonomy and
insights then suggest

Enlightenment:
Insofar

as

a

a

a

moment of heteronomy.

Things are for-an-other

thing

is

"in-itself,"

uncov er ing/ prod uc ing the dual

was the comparison with

provide an
a

o

God:

God

Yet

a

it

,

but wh ich other?

is "other"

The original

or

alien,

impetus

nature of finite reality
was the reference point,

point of reference,

rienta tion to temporal

fixedn ess

These

for-an-other, that upon which all being

the other of the

was dependent.

a

new set of troubling questions for

but to what or to whom is it other?

have

a

,

clearly identified

s

ol id ity

by those

and

,

in

in

acts and
the

order that it

beliefs, must

capacity to be

search of orientation.

T

becomes apparent that while the exalted but attr ibuteness
God

has residual

presence

in

early modern life (enough to

spark the initial consideration of the status of material

being), it no longer has the strength to be its reference
po int

t

.

What is useful, is something
being in i t s el f
b u t ] this
at the same time only a pure
absolutely for an other but
'other' merely what it is in

for

i

.

e
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The

God of the

Robust Faith had been the center and

ground of all experience:

it

was the still fertile

creator, the site of efficacious
of subjectivity.

But

as

in t en t ion al

i

t y

,

the locus

Enlightenment unfolds the human

self emerges as the only being eligible for the position of

reference point.

There is thus increasing pressure to view

humans as subject, as having

a

mental

reflexive se 1

life,

psychology,

a

The principle of

u t il

a

ity is the

deep, complex inner or

accomplice

f- co n sc io usn e s s

to

.

this shift in

ontological emphasis; it is the formalization of the view
that reality is constituted by its references to human

subjects.

"Finite reality can therefore, properly

speaking, be taken just as one needs."
Yet Enl ightenmenl-

ambivalence

inevitably if paradoxically uncovers

the status of humans.

in

6^

human is lord, the sovereign subject:

On

the one hand

,

the

as "one who has come

from the hand of God" (to take his place, that is),
"

v er yt h

i

ng

exists for his pleasure and delight and. ..he

walks the earth as

in

a

garden planted for him."^

The

non-human elements of the natural world become objects
implicated

in

a

system of known or soon to be discovered

laws, objects docilely awaiting manipulation
of

h

urn

in

the

service

an desire.

Thus Experimental Science became the science of
the World. ..It seemed to man as if God had but
just created the moon and stars, plants and
animals, as if the laws of the universe were
established for the first time, for only then did
they feel a real interest in the universe, when
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they recognized their own Reason in the Reason
which pervades it.
The world

is

a

garden made for humans -- the creationist

ontology, the remnant of the enchanted world of Faith,
is
still

within Fnlightenment and here shores up the
sovereign

subjectivity of the self.
the enslaved object:

On

the other hand

the human,

too,

the human is

,

fits within the

category of finite reality through its embodiment.

Thus

the principle of utility contains within it the possibility
of treating humans

as mere means.

This ambivalence, this realization that humans are, at
one and

the same time,

subject and object, has

1-

h e

potential to muddy the self-assured waters of

Enlightenment.

Enlightenment

is

in

a

position to question

its pursuit of ever-increasing conceptual clarity,

a

pursuit which motivated its desire to disentangle self,
thing and God.

The subject/object "refinement" could be

shown to be not only

a

clarification but also

a

mystifying

oversimplification if Enlightenment would apply its method
to

the point of its origin

—

to

the human self.

It

is

also possible now for Enlightenment to confront the

pernicious or at least problematic moral

consequences of utilitarianism.
of these

and

political

Hyppolite specifies some

consequences:

reducing everything speculative to the human,
it seems that the Enlightenment reaches a world
of no depth, a world in which things are only
what they are immediately, and a world in which
In

69

individuals are. ..linked to. each other only by
considerations of interest. 0

Enlightenment does not, however, take advantage of
this

opportunity to deepen its insight; it covers up its
methodological and moral weaknesses as soon as
the possibility of their discussion.

mode of consciousness still

It

raises

it

will be Faith, the

lurking in the background, that

will periodically emerge to make the point about the limits
or

underside of utilitarianism.

Enlightenment sidesteps these issues by placing its
faith in reason and will.

Peason here refers to

capacity for principled thinking;

it

a

natural

refers also to the

ability to justify those principles (to provide "reasons")
by reference to their human

ccr.

sequences and/or by

reference to other principles deemed fundamental to human
existence.

Peason is always paired with will for

Enlightenment.

Peason is the universal human potential to

discern, devise and judge moral principles, will is the

decision to invoke reason and
action.

For

example,

to

carry out principled

although Enlightenment admits that

utility "can go beyond itself and destroy itself" (where
the destruction refers both tc the exploitation of nature
and

the perversion of the essence of man by reducing him to

his use-value), man is the "T v ing that is

relation"^ of utility.

Thus, according

c

to

onscious of this
Enlightenment,

consciousness equips man with r-eflective powers that can
limit the overextension of utility.

70

We

yet

for

see that the view of God

as designer

is not dead

Enlightenment, for the basis of its assertion that

utility will not destroy man or nature is another
assertion
that man is designed such that he contains a natural
barrier to immoderation.

"Reason is for him

a

useful

instrument for keeping this excess within bounds, or rather
for

preserving himself when he oversteps his limit..."

Reason is also called upon to ensure that utility will be

channelled

in

socially beneficial ways:

"Just as

everything is useful to man, so man is useful too, and his

vocation is to make himself
for

a

member of the groups, of use

the common good..." 70

Enlightenment has now turned its attention exclusively
toward human reason/will and although the concern with the
self has always
Hegel

now,

in

informed Enlightenment understandings,

his discussion of the French revolution and

Rousseau's general will, thematizes this concern and

dramatizes its effects.
Despite Enlightenment's conclusion that finite reality
is

wh

a t

it

is

only insofar as it is instrumental, its early

formulation of the principle of utility still presupposed
the

in-itself or autonomous moment of the object.

The dual

nature of finite reality remained dual even as the "other"
of the
to

for-an-other was given primacy.

Utility attempted

reconcile subject and object by making the latter

subordinate to the former, but it was incapable, in both

s

71

intention and effect, of subsumin g reality into subjective

consciousness.
object..." 7

1

"Utility is
The

s

till

thing continued

objectivity and of opposition
new developments, tied

up

predicate of the

a

have the appearance of

to

self-consciousness.

to

Put

with the newly emerging view of

freedom as will, now allow Enlightenment to bring

utilitarianism
of the

conclusion -- the "withdrawal

its logical

to

Useful." 72

form of objectivity of the

re-thinks the nature of finite reality and
the

el eg

i

tim

i

ze

in-itself moment by saying that the self of the

in-its-self is not

true

a

valid

and

to be "in-itself"

has changed.

s

elf and

its sub jectivity go

t

he obj ec

t

as an

in dependen

t

" i

n-

i

t s el

to

in s t

i

t

of th e human

wi th

the loss of

and

c

enter of resistance.

in

to

a

The

which anything that
Clearly, natural
Human consciousness

this model.

"lets nothing break loose to become
a

hand

y

h

f-hood" has to conform.

objects do not conform

ag

primac

The

human subject has become the model

claims

self for another

Thus the very conception of what it means

self."

[human]

ov er

d

Enlightenment

free object standing

"7 3
.

What is the new status of "things"?

The

primary unit

of reality to which one must relate is no longer "objects"
but "notions";

our concept

s

of objects.

"

Th e

consciousness conceives the object as having
essence than sel

f- con sc iousn ess

absolutely Notion."

7

'4

individual
no other

itself or as being

Objects are second-order beings, the

y

72

products of the particular mental category
that organized
and created an identity for an originally
chaotic cluster
of elements.

Tn

Hegel's introductory discussion of

Enlightenment he foreshadows the effect of the

transcending/preserving of utility:
to

abolish every kind of independence other than that of

self-consciousness, whether
is

Enlightenment "seeks

it

be the

independence of what

actual, or of what possesses intrinsic being..." 75

Enlightenment's focus on the mental constructs of
reality, combined with its faith

in

a

self-limiting and

self-generated reason, expose how Enlightenment privileges

subjectivity.
strand.

But

committed to

Enlightenment has
we
a

a

clear rationalist

saw earlier that Enlightenment is also

sense-certainty epistemology and

a

materialism, both of which have as their necessary
precondition the existence of finite "things" on tol og
strong enough to ground knowledge.

ic all

Within the

Enlightenment decision to give primacy

to

finite material

reality is contained the view that things -- rocks, rivers,
stars, tables, animals,
to

—

plants

the human conceptualization

and

have an existence prior

categorization of them.

Otherwise objects could not perform their role as the
stimulus of knowledge, i.e., there would be nothing out
there that shouts to the senses.

privileges the object and has

a

Enlightenment here
clear empiricist strand.

s

t
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Enlightenment, then, seems to be the paradoxical

convergence of

a

type of empiricism (where things-in-

themselves ground perception-as-knowl edge)

and

a

version of

rationalism (where objects are products of consciousness
and

the mind

is

the

ground of knowledge).

disappears however, when we focus on the

The
s

paradox

ub j ec t/ obj ec

dichotomy shared by empiricism and rationalism.
and rationalism engender each other; they both

that the most basic way of being
In

the world

in

Empiricism

presuppose
is

knowing.

both cases reality is exhausted by what lends itself to

clear representation -- representation in human perception
or

in

human thought.

An

experimental science that

manipulates physical objects and

a

logical analysis that

manipulates concepts together presuppose
subject and

lacking

in

a

view of nature as

the will,

a

a

view of self as

depository of objects

intelligence and

p ur po

se f ul ne

s

necessary for subjectivity.
In

the move to lower the status of objects,

Enlightenment continues to respond
continues its attempt

to

to

alienation, i.e., it

experience the world as

whole, where every element is

a

neatly with every other element.

a

unified

work of art designed
The "experimental

science" of Enlightenment is motivated by the desire

to

believe that relations among inanimate objects contain
pattern,

a

fit

to

rationality intelligible

to

humans.

And

Enlightenment philosophy is motivated by the desire to

a

7<4

believe that things or processes or experiences lend

themselves to the form of "notion."

practical interest

"A

makes use of, consumes the objects offered to it;
theoretical

a

interest calmly contemplates them, assured that

themselves they present no alien element," because "for

in

the ... Ego
s p ir i t

ual

.that which is diverse

..

,

.

.

pr e sent

.

s

an

itself, sensual or

from

object of dread..."

aim of Enlightenment is to secure external

7 f\

The overall

reality, to seek

the "unity of Thought with its Object" and this

"penetration of the Ego into and beyond other forms of
be

i

ng

.

.

.d ir ec tl y

involves the harmonization of Being..." 77

Notwithstanding his commitment to the philosophy of
absolute Spirit,
of Being

is

Hegel

understands that the harmoni zat ion

tricky business, for he says that

a

Enlightenment's project requires "ch allenging the external
world to exhibit the same Reason which Subject TEgo]
po

s

se s ses

„7 8
"
.

fi

b s ol u t e

F reedom

Thinking itself successful, through science and

philosophy,

in

escaping the constraints of objects,

Enlightenment experiences and seeks to prolong
sense of freedom:

will..."
and

79

"the world is

for

it

an

euphoric

simply its own

Freedom of the will -- freedom is derived from

properly belongs to the human will alone.

This is

75

because, as we have seen, neither objects
nor God any
longer have central existential

roles.

Human

freedom is

understood not as an inferior replica of divine
omnipotence
nor as necessitating participation in a constant
struggle
to control

the will

is

objects inherently resistant to control.
free only when all

exercise are removed.

God

had

Thus

impediments to its pure
receded, objects have been

unnerved, only the particularity of an act of will stands
in

the

way of the purity of will

absoluteness of freedom.

and

thus of the

Enlightenment "must know what the

Will

is

will

anything alien, extrinsic, foreign to itself..., but

in

itself. ..The Will is Free only when it does

wills itself alone -- wills the Will."

80

not-

This task, the

task of the French Revolution, requires that will be

universalized, not limited by the contingency and finitude
of any

i

will.

nd iv id ual

Thus there appears in history

Rousseau's notion of the general will.
For Hegel

emergence of talk of

the

a

"general will"

exemplifies the Enlightenment process of subsuming reality
into

un

iver sal

concepts.

What it means for reality to

become "notion" is that all particulars, e.g., all
individual persons or acts or desires, are
d

e- par t ic ul ar

category.

In

i

zed

and

absorbed

into

general abstract

a

the case of the reality of individual

will,

the notion of the general will is the medium of absorption.
The general

will

is

universal;

it

is

a

category accessible

76

to,

applicable for, and inclusive of

universal

subject inherently

a

.

The un iversal ization of will

involves the

harmonization of individual wills into one will.

This

means that freedom requires that there be no social

differentiation of roles, functions, ideas -...all social groups or c 1 a s se s
i n to
which the
whole is articulated are abolished; the
individual consciousness that belonged to any
such sphere and willed and fulfilled itself in
it, has put aside its limitation; its purpose is
the general purpose, its language; universal law,
its work the universal work.
.

The

.

.

primary political conflict and the significant

theoretical tension now to be reckoned with is that between
the
an

individual

and

Th e

the community.

debate, perhaps now

impasse, between the two continues today -- forms of

individualism vs. forms of collectivism.
forced, or rather has

viewing the world

in

sees only two forces

forced

itself,

into the

exaggerated oppositional
in

a

and

position of
terms.

Tt

"It divides itself

struggle:

into extremes equally abstract, into
cold universality,

Enlightenment is

a

simple, inflexible,

into the discrete,

absolute hard

rigidity and self-willed atomism of actual self-

consciousness."

82

This tension

object dichotomy that

utilitarians.

is

preoccupied

Enlightenment

Eoth persist despite

resisting object has been absorbed
individual has been absorbed

into

subset of the subject/

a

the confidence that

the

into the subject and the
the

general

will.

77

Hegel
is the

shows us why the mopping up project
fails.

Here

problem with the pursuit of absolute freedom:
How does Will assume a definite form?
For in
willing itself, it is nothing but an identical
reference to itself; but, in point of fact, it
wills something specific:
there are_ wa know,
distinct and special Duties and Rights. 3
,

Before the universal can perform a deed it must
concentrate itself into the One of individuality
and put at the head an individual selfcon sc iousness ... But thereby all other individuals
are ex cl ud ed
so that the deed would not be
deed of the act ual universal self.

.

a

.

consciousness.
Eecause any action whatsoever of an individual is guilty of

being non-general and thus arbitrary and counter

to

the

universal needs of humankind, any and every particular
action is suspect.

The result of absolute freedom is and

only can be negative:

The

terror of the guillotine, the

denial of civil liberties, the violence of revolution.
Universal will can only act, in

a

way parallel with the

Enlightenment negation of Faith, to destroy that which is
established.

When it tries to build or

affirmatively the universal will,
issue

in

action.

particular actions.

it

Action

Yet advocates of the general

note the absence of the general will;

in

the

imp l ies

particular

will cannot help but

social

"Life

still

They then locate

secret wills of evil

seeking to undermine the community.

express

finds that it can only

contains factions, strife, differences.

responsibility

to

individuals

Absolute freedom

78

becomes absolute terror, as the leaders of the general
will
seek out and destroy suspect individuals.

Enlightenment completes itself in disarray and
decomposition.

On one

side, its definition of the world

through the notion of utility threatens to convert the self
into

a

means and undercut its ideal of freedom; on the

other side, its attempt to realize

engulf the particular self
can only act to deny and

affirm.

in

an

a

pure will threatens to

abstract universal which

destroy, never to build and

Although Enlightenment, contrary to its belief,

has not eradicated Faith, it has exposed
it.

Despite these flaws,

serious flaws in

Faith has shown how neither can

Enlightenment sustain its views of knowledge, science or
freedom.

In

their attempt to fulfill their ideals,

Enlightenment and Faith require each other.
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ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND NATURAL HOLISM
Introductio n

Hegel anticipated that the dialectic of Faith and

Enlightenment would come to
realized.

Put

if,

as

we

a

close as modernity was

claim, the Hegelian solution that

was to transcend the dialectic,

failed,

and

if,

as we

the ontology of Geist,

also claim, Hegel's account of the

dilemma is accurate, we should expect to find its manifestations

in

chapter,

explore those manifestations as they occur in

I

the contemporary political

world.

this

In

the attempt to rectify the damage done to the natural

environment.

I

concentrate on the presuppositions made

about nature in alternative environmental orientations to
see whether the understandings of nature required by

contemporary versions of Faith and Enlightenment can be
sustained today.
The thesis

is

that the two paradigmatic contemporary

orientations to nature function together, each providing
insightful critique of the other, yet neither able to

transcend the critique of itself.

Moreover,

ability of each to uncover defects

in

it

is

the

the programs of the

other that helps to foster that uncritical view of each

toward

itself.
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One modern orientation to nature gives primacy
to

economic utility.

Both the (lamentable but unavoidable)

destruction of natural sites and their preservation
are
defended on this ground.
Marshes are drained and developed
in

order to increase the value of real estate and the

supply of desirable housing; retail businesses are encouraged to

form

a

mall on farm land

base of declining rural areas.

for

the sake of the tax

Yet the condemnation of

residential and commercial development is couched as well
in

terms of financial losses to the recreation or tourist

industry (rather than, for example, in terms of acknowledging the integrity of beings different from ourselves or
for places not ordered

design).

according to principles of human

This chapter explores the implications of this

view of nature as standing in reserve for human use for
conceptions of knowledge, self and reason.
There is also

a

strand in modern thinking, however,

that finds this view inadequate and

it

is

an

important

philosophical task to draw out and articulate this holistic
perspective.

There is something troubling, for example,

about stripmining even if the land is "successfully

reclaimed."

And

it

is

difficult to explain, in terms of

economic, productive, or even aesthetic utility alone, the
sense that there is something wrong about the needless

destruction of an old tree, even were the axeman the last
and

soon-to-die human.

This chapter explores the
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epistemological and experiential bases of this
sense of the
inadequacy of an instrumental orientation to nature.
These two types of orientations, those relating
to

nature primarily through utilitarian categories

(environmental management)

and

those relating primarily

through moral categories (natural holism), form the

dominant paradigms for env ironm ental i sm today.

Management, Technique and Control

From the perspective of environmental management, the

instrumental use and mastery of nature are irreducible
elements in the human relation to nature; environmental

awareness allows us to compensate for the side-effects of
this necessary orientation.

Environmental management

assumes that the environmental problem, once properly
defined as "pollution," or "overpopulation," or

"conservation," or "societal values," finds its solution

in

better human planning, organization and technical control.
In

its most

fundamental sense, technique refers to any

human contrivance designed to further human aims:

enlightened solutions to the environmental problem revolve
around the attempt to devise new techniques to mitigate

adverse technological effects on the environment.
of these techniques cut

disciplines:

tax

Examples

across professions and academic

incentives for pollution reduction, legal

.
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procedures for acknowledging environmental
rights,
engineering plans for pollution control devices,

analytic-philosophical arguments for an environmental
ethic, and bureaucratic regulations of industry.
The theme that runs throughout environmental

management is the requirement that human-made order be
imposed upon the self, upon society, upon nature:
(1)

The self is not

a

natural harmony of interests and

needs; it needs discipline that simultaneously fosters that

which is uniquely human and suppresses that which is

uncultivated and animalistic within humans.

Spiritual

insight must be replaced by scientific knowledge.
of the need

for

Because

discipline, elements of the self, its

attitudes and emotions, become targets of the techniques of
personnel departments, advertisers, the military, consumer
advocates, religious groups, environmentalists.
(2)

Society is not grounded

a

secure tradition; it

The reification that is

needs to be conventionalized.

tradition falsely insinuates

in

a

unity of individual and

collectivity, whereas convention is human contrivance

self-conscious of its non-natural, controversial and

controvertible form.

Traditions and customs must be

replaced by self-conscious norms and rational policies.

A

conventionalized social order is an entity amenable to the
application of techniques of administrative
rationali zation
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(3)

Nature is not enchanted with the echoes of

resemblances, the physical world is not intentionally and

divinely ordered;

it

needs to be humanized.

self-operating order of nature

in

by environmentally managed sites.

The

the wild must be replaced
And

the assumption is

that nature's resistance to the human arrangement of it can

general be overcome.

in

We

already form nature through our

sciences that enable domestication of plants and animals
and cultivation of soils -- in short,

"resource management."
is

a

through good

Nature, divested of superstition,

potentially useful environment where atoms, electrical

attractions/repulsions, chemical interactions, and plant
and animal biologies wait,

standing ready to be harnessed.

will here explore two versions of the attempt to

T

apply technique to environmental side- effects:

environmental economics and environmental ethics.

Our

concern is not with the details of any particular economic
ethical plan, but with the assumptions about nature

or

operative within such plans.
Tf

one were to distill

from environmental

economics

would be the intention to rationalize,

its basic aim,

it

according to

recently discovered value called environmen-

tal

a

quality, the economic system.

finally recognized but still
po

1 1

ut

i

on

.

We

will

internalize the

external social costs of
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It

is

relatively easy to see the way an instrumental

view of nature coheres with the beliefs
and practices of

environmental economics

—

use and distribution,

high material standard of living,

a

the values of efficient resource

preservation of economic freedom, etc., presuppose

a

conception of nature as lifeless materials for use.

Nature

has the ontological status of matter; this matter has an

order of statistical regularities, indifferent to human
needs but amenable, once understood through scientific

investigation, to human re-ordering.

^h

e

discussion of

environmental economics is for the purpose of introducing
this modern scientific conception of nature, the

rational- empirical conception of knowledge, and the faith
in

human reason and technique.
The discussion of environmental ethics shows how it

displays

a

more complex, subtle version of these same

conceptions.

Environmental ethics shifts the emphasis from

the efficient and

prudent use of

a

deposit of natural

resources to our responsibility for them and our right to
the continued

use of them.

Tn

its dominant mode,

it

shares

with environmental economics the motivation for the pursuit
of environmental

health,

quality:

human desires for recreation,

scientific curiosity, or wealth.

Both the economist and the ethicist carry forth the

project of artifice-making, subjecting to human organization and control that which was beyond or indifferent to
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it.

Environmental economics operates primarily
at the
level of society, rationalizing its policies,
regulations,
and

laws; environmental

ethics concentrates on the self,

examining and reshaping the beliefs and attitudes
presumed
to underlie the modern treatment of nature.
From
the

perspective of environmental ethics, human values are
available for technical manipulation and can with skill
be
altered and deployed to achieve an environmentally sound
effect
I

.

turn now to

a

fuller discussion of each of these

versions of environmental management.

Environmental Economics

The environmental problem is,

economics,

a

for environmental

matter of inadequate pollution control.

Until

recently, the primary tool for pollution control was

government regulation.

public agency was made

A

responsible for determining how much of each pollutant
could be safely discharged into the air, land, or water,
and

for monitoring

appropriate fines.
the maximum

each pollution source and
In

imposing

determining the "threshold values,"

allowable level of discharges, the agency was

to take into account the public health,

the best

practicable technology for each industry, and the financial
burden

a

firm could bear.

1

.

Economists were quick to recognize that this
approach
contained obstacles to efficiency and economic
freedom:
It

(1)

How could

a

required an inordinate demand on bureaucracy.
public agency determine threshold values for

every pollutant and for every firm?

Because fines were

minimal or, more often, never imposed, there was little

financial incentive for pollution reduction.

The

regulation approach reauired either constant inspection by
agencies notoriously understaffed, or
by any experience, that the social

a

faith, unjustified

conscience of polluters

would compel them to act in the public interest.
(2)

It

was highly susceptible to corruption.

Regulatory agencies tended to be responsive to the
industries they were designed to monitor.
(3)

It

was legally complicated.

It

was difficult to

determine the "best available technology" or
cost."
in

1

eg al

(4)

a

"reasonable

Pollution could continue while cases were ensnared
contest
It

focused only on the output of factories and

did nothing to encourage recycling,

internal changes in the

production process, or the restructuring of production or

consumption priorities.

Moreover, even if

a

polluting firm

compiled with the letter of the law, it had no incentive to

reduce pollution further.
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Its

(5)

interventionist logic raised the spector of

a

socialism that suppressed free enterprise and

entreprenur i

al

initiative.

Environmental economics then invested its hopes

in

market incentives for production reduction, for the market
was the best known way to preserve freedom and
efficiency.
A

price,

in

the form of

tax, could be put on pollution,

a

obviating the need to regulate the amount of pollution
discharge.

The price of

true cost to society,

a

product would then reflect the

for unlike

labor, supplies or

overhead, air, water and land had for too long been treated
if they were

as

free.

There was, therefore, no economic

incentive to minimize damage to them or depletion of them.
This market approach, which internalized the externalities
of pollution, gave the polluting firm freedom to choose its
own

pollution, reduction procedures.

The key, of course,

was to set the tax higher than the cost of any
po

11

ut

i

on- r ed uc

tion

strategy

a

firm may devise.

Advocates of the market incentives approach claim that
another advantage is its reliance on the self-interest of

polluters.

It

assumes no special good will on their part,

but only that producers seek to reduce costs and

profits.

increase

The beauty of the incentives approach is that the

result is socially desirable but the motivation is

individual gain.

Changes in social behavior can be

accomplished by modifying the incentives that induce people
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to

act rather than by mandating or prohibiting
certain

acts

.

Put while advocates of putting

a

price on pollution

are more successful than the regulators approach in

preserving economic freedom (where freedom means the

greatest possible choice options), their scheme too
requires considerable government intervention.

public

A

agency still must measure the output of pollution from each
source in order to set

a

fee which approximates the

marginal social cost of pollution.
A

related attempt to preserve the market by

closing/internalizing its loopholes/externalities was the
concept of amenity rights.

Within the legal system that

ensures the preconditions of free enterprise, industry must

compensate owners of private property for damage resulting
from their activities,
for damage to peace and

privacy.

If these

quiet, clean air and water, or

amenities were given legal standing,

then damage to them would have to be considered

production decisions.
losing

a

provision

yet there exists no legal

in

There would then be an incentive --

court case or facing

a

jail

sentence -- either to

compensate victims or to reduce damage

in

the first

place

through the manufacture of quieter, cleaner, less

ecologically intrusive products.
What are some of the themes common to these three --

regulation, tax incentive and amenity rights -- attempts?
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First, the orientation to nature is politicized:

pollution becomes an issue of public policy.
calls for

a

rational plan,

Pollution

plan that requires increasing

a

our understanding of natural

systems through basic

research, research that can facilitate prediction of
natural responses to human intervention, prediction that
turn can allow control.

All

in

environmental economic

perspectives agree that nature cannot simply be left alone:
the good life is tied to continued increases in production
and

consumption.

Put

just as the pollution problem is

human-made, it can be solved through human ingenuity.
There is, however, some evidence of dissension in the
ranks of the technophiles

The problems are complex and

.

require an interdisciplinary effort, they say.

The once

con fident field of economics begins to fear that its focus
on quantitative scarcity

environmental protection:

inadequate to the task of

is

economic growth as now measured

may not be the most fruitful

focus.

Fconomic techniques

must be supplemented with political ones, and concern with

"quality of life" and the political criteria used for
choosing among resource-use strategies grows.

"The

difficult questions now are not whether physical and
economic problems can be solved, but which problems to
solve and how to solve them."

2

Despite these stirrings,

the internal debates of environmental

economists and polic;

scientists continue to center around the method of control

.

:
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of nature and its human polluters,

arguing over the merits

of regulation-driven control,
market-incentive-driven, and

legal-incentive- driven
Second, there is

a

general faith in human contrivance,

even though the specific remedial techniques are as yet

unspecified
Tf private firms were adequately
motivated to modify their production
processes so as to generate less
pollution, there is every reason to
believe that technology could be
harnessed, in as yet unknown ways, to
diminish rather than to increase

poll ut ion

.

Ignorance is one of the most potent
obstacles to solving our ecological
problems, an ignorance which only
science on dispel.
Here the environmental managers mirror the Enlightenment
faith in

a

self-monitoring, self-correcting reason.

This

reason operates at peak efficiency if carried out at the
level of the reflective individual and when uninhibited by
the demands of tradition,

religion, or collective action.

However, environmental management's faith in the autonomy
of reason conflicts with the detailed, extensive regulation

by

a

central authority required by each of their schemes.
Third, the faith in reason and technique is connected

to

a

conception of nature as

latent potentialities.

a

deposit of resources with

There are

a

multitude of
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potentialities within nature, but each is realized only

in

collaboration with science and technology.
Half a century ago the air was for
breathing and burning; now it is also a
natural resource of the chemical
industry.
Two decades ago Vermont
granite was only building and tombstone
material; now it is a potential fuel,
each ton of which has a usable content
(uranium) equal to 150 tons of coal.
Nature is matter and when we apply technology we treat it
in

the manner appropriate to the type of being it has.

No

wrong is done to nature when it is used, rather we are

perfecting it, allowing

it

utility for human beings.)

to realize

its essence (i.e.,

The relationship of use is

mutually beneficial, not merely exploitive.

Here we see an

endorsement of the Enlightenment understanding of finite
reality as having

a

dual nature:

It

is

what it is only

insofar as it is instrumental or for something else; its
end

is

to be

a

means.

There are different versions of this conception of

nature as

a

resource in need of technological fulfillment.

The three perspectives we have explored

briefly generally

understand nature to be plastic, easily moldable.
Regardless of whether nature is initially unordered or is
ordered in ways oblivious to human need, it offers little

resistance to the imposition of form upon it.

The success

of modern technology is evidence of this.

Few components of the earth's crust,
including farm land, are so specific as
to defy economic replacement, or so
resistant to technological advance as to

1

on

be incapable of eventually yielding

extractive products at constant or
declining cost.

Infatuated with technological power, some environmental

economists claim that scarcity of natural resources,
defined as diminishing returns for extractive industries,

simply may never occur, for it is now possible to "escape
the quantitative constraints imposed by the character of
the earth's crust." 7

Environmental Ethics

The environmental

ethics version of environmental

management sees the natural constraints on human action as
more serious.

There are limits to the shape nature can be

forced to assume, limits that no technological advance can

overcome without dangerous consequences.

technique

still the preferred method, but this version uses

is

a

vocabulary of responsibility rather than economic
efficiency.

In

if natural

this view,

limits are ignored or

overridden by the sheer magnitude or force of technology,
we are no longer fulfilling our duty to

perfect nature.

[T]o perfect nature is to humanise it, to make it
more useful for men's purposes, more intelligible
to their reason, more beaut i ful ... Put like gogd
r e s pec t their material.'
artists, men s ho u Id
.

.

.

This combination of transformation, use, and respect

results in

a

relation to nature of mastery, but

a

mastery

101

which disciplines and enhances rather than
enslaves and

destroys.
a

Nature needs to be liberated

tantrum-prone child,

itself.

Like

can be freed from the torment of

it

chaos or imperfect control

external constraints.

from

through the imposition of

Nature realizes itself through our

transformation of it and

we

realize our highest potential

through this process as well.
[Mean's great memorials -- his science, his
philosophy, his technology, his architecture, his
countryside -- are al 1
f o un d ed q u po n his attempt
to understand and subdue nature.
.

.

.

Not only must humans use, transform,

the sake of survival and

and

subdue nature for

for the establishment of

stable

a

society, they ought to, for "it is only they who can

create

.

"

This shift in emphasis from the efficient and prudent
use of natural resources to our responsibility for them and
our

right to the continued use of them is exemplified

the work of Christopher

Stone.

Jn

Should Trees Hav

in

e

Stand ing? he proposes that we grant rights to natural

objects themselves.

We will

see how Stone continues to

assume the primacy of human needs even though his overt aim
is

accord natural objects

to

hum an s

a

status independent of

.

Stone advocates that natural objects be recognized as
jural entities competent to press for damages for injury to

themselves.

Natural

objects cannot speak, but one can

102

handle this "as one does the problems of legal
incompetents

—

human beings who have become vegetable.

..

[S]oraeone is

designated by the court with the authority to manage the

incompetent's affairs."
the Sierra

11

Thus,

a

human guardian, such as

Club, could apply to be the representative of

natural objects.

Stone's view differs from the current

legal approach whereby natural objects are treated as

property, property protected for the sake of its individual

owner

—

damages are liable only at the owner's behest and

only for demonstrable injury to the owner.

The granting of

rights to the objects themselves would facilitate the

restriction of industrial, commercial, or recreational
actions that threaten remote public lands (whose owner is
the diffuse and

fragmented "public")

or

particular

ecosystems (whose owners might include "the future
inhabitants of the Southwest").

The guardian could be

viewed as the voice "of unborn generations... of the

otherwise unrepresented, but distantly injured,

contemporary humans."
Stone's attempt to legally acknowledge injury to

natural objects requires

a

method

for

assessing damages.

Here Stone participates in the project of incorporating
into the

1

eg

a

1- eco n om

i

c

system that which should be

included by the system's own logic, but has not been.
»'[T]he river
is

polluter's actions are costless, so far as he

concerned -- except insofar as the legal system can

1

somehow force him to internalize them."

13

03

This

internalization requires an assessment of the social
costs
of environmental degradation, costs that then could

constitute damage claims
for

in

court of law.

a

Put in order

river to receive damages, its guardian must provide

a

monetary value for the injury.

a

Stone admits the

difficulties in estimating these often intangible costs,
but nevertheless

pursues the attempt, for society is better
14

off with rude estimates than with none at all.

Estimates

could be based upon losses to the fishing or vacation

industry requiring the unpolluted site, or upon the costs
to

the environment per

se

,

i.e., the cost of returning the

degraded area or object to approximately its original
state

.

This brief summary of Stone's position enables us to

discern the ways in which his conception of nature is
lodged with the

h

urn

an-

c

en t e

r

ed

framework of

Fn

1

ightenment

and thus undermines his commitment to accord natural

objects

a

status independent of humans.

First, the environmental management theme that the

perfection of nature reauires our transformation of it is

reasserted by Stone as the view that nature ought to be
conceived on the model of deficient humanity.

1

5

Like the

status of the insane or mentally handicapped (human objects

deemed legally incompetent), the status of natural objects
depends upon an external standard -- the characteristics of

1

normal human beings.
to the

on

Natural objects are worthy of respect

extent that their physical or psychological

structures resemble those of normal humans.

Th

i s

vision of

nature as inferior humanity both reflects and helps to

constitute what much of nature has
become:

in

the modern

age

the domesticated product of human technique.

Evidence of this is the breeding of animals and plants more
and more according

to

marketing, packaging, and

distribution imperatives, as well as the emergence of
animal rights groups protesting this.
second way in which Stone privileges humans is

A

through the conventionalization of rights.

Drawing upon

the Enlightenment insight about the social construction of

reality, rights and the status they endow are conceived as
"legal conventions acting in support of some status quo."

1

^

This view departs from both the classical liberal doctrine
of rights as having an inalienable attachment to their

bearers and the theological position that value has

(human)
a

divine source only.

dispenses value as
deems fit.

it

According to Stone, the modern self
"grants" rights to those objects it

Although the granting of rights must to some

degree reflect

a

prior cultural valuation of the affected

group, its primary function is to create that higher, more

independent status.
its rights,

we cannot

the use of 'us'
t

ime

"
.

1

7

"[U]ntil the rightless thing receives
see

it

-- those who

as

anything but

are holding

a

thing for

rights at the

105

Because rights are conventional and because

conventions are

" h

y po s t a t

i

za t

i

on s

[that]

always have

a

pragmatic quality to them/' 18 the extension of rights to

non-human nature is justifiable in terms of its utility:
It

protect us from the adverse environmental impact of

can

industrial society.
only

Besides, says Stone, his proposal is

logical extension of the Western moral tradition

a

that has progressively included children,

prisoners,

aliens, women, Blacks, and the insane into the realm of

moral consideration.

In

conclusion, when Stone says "the

rightlessness of the natural environment can and should
change,"

1

9

we

now see that he means (1) all rights are

conventions and thus "can" be changed, and

(2)

a

change in

the status of the environment would be better for us at

this stage in industrial society and thus "should" be
pur sued

.

Stone's argument that "the strongest case can he m?de
from the perspective of human advantage for conferring

rights on the environment,"

20

admittedly employs

notion of what counts as advantageous to humans.

a

broad
To

elevate the legal standing of nature through righthood can
improve not only our material standard of living, but, by

enlarging our empathy and our sense of

i

n t e rd e

nature, also can make us "far better humans.

pe nd e nc

y

with

,.21

Nevertheless, despite this broadened notion of utility,
despite references to the "environment per se," and despite

1

06

the attempt to differentiate himself from purely

anthropocentric perspectives, Stone's approach presupposes
a

view of nature as instrumental

—

as

potentially

malleable and value-dependent upon humans.
This is not to say that nature exists only to serve

humans -- that would imply that nature has an inherent

purpose and scientific investigation has uncovered too many
random events, too many natural processes that fly in the
face of human desires and aims to substantiate that claim.

Rather, Stone's view implies that since nature cannot be

understood as sacred or enchanted, there is nothing immor a 1
about using it to our advantage.

The resistance of nature

to de- legitimize mastery, but

to mastery is not sufficient"

means only that we must anticipate practical or technical

obstacles in order to overcome them

in

the future.

Stone's

opposition to the view that natural objects are "for man to
22
is
conquer and master and use"

ontological violence

is

done,

a

pragmatic one:

No

i.e., no violence to the

essence of what the thing is, when natural objects are

conquered, mastered, or used.
I

note here that because Stone had to conventionalize

rights in order to extend them to nature, there always
exists the possibility of reversing or revoking these mere

conventions, especially when other human needs outweigh the
desire to preserve nature.

possibility implicit

in

Stone does not acknowledge this

his position, but it accounts for

s

1

07

the fact that he is unable to maintain his
distinction

between

natural object that is

a

us" and one that

is

a

"thing for the use of

"thing with rights."

a

The distinction

collapses because no beings except humans can have
intrinsic value within
(and

a

conventionalized view of rights

even this standing of humans is partly grounded

convention,

a

in

convention self-bestowed because necessary to

any further social construction).

Stone leaves himself, then with two on t o 1 og

alternatives for no n- humans:
construed

i

c a 1- s t a t u

instrumen t al value na rrowly

where natural objects are used indiscriminately

,

and without regard

instrumental

for consequences;

v a lu e,

and enli ghtened

where natural objects are used with

awareness of the ecological, economic, or recreational
needs of living humans or their descendants.

Other

environmental ethicists distinguish among types of
use-value while holding to the fundamental instrumentality
One such distinction is between instrumental

of nature.

inherent value.

value and

the concrete uses of

the more subtle worth

"Instrumental value" includes

thing and "inherent value" refers to

a

a

thing has through its ability to

inspire, fascinate, spiritually heal, or aesthetically

please us

23
.

The conclusion about the essential

instrumentality of

nature to which Stone and all environmental ethicists are
led

is

bound up with the attempt to discern the type of

,

1

"value" that can properly be ascribed to
nature.

08

What are

the methods through which the ethicist
determines "value"?

environmental ethic requires

An

they say,

and

a

t

heory of value,

this requires the elaboration of criteria

that establish something as worthy of moral consideration.
The criteria range from those most tightly linked to
human

being (rational agency, consciousness, cognition, the

ability to have interests) to those associated with

animateness (sentience, self-determination) and finally to
those which could include inanimate things

having

"good of one's own").

a

(

benef icience

After the fact of some

value is established, environmental ethicists must decide
the order of this value,

and

they generally agree that

value can be either instrumental or intrinsic.
sig nificance

of moral

,

where the value of

a

(The issue

particular

thing must be weighed against that of another, depends in
part upon this prior establishment of the type of value

each thing has
A

.

)

review of these ethical discussions of nature shows

them to be quite intricate, reauiring finer and finer

distinctions:
qualify
so,

a

Ts

sentience necessary (or sufficient?) to

thing for moral consideration? they ask.

And

does that imply that pleasure has intrinsic value?

does that imply that individual sentient members of

a

species are of more value than the species itself?

Does

if

And

interest -bearing mean the capacity for actual or potential

c

r

1

interest?
to having
is

09

Are interests linked to consciousness
or simply

"good of one's own"?

a

will argue that there

I

something askew in these discussions of
nature caught

within the frame of "value."

The distinctions made

collapse or explain very little:

The project as

whole

a

seems to be sustained by the very activity of tangling
and

untangling the fine hairs created by each differentiating
argument

.

Why?

One reason is that the

distinction
nat ur

e

A

•

is

H

i

n s t r urn

faulty in the context of

talk of "value"

en t al

a

/ intr i n s i

philosophy of

presupposes the centrality of

humans; the subject always determines the "value" of an
object.

In

fact,

object is that which requires

an

subjectivity as its foundation.

Therefore, within this

frame of value, the category of "intrinsic value" can have
no

if "intrinsic"

place,

is meant

to capture our

sense of

the recalcitrance of nature or the existence of that

element of nature awesome because independent of us.
yet

this is precisely the sense in which the environmental

ethicist intends the term:
exists]
i

And

nterest

independ entl
.

.

.

on the

y

Intrinsic value is "value [that

of any awareness or

a

ppr ec

part of any conscious being."

concept of intrinsic value is

a

i

at i on

.

.

.

o

The

category mistake except

when applied to the human self as

a

subject.

cases, it is analogous to an "accidental

In

the other

intention":

E"

a ch

term is inimical to the one it is supposed to qualify, and

1

the conceptual incompatibility expresses

incongruity in the theory.

a

1

0

deeper

The subjectivism of

environmental management talk of "value," as well

as

its

overall aim to impose form on nature, are the
residues of

Enlightenment's preoccupation with human will as it
attaches to reason in the service of freedom.
Robin At t field, in The Ethics of Environmental

Concern

,

defends the concept of "intrinsic value" and its

use in expressing the impossibility of reducing natural

beings to instrumentalities:
however instrumentalist

in

"FA]ny theory of value,

tenor, must recognize intrinsic

value somewhere, or there is nothing which gives anything
of value

its point."

25

This is not, however,

defense of

a

intrinsic value for nonhumans, but rather supports the case
that

h urn a n

sub jecti v ity is the genesis of value.

Tt

is

no

surprise that we conclude from Stone that the only "value"
of natural

objects is instrumental; all

deeply enough,

value, when probed

finds "its point" in human aims, needs, or

ideals.

Despite these philosophical difficulties,

environmental ethics
of nature.

Why?

drawn to discussion of the "value"

Because they are caught within an

Enlightenment frame:
the self and

is

The discourse of "value"

privileges

supports an instrumental view of nature

because it sees the alternative as un s u p por t ab 1 e in the
face of modern science and technology.

Tf

humans cannot

1

1

assign value to what is essentially
say,

a

1

material nature, they

then human worth must be dependent upon biological

contribution to nature; if nature is not made up of usable
objects, then it must have subjectivity and
nature is not

a

a

teleology; if

means then it must be an end-in-itself; if

humans do not investigate nature according to

a

rational,

scientific model, then the orientation to nature must be
irrational, primitive, and mystical.

The

ironmen tal Manage ment

En v

C ritiq u e

of

Nat ura l

H olism

This method of self- justification through contrast to
an

implausible alternative presented as the only

alternative

is

characteristic of environmental management.

Exemplifying the dualistic character of Fnl ightenment
thought, it defines all alternatives as its stark opposite
and thus presents them in

hegemony.

aim

presupposes its own

Once this implicit move is accepted, the case

against the alternative
To

way that

a

at

is

already made:
propositions,

the formulation of rational

theories, and policies

is

to

relegate utterances based upon

other standards to the realm of irrationality and
and
abnormality; to strive for the clean, odorless

glamorous life of modernity is to reauire
c

a

life lived

in

primitive; to deploy
lose contact with nature to be deemed

science that aims

to

uncover in full the mechanism of

1

12

nature is to classify knowledge that
anticipates some

irreducible opacity

in

nature as mystical.

For

example, an

extreme version of environmental management fears
that
contact with "raw" nature may result in

imagination

..

.the

a

"highly strained

source of fanatical religious and

superstitious terrors."
Although management thought has restricted knowledge
to

a

set of conceptions and their mirror

also enabled

images, it has

knowledge through its insistence on precise

distinctions such as that between what is given (nature),
what is

a

human creation (society), and what wills and

creates (humanity).

This is an achievement because it is

a

prerequisite for the painstaking civilizing process of
rescuing humans from submersion in the realm of necessity.
We are increasingly self-determining beings; nature is

a

background environment which, although not static, does not
move

in

any obviously teleological way.

reason point in the same direction:
laws not designed

for us or by us and

Both science and

Nature is governed by
not functioning

necessarily to our own advantage.
Only if men see themselves ... f or what they are,
quite alone with no one to help them except their
fellow-men, products of natural processes...
wholly indifferent to their survival, will they
face their ecological problems in their full
implications
.

The natural

holists, according to environmental

management, do not see humans for what they are,

for

they

1

1

?

cannot bear to accept the disappearance of telos
from
nature.

Instead, they still seek in nature principles
that

could guide an ethical or social order and signs
that could
reveal

the human essence or the meaning of life.

While

this quest for meaning is an enchanting idea, compatible
with the world of Robust Faith,

it

radically incongruent

is

with modern institutions, science, roles and norms.

Conceptions of nature not grounded in human "value" are
unable to find embodiment

engendering modern forms.

in

any of the mutually

Thus estranged

from our world,

holism routinely becomes abstract, able to exist only

in

philosophical constructs; or nostalgic, able to exist only
as

unattainable, albeit inspiring visions.
Fn

v

ironm ental management places its opponents within

frame that makes them esay to dismiss,

yet

it

a

never

actually dispenses with them; quite to the contrary, it

continually revivifies what by its own account ought to be
a

decaying and anachronistic body.

It

does this because,

like the parasite that saves the vital organs of its host
until

last

in

order to prolong its feast, environmental

management requires its opponents but
be constituted

First,

it

in

a

it

particular way.

requires them as content for its

rationalizing critique:

environmental management need?

less-than-rationalistic accounts to serve
material

in

requires them to

need

of clarification.

as

the messy raw

Second, the credibility

c

1

1

1)

of its own

affirmations depends upon its audience accepting
the management construal of the alternative
position.
For

without this acceptance, the defects within
environmental

management would become more apparent, encouraging movement
toward the opponent and the weakening of its own
hegemony.

Environmental management has an ambivalent stance of
rejection and engagement with non-instrumental views of
nature.

claims to fear as confused and regressive these

It

views, but the characterization of them that exaggerates
the confusion and the regressive potentialities suggests
that what

views,
foil

for

for

really fears

it

it

is

the disappearance of such

darkly recognizes its dependence on them as

a

its own weaknesses.

Through our examination of nature according to

environmental management, we have seen how Enlightenment
finds contemporary expression.

It

appears now that

environmental management deploys several different but
related conceptions of nature.

We can categorize these

views according to the degree and kind of order ascribed to

nature

:

(

1

)

Chaotic Disorder

.

Nature has little or no

inherent organization and is chaotic, wild and dangerous in
its pristine

state.

No

matter what the resistance or

difficulty, we have little choice but to master and
transform nature.
moral law,

in

Nature, far from being in harmony with

conflict with it.

We saw how Chaot

i
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D isorder

as

a

where nature is feared as the beast within us and

,

threat to civilization, is tied to the way

environmental management constitutes its required double.
(

2

)

PI ast ic

Pi

sorder

.

Nature has little or no

inherent organization and is benign and neutral,

a

messy

conglomerate of functions, forms and processes, all passive
with regard to human attempts to organize them.

assumption of
in

Pl

ast ic

The

Disorder in nature found expression

the belief that nature is in need of technological

fulfillment.

In

cases

(1)

or

(2),

whether nature is

chaotic and something to be feared or benign and amenable
to the

imposition of order upon it, there is nothing

morally wrong with widescale altering of it.
(3)

Indif ferent Order

.

Nature has some sort of

significant order and that order is indifferent to humans,
according to priorities not necessarily

that is, ordered

compatible with human rationality, psychology, sensibility
or

perception.

Advocates of this view differ according to

the degree nature is believed to resist re- ordering
The continuum ranges from nature as highly

attempts.

resistant to nature as easily overpowered.

Ve saw,

for

example, how Ind iff ere nt _Or_d er is tied to the rejection of
a

teleological view of nature as radically incongruent with
Thus,

modernity.

environmental management can come to the

conclusion that mastery
humans to
them.

a

is

the

appropriate response of

world not designed to coincide neatly with

116

There exists, however, anoth er conception
of nature
and order, one that finds little
expression through

environmental management:
(4)

Natural Hol ism.

Nature has some sort of

significant order of its own and this order harmonizes
with
humans'

needs.

Advocates of thi

s

view see little call for

aggressive restructuring of nature and instead seek to
discover and comprehend natural laws
behavior and society to them

in

ord er to mold human

Fxtreme versions of this

.

harmonious holism see nature as sacred, with an inviolate
order

.

We have already caught

glimpse of natural holism as

a

environmental management characterizes it; soon we will
allow it to speak for itself through the works of Frazim
Kohak and John Compton

.

But

first, we will explore an

orientation to nature intermediate between environmental

management and natural holism, the science of ecology,
order to illustrate the way Fn

interpenetrate

i

ghtenm ent and Faith

.

Intersect ion of Fnv i ronmental Management and Natur al

The
Hoi

1

in

i

s

m

Modern science must assume that nature
some degree,

for

science "works"

prediction of natural

—

is

ordered to

the description and

regularities has technological

117

success.

But

this order is understood as imperfect,

containing inex pi icables and irregularities.
posits not

a

Science

harmonious fit between plants and animals or

between human needs and the natural provision for them, but
recurring natural patterns with some degree of internal

coherence

.

Evolutionary theory, for example, repudiates
strictly teleological interpretation of nature.
a

is

a

Nature has

general tendency toward adaptation for survival, but it
also full of instances of what can only be called

evolutionary dead ends, malad aptations or mistakes.
Despite attempts by natural holists to use evolutionary

theory as evidence of telos
say,

nature (the theory, they

in

assumes "universal kinship and common bonds of

function, experience and value among organisms"'),

2Q

science

insists that evolution does not imply the kind of telos
that offers the assurance that the world is

a

purposive

order or even that its natural elements tend toward

a

state

of harmonious equilibrium.

theories within physics confirm the view

The latest

that nature is

a

field of chance and statistical

regularities rather than

a

composite of stable, rationally

ordered substances.
[W]ith the advent of quantum theory and the
pr esen t theory implies
indeterminacy r el at ions
that objectively, and in fact, material particles
of very small dimensions do not possess certain
combinations of these precise values
simultaneously. .. [Tlheir individual behavior is
not theoretically determinate...
.

.

.

1

1

8

[Elntities exist and are definable primarily by
virtue of interrelationships with other
entities
rather than by virtue of any supposed substanceessences of their own.
Their fundamental
properties age not so much inherent as
derivative.
The irregularities in the order of nature, the
dead

ends of evolution, and the indeterminacy of subatomic

particles that calls the materiality of matter into
question, are interpreted from an Enlightenment perspective
as

evidence that the world is not imbued with telos.
From

a

Faith perspective, however, these discoveries

are interpreted as
the

Enlightenment science's own admission of

incompleteness of its knowledge and the irreducible

element of mystery

in

its theories.

For

Faith, the

regu aritie s of evolutionary development are signs of
l

a

designed universe and the irr egularities of evolutionary

development and subatomic particle/waves are signs of the

discrepancy between finite human science and divine
omniscience.

Fnl ightenment ordinarily assumes the

possibility of certain and complete knowledge, says Faith,
but here finds itself asserting indeterminacy,

incompleteness and mystery as characteristics both of the
world and of the knowledge of it available to us

—

and

these latter assertions have affinities with those of
Faith

.

We can

pursue this claim that environmental

management

intersects with natural holism by examining the science of

1

eCOl °gy

In

-

1

9

general, the environmental manager's adherence

to the essential

instrumentality of nature involves some

kind of atomistic conception of nature, for its
assumption

that particular natural elements can be manipulated

is

without so disrupting other elements that the net result is
a

negative benefit to humans.

The science of ecology has

called the hegemony of this atomism into question.

Those

environmental economists who worried about the instrumental
view of nature edged, as we have seen, toward the

recognition that nature is

a

system of interconnected

parts, an organic whole.
The science of ecology attempts to

investigate,

predict and control nature through uncovering the
functional
such as

a

i n

t

er d

e

pe nd en c

watershed area,

i

es
a

of members of an ecosystem

forest,

a

prairie.

It

emphasizes properties whole systems rather than its parts.
"The

2_^liL§.

°f the ecosystem. ..means. ..that

greater than the sum of its parts, that
is

'more than'

oxygen ."^
a

a

a

whole is

molecule of water

the simple addition of hydrogen and

The ecology within

environmental management has

certain affinity with Faith's holism.
Put while the systems approach of ecology overlaps

with the holism of Faith,

it

does not coincide with it.

Faith seeks to articulate the interde pendencies of all

parts of the world, where "world" means the interplay of

psychological, social and natural worlds.

There are no
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truly autonomous entities but only relative
degrees of

autonomy of function or form.

Faith's holism views the

world through an understanding of relations, of
how all

"internal" workings of an entity, be it
an

idea,

in

a

a

self,

social

a

problem or

a

a

plant, an animal,

norm, are involved

web of relations with other entities too numerous to

mention, much less investigate exhaustively.
There are at least three ways in which the science of

ecology parts company with Faith's holism.
First, while

sector within environmental management

a

accedes to the ecological assumption that nature is

a

system of functionally interdependent parts, this sector
resists conceiving humans as simply another one of those
parts.

The environmental manager finds it difficult to

acknowledge the interd epend enc

y

of all

living and

non-living things without immediately following the

acknowledgement with
that web of

i

nterd e

a

pe nd

disclaimer distancing bumans from
e

nc y

The uniqueness of

.

a

human

"lies. ..in the special character of his relations with

other systems. ..[i.e., his]

ability to transform them."-

The preservation of the sanctity of humanity and of the

uniqueness of each particular individual requires the
rejection of what one environmental
holism, the view of nature as

a

manager called mystical

metaphysical whole within

which all differences are converted

into differences in
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degree.

A

holism)

is

harmonious holism (but not
seen as ecological

systems theory

a

fascism.

Second, when the science of ecology says that the

whole is more than the sum of its parts, the "more than"
does not include that dimension of life that evades

empirical

identification.

While holist when compared to

chemistry or to the traditional biology of classification
and dissection,
so,

to

ecology

is

still tied,

if more

the dominant scientific paradigm.

ambivalently

Mature is an

ecosystem filled with complex and interconnected parts but
the parts are essentially physical

"Kinship" among parts is purely
the kinship of

need

for

food,

shared

a

the

rv

i

v a

1

- f u nc t

i

on

a

1

evolutionary history or of

comfortable when the world

find

s u

shelter and air.

material reality.

and mechanical.

it

;

it

a

shared

is

Ecology is most

engages is the world of

One of Faith's central concerns is to

appropriate way to express the intimate relation

between reality and those aspects of existence inadequately
described as material
intent ionality,

God)

(spiritually, consciousness,

.

Third, both the enthusiasm and explanatory power of
the science of ecology dwindle the closer it approaches

thoroughly humanized environments like suburban

neighborhoods, city blocks or industrial
can best account

for

parks.

Ecology

humans and their relationship to

nature when humans account for

a

tiny percentage of the

1

population of the biotic community under study.
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Ecology is

inadequate, for example, for understanding
the implications
of human embodiment or an orientation to
nature.
What it
means for humans to be a part of nature in
light of the
fact that they are not exhausted by their physical

form and

what is the connection between the structure of
human

perception and the natural world are questions beyond the
ken of ecology.

Humans are related to nature from the

perspective of ecology, but primarily in their role as
external manipulators of it.

Human actions affect natural

disruptions; but the science of ecology is unable to
elucidate ways
actions

in

which natural structures enable human

.

Through the examples of evolutionary theory, quantum
physics, and the science of ecology, we see ways in which

Enlightenment draws nearer to holistic Faith.
it

is

Even though

primarily the theologians of Faith who dwell upon the

parallels between scientific and religious orientations to
the world (while science continues to define itself as

militantly secular), and even though
already committed to
on the right

a

it

is

often those

harmonious holism who see ecology as

track but deficient (while ecologists are

quite content with systems theory), there do seem to be

many points of contact between Enlightenment and Faith.
But it may be too strong

to call

them affinities, which

connote an untroubled attraction -- evolutionary theory,

.

.
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quantum physics, and ecology are at the
intersection of
Faith and Enlightenment and they partake of the
ambivalency
which accompanies such

i

n

term ed ac y
i

Although dichotomies are most operative within

environmental management,

a

certain dualism is constitutive

of the holist-management relationship itself.
it

means to say that there exists

a

Part of what

Faith-Enlightenment

dialectic is to affirm the mutually engendering nature of
the two modes of understanding -- elements of each mode

migrate into the other and mingle with elements initially
foreign to them.

Thus, natural holism harbors

a

secret

respect for the precise method of science and environmental

management finds itself unable to ignore the questions of
ethics

.

We

will

soon see how natural holism too defines its

opponent narrowly through

a

simple contrast to its own

favorably interpreted views.

Yet it tries to avoid

proceeding through dichotomies

understandings.

It

either/or categories

developing its internal

struggles, for example, to resist
in

order to embrace the organic model

of knowledge reminiscent of

Faith and

in

p

i

c t ur e- t

ho ug ht

s

Enlightenment continually draw near only to

diverge once again.

They draw near because each bumps into

its own limits as it pursues its

project.

They diverge as

they respond to these limits differently and give different

weighting to similar considerations; each is governed by

a

12M

different project it thinks susceptible to fulfillment.
For Enlightenment the project is the precise
articulation

of knowledge about the world;

for

Faith the project is to

show how the world cannot be described truly in

Enlightenment's precise terms.

Thus, the "same"

phenomenon, e.g., the social costs not captured

in

product

prices or the rights of natural objects not included

in

the

legal system, are weighted differently by environmental

managers and by the natural holists.

For environmental

managers, they are externalities to its technological
schemes to control pollution, side-effects of

a

neutral

attempt to improve the natural environment; for holists
they are flaws endemic to the attempt to manage nature.
Social costs and the integrity of natural objects, from

within

view of the organic connection between the

a

physical, social, moral, political and economic worlds, are
not contingent externalities but central and necessary

concerns

.

Natural

Holism Sp e aks for

Tt s

For the holist, nature is not merely

a

elf

deposit of

resources for use, although we do draw moral and physical

sustenance from it.
systems)
web.

and

Nature (animal, plant and inorganic

humans are conceived as

The task of organized

a

mutually engenderi

science should not be the
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mastery of nature but the development of knowledges
that
facilitate

a

minimum of human disturbance to natural

functions, processes or forms.

Environmental management seeks mastery and control of
nature, albeit

mastery that avoids actions upon nature

a

harmful to long-term human interests; holism seeks

accomodation with nature.
nature,
to

for

The aim

is

not to rationalize

already possesses its own rationality and is

it

be respected

for

its beautifully complex

design.

Holism criticizes environmental management for naive
faith in science:

No

amount of technique can reverse our

environmentally destructive path.
in

An

orientation to nature

terms of use-value, despite any attempt to mitigate the

most dangerous or distasteful side-effects, must result in

environmental crisis.
has pernicious mor

a

Moreover, such an approach to nature

1- po 1

i t i c

a1

Humans,

consequences.

through their embodiment, are natural too, and

a

utilitarian orientation to nature fosters the instrumental
use of humans

—

through genetic and social

engineering,

manipulation of public opinion, and bureaucratic treatment
of clients.

For holism, the tyranny of instrumental

rationality, an often lamented hallmark of modern life,
must be fought at the level of our orientation to nature if
it

is

to be

We

fought at all.

explore now two natural ho lists:

The Fmbers and the

5

Erazim Kot>ak in

tars and John Compton in "Re-inventing
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the Philosophy of Nature"

Nature."

and

"Science and God's Action

in

What makes them both representatives of Faith is

their focus on experiential contact with nature
and on the
implications this direct experience carries for an

appreciation of holism.

For Kohak, the nature to be

experienced is the great outdoors, where

a

simple life in

pursuit of basic needs teaches us about the moral order of
nature.

For

Compton

,

the natural site of interest is the

human body, where one investigates the structures of

perception and cognition in order to uncover the primordial
belong ingness of embodied selves to the natural
An

world.

exploration of these modern representatives tells

us that Faith has once again changed

its locus.

Robust

Faith spoke in terms of the wonder of the world and the

darkness of knowledge and drew these insights from within
an

enchanted natural world

.

The Faith facing the

eighteenth century Fnl ightenment attack found the context
for

spirituality and pic tur

supe

r

e- tho ught

sen suo us realm of salvation

and

knowledge

in

the

human ensoulment.

Contemporary Faith's sense that the world is

in

harmony

with the true human self and that the relations between

selves and things must be understood holistically is based
upon the actual ex perien ce of humans immersed in their
n at

ur al- bod

i 1

y

environment.
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The Embers and the Stars

Before we can see the moral sense of nature, says
Kohak, we must be shown how the dominant view of
nature,
(the one we recognize as environmental management),
our

recognition of this sense.

presupposes
nature:

a

This concealing view

fundamental discontinuity between humans and

Humans are the active, purposive and free beings,

nature is "dead, meaningless,
and

impedes

mate

r i

al

.

.

.

a t

best irrelevant

typically threatening, to be conquered by an act of

will."-3 3

Kohak connects this view to the secularism of the

mod er n age

:

If there is no God, then nature is not a
creation, lovingly crafted and endowed with
purpose and value. ..It can only be a cosmic
accident, dead matter contingently propelled by
blind force.
Tf God were dead, so would nature
.

be
If

God

.

3

.

is

dead, if nature is contingent, then we are

accidents thrown into an inhospitable world.

(This sort of

reasoning, where all alternatives to one's own view are

characterized as the simple inverse, should ring
Holism too requires its nemesis to be constituted

bell.

a

in

a

particular way.)
Kohak rejects this secular orientation for its

inability to generate

r

espec

t

for

nature.

Any secular

environmental ethic can ground its "moral" stance

ultimately only in utility, and an instrumental view of
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nature will be destructive, not respectful
of it.
created, teleological nature can do the job.

Only

a

Kohak does

not, as some might, concede the death of God

attempt to dissociate that death from

orientation to nature.

and

then

respectful

a

Instead, he seeks to show how

respectful orientation itself evokes God.

distinction for Kohak between pur pos e

a

There is no

nature and

in

integrity worthy of human concern, as there might be for

a

non-teleological ethic where concern for nature was
grounded
to h

urn

ans

in

its otherness,

its difference, its resistance

.

The "eidetic structure of being,"

a S

-

is echoed

"

organization of human minds and bodies:
in my own

way,

nature."

I

yet belong, deeply,

in

the

"though distinct

within tne harmony of

This harmony is as tangible as the

craftsmanship of the beaver's dam and the regularity of the
movement of the stars.

Kohak's vivid descriptions of

nature seduce with the promise of

a

no

n- al

i

en

at

ed

existence, and, after this longing to be at home

in

the

world has been aroused, he encourages recollection of times
when we have in

fact "understood"

"explained" our world.

distinction
be

is

Our

and

not merely

ability to make this

evidence that our longing to be at home can

fulfilled, given the proper orientation to nature.

Because understanding "is

grasp on the

i

n tr i n s

ic

.

.

.

d

am en

rh ym e

and

f

un

ta1 1 y

.

.

.

t

he

empathetic

3
reason of its object,"-

7

1

understanding implies the existence of

29

moral order in

a

nature.
Eut

if the harmony of nature and

humans is

a

primordial given, what accounts for the dominance of

environmental management?

We

often fail

to

recognize the

eloquence of the cosmos, says Kohak, because we can no
longer experience
under

a

models.

n

atur e- in- it sel

f

for we have buried

,

it

thick layer of abstract theories and explanatory
For example, the methodology of science mediates

and distorts our relation

to

nature, substituting "a

theoretical

nature-construct for the nature of lived

experience."

3 8

"For the sake of managing our environment

purposively -- say, of dispatching rockets to the moon," 39
this substitution is profitable, but it cannot explain the

moral dimension of human existence,
to

a

dimension Kohak tries

draw out and re- secure.
But

a

change

in

the

theoretical orientation to nature

would not suffice to de- throne the environmental

management, for the nature with which
unmediated contact has already been to

physically transformed

to

fit the

we
a

can be in direct,

large extent

scientific model.

Much

fenced and regulated

of the outdoors has become artifact:

parks, perpetually noisy and neon-lit streets.

We

still

have ordinary "actual experience," but the world we

experience

is

rarely that of nature

in

itself.

We

situate

ourselves not against the truly "other" of the stars or the

1
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soft darkness but within an eerie neon light;
we interact
not with food that we have touched and
watched grow, but

with pre-cooked and packaged meals.

"Cur estrangement from

nature is no longer conceptual only:

it has acquired

an

experiential grounding."
What is the way to nature

itself?

in

How do we

approach that which presents itself not as our own making
but as something

demands"?

"to be acknowledged, making

its own

The enabling method, Kohak tells us,

necessitates living, at intervals,

in

"radical brackets,"

that is, apart from the most characteristic modern

thoughts, institutions, practices and devices.
put ourselves

in

a

to

situation where we can escape the

physical and intellectual snare of
to

We have

ev er yd a yn e ss

.

"We need

suspend, for the moment, the presumption of the

ontological significance of our constructs, including our
concept of nature as 'material.'"
Only through the solitary immersion

in

nature

undominated by humans can we experience its moral order and
our

place within it.

otherwise, we sink into individual

solipsism ("I have only to conceive for there to be") or
the collective solipsism of intersub jective consensus ("We

have agreed that
all

too often

for

it

a

x

is

true").

In

t

er

s ubj

ec

t i v e

consensus is

ratification of unreflective commonplaces,

installs "truth" through insistent repetition.

favorite mode of television commercials,

it

A

loses its power
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to convince when

environment.

we

put ourselves in

a

truly natural

There we see that truth is not conventional

but

something that makes itself manifest through
patient
observation.
Near the roar of the ocean or in the

stillness of the forest,
...nature presses in.
Tt is too vast for the
human to outshout it, too close for him to
withdraw from it into speculation .. .[There we
learn that] a human cangot impose. .upon the
world quite so easily.
.

Nature resists.
for

us, but the

True, nature is ordered with

in

it

it

will not be bent to any and every will.

place

a

solidity of its own order means that
This fit

between nature and humans is not one that humans have
crafted, not the result of

a

plasticity in nature.

We

belong to nature, but to belong is not to control; the need
for control

is

already there

lessened once the cosmos is seen as always
b e fo r e

us --

experienced and existing

standing

p rior

Already favorably disposed
gifts.

i

to our
to

front of us to be

n

experience.

nature bestows

us,

First, the gift of "the night":

"Were there no

darkness to restore the soul, humans would quickly burn out
their finite store of dreams.

Night soothes ontol og

would grow brittle."
as

psychologically:

Unrested, unreconciled, they

It

1

y

as well

makes us whole, enabling the full

range of human experiences, providing
of perception,

ic al

a

setting where modes

knowing and feeling unexpressed during the

busy day can come to the fore.

One of these latent moods

132
is an

encom passing and

makes its

a

easy wonder.

When the first star

ppearance seemingly from nowhere, we experience

wonder th at does not require effort or even assent.

a

The
.moon does not
shine* ... All our words for
1 ight ing...are active verbs,
suggesting doing,
wh i 1 e the moon does not do.
It lets itself be
seen, not crowding out the darkness but rendering
it v i s ible
.

1

.

.

The darkness and

inexactitude of the night relieve us

of the pressure to explain all, to know all, to re-enact in
our minds the structure and mechanism of phenomena around
us.
in

The inescapable difficulty of working or investigating
the dark excuses us

lights enable

in

from the duty to do so.

Electric

many ways, but their illumination obscures

the way they deprive us of relief.

the artifact world

Nature soothes while

alienates, an ironic state of affairs

given that nature, unlike society, is not our creation.
The dominant colors of a forest. ..are green and
light blue, both of which, as empirical
psychology can attest, have a distinctly soothing
effect. ..The decibel levels here are geared to
the tolerances of the human nervous system. ..The
environing world of a forest. ..is calm and and
unjarring, living its own familiar life, so
unlike the thr e a ten in g ^ ^ un pr ed ic t ab 1 e environment
of the artifact world.

Night also shows our senses to be
upon the world's cooperation with them.

a

gift, dependent
Sight is possible

only because light, shadow and form allow it.

We

can

loosen our attachment to sight, sometimes even gratefully,
in

the vague

and

mellow world of the night.

And

then

the
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gift of hearing
to listen
A

can come to

the

fore.

Sometimes we do best

patiently, to be open to the voice of nature.

third natural gift is "the word."

The dominant

modern orientation to nature and language declines to
accept this gift:

If

nature is meaningless in itself and

meaningful only as utility, as artifacts are, then words
can only designate or

sense already present.

assign meaning, they cannot express
For

Kohak

untamed nature allows us to have

,

actual experience of

a

new thought:

—

"TSlome thing must be for something to be said
be meaning

to

which our words point, not as.

.

a

there must

.impositions

but as expressions of the meaning that stands out..." U

,

7

Through our linguistic, social, and scientific

interpretations, we articulate the being of natural
things

—

but

nature allows some interpretations and

disallows others.
How does Kohak, as the heir of Faith, convince us that

language does

in

fact have an expressive function?

He

simply sets forth the expressive model of language and
waits and sees whether his account strikes
chord

a

chord in us,

a

familiar but long silent because of the dominance of

the designative model that is well suited

developed

in

conjunction with)

Language is

a

life

in

for (because

the artifact world.

gift that expresses the meaningful order

of being, but expresses it indirectly and darkly.

can gesture toward their source, but their "source"

Words

1

34

includes both the human who receives and interprets
meaning
as well

the

as

thing which evokes and encourages

interpretations.

a

range of

Because of the constraint of "the double

discipline of the reality it confronts and the demands
of
those to whom it would speak,"
not definitive.
so "with the

language is suggestive but

Words express that which is but cannot do

same clarity and

experience itself."

k Q

and thoughts is crucial

And

immediacy as in lived

yet the articulation into words

to "lived

experience," for some

degree of articulation is necessary

in

order that lived

experience become fixed rather than inchoate, fleeting and
thus immediately forgotten.

The relationship between

natural things, the lived experience of them, and the

articulation of the experience is evocative not
designative.
on

the model

Like

Robust Faith,

of parables whose

Kohak conceives language

ability to convince is

a

function of metaphor and the power to incite empathy.
Kohak'

s

prose exemplifies how

a

text relies upon the

incitement of the reader's longing for ontological comfort.
It

is

filled with gentle, healing words:

inherent rhythms,

rhyme and reason, integrated cycles, continuity and

periodicity of being, harmony, primordial and enduring
presence,

immutable order, revealing truths, miraculous

wonder, invisible renewal, deep solitude, peace, warmth.
Kohak experienes nature as

experiences himself as

a

a

meaningful whole and

moral

subject; his text makes

e
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explicit the function of all language, the
evocation of "an
analogous experience." 50 Kohak's language resounds
with

the resemblances and similitudes of an enchanted natural

world

.

Can

the evocative argument that nature has

a

moral

integrity that is of itself worthy of respect convince?
think not.

I

Kohak's use of actual experience and of the

evocative power of metaphor

support of

in

view of nature do not suffice.

Actual

a

teleological

experience of nature

includes experience of drought, parasites, hurricanes,

earthquakes, disease and senseless events.

Th

environmental management position that nature is ordered

in

ways indifferent to us, that nature is an aggregate of

matter "exhibiting at most
regularities," 5

1

too has

metaphors can also be put
aims.
to

a

.

.

.ontolog ic all

y

random...

basis in lived experience.
to

And

the service of management

Kohak is aware of the incompleteness of the appeal

actual experience and metaphor, but waits until we have

been primed by them to supply the missing ingredient:

Trust in the cosmos, read God.
From the perspective of faith, the real

issue

in

the

environmental debate between holism and management is not
how to devise and

implement the most efficient method of

control of polluters or pollution, but how to recognize the
proper place of the human

in

the cosmos.

The question

"whether we shall conceive of ourselves as integrally

is

1
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continuous with the world about us or as contingently
thrown into it as strangers into an alien medium. 52

If,

as

Kohak admits, "nature lends itself willingly
to either
interpretation," 53 how can he claim that his
view is the

way "nature

in

truth is"? 54

For management, the choice

between the two options is ours, to be based upon

a

judgment of the political, economic, and psychological

consequences of each.
as

invitation to human choice, but one to be based not

an

upon

Holism too sees nature's flexibility

a

utilitarian calculus or upon the will to carry out,

but upon
...an act of trust that the harmony of the embers
that glow with the warmth of the human heart and
the stars that proclaim the glory of God. ..is not
only. ..[a] naive first impression
.the
ultimate conclusion of deep thought.
.

.

.

.

Kohak admits that he can never prove the truth of that

conclusion, but claims that faith

—

in

providence,

human reason or will, progress, history -- is
for

a

any conception of nature, not just his own.

God,

reauisite
Kohak

admits that his harmonious holism is contestable; however,
the view of nature as standing

reserve

is

just as unproven.

...all that can be said will not constitute an
argument, nor will arguments convince. .TA] 11
That faith, though, is
knowledge rests on faith.
Tt
is an
neither ?rbitrary nor irr^ional
expression of a vision...
.

.

Thus, Kohak follows in the

picture-thoughts.

definitive.

e pi st

em ol og

i

c al

footsteps of

Knowledge can be evocative only, never

Trust or faith is necessary; we can at best

1

get only
and

a

glimpse of the moral order.

To
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pursue precise

clear concepts is to transform natural holism
into the

systems theory of ecology.

A

Like

Natural Philosophy of Embodiment

Kohak,

Compton takes issue with the dominant

understanding of nature as resources for use.

He

identifies the source of the environmental problem

specifically in modern science.

Also like Kohak, he argues

that despite appearances nature and self are

harmony.

in

His strategy for making holistic inroads into the

dominant view is to show how science presupposes
pr e-

fundamental

theoretic

al

a

experience of nature where it is revealed

that nature and self engender one another and that nature

corresponds to our capacities for perceiving it.

Tompton

seeks to inform science of its unacknowledged debt to this

experience of belonging.
hopes, can be made into

nature,"
and

The philosophy of science, he
a

"re-invented philosophy of

less destructive but still theoretically refined

po wer f ul

.

Compton begins with an account of the structure of
human knowing.
pr e-

theo r e t ic al

The condition of possibility for both
and

scientific knowing is

a

background of

beliefs, conventions, perceptions, thoughts, geographical

prejudices, bodily moods and rhythms, which can never

in
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full be the explicit object of knowledge.

The structure of

any knowing is akin to the structure of sight:

focus on

to

a

To "see"

is

particular scene or item while necessarily

blurring the field of vision

in

which it is set; to shift

another scene or item requires the re-submergence of
the

to

first.

The only knowing available is

which is lifted
a 11

en t ion

to

the

a

knowing of that

foreground by the focus of our

.

Because

pr e-

theoretic al knowing occurs almost

automatically, through perception given with

a

normal human

body, it is less complete and less precise than scientific

knowing.

Implicit knowledge of nature is pervasive and

always there affecting thought and judgment about nature.
But its status as knowledge is suspect because of its

vagueness.

Scientific knowing, on the other hand, secures

its status by accelerating,
the

intensifying and crystallizing

perceptual process of lifting out and isolating

particular items from within the field of experience.

For

Compton, modern science too often achieves clarity at the
price of reification; it seeks to prevent the
e- subm erg en

c e

fixing it in

a

r

"

of the object in its knowledge-context by

mathematical formula or

statement of

a

fact
so
Scientific inquiry. ..is so techn ic al
prediction
in
st
s
pre-oriented to serve ... in tere
a ss urn pt io n s
and control, so selective., .in i t s
that we must wonder whether...^ can provide...
revealing knowledge of nature.
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

g

1

Compton hopes to articulate

a

39

philosophy of nature that

integrates both modes, walking

fine line between the

a

elusive but primary knowledge of actual experience
and the
clear but reductive knowledge of science.
In order

to defend

the primary knowledge-theoretical

knowledge distinction, Compton must attempt the nearly
paradoxical task of articulating the

understanding of nature.
we can make

says

pr

e-theoretic

There are several general claims

about the structure of pr e-theor et ic

Compton.

al

nature,

al

can give an "at least heur ist ic al
ly

We

suggestive description" of how

know nature through our

we

"bodily receptivity and activity with things as we seek to
satisfy our needs and purposes."
First, actual

experience

is

58

experience of something

that has some identifiable continuity and thus some

predictability.

Events, processes, or things

objects of the lived natural world

—

—

the

have recurrent

constancies which allow us to pick out one object from
amidst all the others.

Certain relations among these

objects also persist; they have characteristic and

in

some

cases even law-like ways of combining or interacting.
These constancies occur within the context of
bod ily-perceptu al

exp ecta

t

ion of them.

Human bodies are

such that we live through identifying and

r

e- id en

t

i

fyi n

unities within the multiplicity of forms and manifestations
of the natural

world.

Our

anticipatory apparatus is "the

HO

1

amorphous field of . .spatiality and temporality,
of moving
.

and grasping,

seeing and seeking." 59

This unifying field

of the-body-as-it-interacts-with-the-world
operates at the

individual and the

i

nt

er s ub j ec

level, for

t iv e

...at the margin of each individual's
experiencing of things is the unstated, but
assumed presence of other experiencers. .thus
the concrete un i t ie s- i n-mul ti pi ic i t ies
ar e
not only [mine]
.but
our s
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,
.

.

.

Second, actual experience is essentially implicated

in

relation with other perceived objects, including humans.
There is

a

dialectical relation between nature and humans;

we belong to each other because we exist only in

conjunction with each other.

We

perceive and interpret

nature through bodily organs which are themselves natural;
we

encounter nature through communal history which

comingles with natural history.

The

in ter

s

ubj ec t ive

world

interprets, interpretation made possible by the porousness

—

of perceived objects

condition the

i n

te r sub

j

the very objects which include and
ec t

i

v el y

experiencing community.

Humans, both individually and collectively,
over against

b ut

wit hin nature

themselves

.

experience is experience of something

Third, actual

open-ended, with

find

an

indeterminacy that calls humans to

a

project of uniformity ^hat can never be fully successful or

complete.

The "real"

Within the pe r c e pt

ua

1

perceived object will always startle.
- n a t ur al

field, objects become

meaningful, but while human interpretation contributes to

1
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this meaning, it can never exhaust what the perceived

object is.

This is different from saying that part of
the

meaning of an object is inherent and part derived from
human interpretation -- sll of the "meaning" of an
object
is bound

up with its

place in the lived world, is

essentially connected

the human

to

experience of it.

The

point is that the object is more than its "meaning."
that "more than"

consists of always eludes our grasp, for

only mediated knowledge is available to humans.
the objects of lived

and open

What

Although

reality are incompletely determinate

to further determination,

inviting human

interpretation, objects are at the same time experienced as

resistant to us, as somewhat opaque, as already there

before interpretation, and as "always more than we know and
ever surprising

us."

6

These characteristics hold sway

also for the human object,

who as an embodied

self is also

embodied self encounters the other

in

only partially explained impulses, in reactions,

in

natural.

disease.

The

its

These coexist with the sense of being an

intention-bearing subject, the author of actions.
Let us compare, for

a

moment, Compton's account of the

actual experience of nature with Kohak's.

For

Compton

the

,

reality behind our linguistic and scientific apparatuses
does not refer to
Compton is

a

a

n at

ur e-

i

n-

i t s

el f

two-fold one, between

.

w hat

The distinction
we

know of

n

for

atur

e

independently of science and what we know of nature through

1

U 2

theoretical constructs; it is not Kohak's three-fold

distinction between natural things as they are

in

themselves, the lived experience of them, and the

interpretation of that experience.

For Kohak, nature is

expressed and not produced through language; language is

more expressive than constitutive for Compton as well,
but
it

is only the lived

pr

that can be expressed.

e-theoretic

al

experience of nature

Compton cannot make sense of

a

"nature without reference to the presence of the effects of

human or any other experiencing life."
Kohak's that allows for nature- jn-itsel

An

can

f

analysis like
speak of

distortions within actual experience or of the possibility
of an

authentic relation to nature -- there

nature" to be discovered or covered over.

is

For

a

"true

Compton,

however, pr e- t heo r e t i c al experience is mistaken or

distorted only in clearly identifiable cases of
ne

ur o- ps yc h ol og

i

c al

disease.

Put

rarely distorted for Compton, the
concrete theories often is.

while

e xperience

t ransla

is

tion of it into

Thus, scientific models of

nature have ignored their grounding in lived experience and
thus miss the

insight that self and world harmonize.

Two conceptions of actual experience are at work

within natural holism, then.
is

a

For Kohak,

actual

experience

looser term, pointing to the immediacy of certain

understandings of the wilderness; for Compton, actual
experience is

a

more precise term referring to the

1
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fundamental ontological structures of the
bodily-perceptual
encounter with the world.
Let us continue with our

of natural holism.

account of Compton's version

The criteria

implicit

in

scientific

judgments of the reality of some new entity, effect, or
structure are, for Compton

closely analogous to the three

,

characteristics of the reality of primary experience
elaborated earlier.

In

physics,

new existent must

a

exhibit one or more of the following:
and

must be detected

It

identified through several independent experiments

(identifiable continuity); it must interact with other
known existents (essential
a

r el a t

ion al

i

t y

property hitherto only suspected (an

o

surprises).

)

it must manifest

;

pen- end ed ness that

Compton concludes that the theoretical

constructs of an adequate philosophy of nature wil] find
their reference in characteristics of the lived natural
world.

To

put

perceptual experience

it more precisely,

puts limits upon what is recognizable by science as

a

part

of the natural world.

affinities between human

Not only are there structural

perception and human

th

eor e

t ic a 1/

sc

i

en

t i f

i

c

activity, but

between human experience and non-human experience as well.
"[W]hat is characteristic of embodied,
wo rid-

r

el ated

i

n t

er

s

ub j ec

t

i

ve

,

human life, is not an aberration, but is
what is

found

in other

regions of

structurally analogous

to

63
the natural world."

Other holists have spoken of this

1

U

14

structural analogy, sometimes likening the
mode of being of
the embodied self to the life of nature:
The epidermis of the skin
surface or a forest soil,

is. ..like

pond
so much as
a delicate
n te r pe n e tr a t i o n
It reveals the self
enobled and extended rather than threatened as a
part of the landscape., .because the beauty and
compl exity gf nature are continuous with
6
not

i

ourselves

a

a

shell

.

.

The details of the

structural analogy between the

human body and the natural order, an analogy that is

evidence for the existence of

a

harmoniously ordered

cosmos, are not specified by Compton.

He does

defend fully his claim that nature forms
He can only "point

whole.

truth,"

[its]

to

phenom enol og

a

not try to

meaningful

some striking evidence of...

ic al

evidence of the essential

connection between anticipatory perception and the natural
This evidence is under-acknowl edged by modern

world.

science

.

Like Kohak,

knowledge.

All

Compton rejects the pursuit of certain
claims about nature can only be suggestive

possibilities, never definitive proofs.

The mode of

argumentation of Kohak and Compton requires

a

sympathetic

reader; the claim is that all conviction relies to

a

certain extent upon the prior disposition of the reader to
believe.

Kohak asks only that we listen

call of nature and metaphor;

to

the

evocative

Compton asks us not to be

convinced but merely to be open

to

the

harmonious holism and to consider it

possibility of

in our

philosophical/
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scientific inquiries.

background

a

Kohak's position has in the

divine creator of nature and borrows some
of

the power of the belief

in

God

to

strengthen the case for

his philosophy of nature; Compton, too, has
philosophical

aspirations grander than his mild declarations of purpose
suggest

.

Compton's natural holism is not

a

morally-neutral

alternative to the scientific conception of nature, but is
superior because "it reminds us that. ..we could, in

reflective and empathetic
to

.

.

.

e nl a r g e

the world we live

include responsiveness to life-world structures at other

levels."

i

wa y

a

t

it

66

strive to inquire under the assumption of

To

harmonious natural holism is to foster the possibility of
respectful,

no

n-

d e

st r uc

ti v e

a

orientation to nature.

Through the environmental crisis, we have become
painfully aware of the danger in attitudes of
exploitation and domination reinforced by a
wh i c h divests nature of meaning
ph i 1 oso ph
entirely.

Compton's position provides

safer, more sustainable and

a

morally preferable orientation

to

nature.

Let us grant that the assumption of harmonious natural

holism results
Is

in

a

less destructive orientation to nature.

There is

this enough to justify that assumption today?

some evidence that is "in

a

broad sense empirical"

support the assumption of harmony, but there

experiential evidence
not designed

to

fit

to

is

to

also some

support the assumption of

humans.

68

a

world

Compton says that science must

"
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presuppose

a

harmonious holism if it is to have

a

nature-revealing and not merely instrumental or predictive
quality.

For were science capable only of the latter, we

could not "tell the difference between reality and useful
fiction
It

69

.

is

c

onceiv able to Compton that human existence

could achieve nothing more than useful fictions, but he

rejects the possibility that our conceptual and perceptual
powers do not belong to the world (in the sense of fitting

harmoniously with it); he rejects the possibility that
primary experience, the ph en om enol og
it,

ic al

articulation of

scientific theorizing all have only the roughest

and

correspondence with and very precarious (because humanly
imposed

and

not "natural")

attachment to the world;

and he

rejects the possibility that our wish for harmonious
integration with nature might not imply any privileged

ontological status for it.
V/h

y

does Compton make so much of very general and

incomplete structural analogies between human and non-human
being?

Perhaps Compton believes that the conventional-

ization project has already gotten plenty of attention.
is

also the case that God

lurks in the background

Compton, as he does for Kohak
in

.

It

for

"Science and God's Action

Nature," written by Compton seven years earlier than

"Re-inventing the Philosophy of Nature," aims explicitly to
reconcile

a

theology of nature with natural science.

Tn

1H7

brief, his argument there is this:

The modern world has an

environmental crisis; the alleviation of the crisis
involves

a

revision of our orientation to nature; this

revision requires affirming "intrinsic meaning and value
the natural order of which man is

a

in

part;" 70 and this

affirmation unfolds through the concepts of God, creation,
providence, telos and logos.

Compton's project is to

retain yet revise these concepts, giving them "plausibility
and

a

ppl ic ab il ity

and. ..the

.

.

.

terms of our common experiences

in

scientific world view." 7

explores what

1

The bulk of the essay

satisfactory concept of God might be like

a

by suggesting an analogy between
embodied human self and

a

a

particular model of the

model of God's action in nature.
"

This conception of God is said to be

cons i stent with

Christian faith and may even be coherent with natural
science."

72

The

admission by theoretical physics and

evolutionary theory that science can never fully explain
matter (because

it

framework for

has made room in its
The modern God

can

indeterminate)

is

find

a

home

in

means that science

,

new conception of God.

a

the mystery of matter.

Compton's theological commitment was overt in "Science
and God's Action

in

Nature;" it is likely that

commitment is present
the missing

element in

in
a

" P

e-

i

nv en

t i

ng

,

"

for

it

a

similar

provides

re-invented philosophy of nature

based upon primary experience.

Faith

in

God

allows us to

move from the mere possibility of harmonious holism

to

the

d
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conviction of its truth.

Our

examination of Kohak and

Compton shows, then, that there is

a

recurrent connection

between theological convictions and the philosophy
of
natural holism.

is highly unlikely that

It

holism can

function even as an ideal without some residual
to

God as creator of nature.

N at ur a l

We

are now in

a

Hoi

sm

i

Re con

natural holism:

and

Is

no n-

we want

the best

d estr

to

uc

t i v e

question that gets

a

environment management

assumption of

the

holism, one that includes
a

s id e r e

position to ask

at the heart of the dispute between

to

commitment

place for

a

orientation

to

a

a

harmonious

God, the only route

nature?

If

avoid ecological catastrophe, then

path to pursue.

If

it

is not,

is,

it

and

Faith will be

then some perhaps

version of Enlightenment is our best bet.
It

has been

the

premise of this chapter that an

investigation of the Enlightenment and Faith orientations
to

nature would enable us to answer this question, but at

first it seems as if our analysis of the
and

Enlightenment suggests that no answer

d u al

is

i

sm of

Faith

possible.

Because Faith's holism of actual experience considers

itself only with regard
it

is difficult

to

to

its secul

ar-raMonal opponent,

know whether the holistic view of

language, knowledge, self and nature could take

a

truly

149

secular form.

Holism sees how the dominant view of
nature

has contributed to the environmental crisis
and then offers
its own religiously-tinged position as a morally
superior

alternative.

Environmental management then undercuts the

force of holism'

s

moral superiority by showing its

assumption of harmony to be incongruous with modern beliefs
and

practices.

After this critique,

must reject natural holism.

Cn

seems as though we

it

the other hand, holism has

exposed the limits to the management conception of nature,
showing that it is not capable of

a

position that is both

coherent and non-destructive of nature.

Holism uncovers

the self- contradictory nature of environmental management

solutions:

It

espouses an instrumental view of nature

which, because of our

ineradicable participation

in

nature

through our bodies, encourages the application of technique
to

humans.

An

instrumental view of nature must reduce

humans to means, subjecting them to technical manipulation
and

instrumental exploitation.

This result conflicts with

management's self-righteous emphasis on the dignity of
humans as the only beings capable of reason, will
f r e ed om

and

.

But

the beginning

of an

answer to our question

ultimately does emerge from the exploration of
env ironmental ism

dialectic.

in

terms of Hegel's Faith-Enlightenment

Ironically, or better, as

a

result of the

dialectic and not the dualism between Faith and

1

50

Enlightenment, management's negative characterization
of
holism and holism's critique of management uncover
the
possibility of

a

conception of nature that rejects

harmonious holism but affirms an orientation that will let
nature be.
The holist view of nature makes two basic claims:

(1)

nature is worthy of more than instrumental treatment,
having an integrity of its own, and (2) nature is in

harmonious relation within humans and among humans and
non-humans.

Holism insists that these claims are

connected, but there may be

a

way to endorse the first

without implying the second.

is

Tt

possible to conceive

nature as an order without purpose but one worthy of regard

precisely because it is beyond our total control and
resistant to human attempts to mold it.
within

Fn

1 i g

ht

con str uc table

,

enm en

t

we can

There is

science that affirms this:

artifact, but also

—

and

—

we can never do this totally or completely,

the

Reality is

this is the important point

as

£nd

moment-

impose order upon it and constitute

it

resists.

a

resistance of nature

is

for reality

ineliminable:

can rail against it with ever more insistent attempts to

humanize it, or we can acknowledge the resistance witho ut
tying that acknowledgement to

a

belief

in

the ontological

attunement of humans with nature.
Compton's point about the

o pe

n- en d ed

nes s

of the

objects of lived experience goes to the brink of this

We

d
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let-otherness-be position.

There is an indeterminacy, he

says, that both invites technical

intervention and

conceptual imposition of unity but still resists that
imposition and places limits upon its duration.

Compton

acknowledge that humans have functions, forms and

coul

action-possibilities similar to those available to
non-human nature, that nature "fits us"

in

so

far

as

it

provides the conditions of possibility for human existence,
without endorsing the view that we were made for each
other

.

Tt

is consistent

with the phenom enol og ic a]

evidence

offered by Compton that the relation between humans and
nature is not one of harmony but one of the embodied self,

replete with affinities and with aspects accidental or
We could endorse an essential and

adverse to human needs.

problematic relational ity between rather than the intrinsic
value of humans and nature.

Because of its theological

commitments, natural holism does not turn to this

appreciation of the

o

pe n- e nd ed ne s

of its anthropocentr ism

management.
to

,

s

of nature,

and because

neither can environmental

Further development of this position may have

await the passing of the dialectic of Faith and

Enl ightenment

.

.

1
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and

its

formally recorded history.

Government by law

enables the state to rationally coordinate policies
that
cut across different sectors of society, for policy
guided
by law can be modified,

in

known and regular ways, to

adjust to complex and changing circumstances.

democracy pursues the simplification and

syst

Juridical
em

i

za

t i

on

of

leading ultimately to "a unified code." 4

law,

Planning within the juridical state is both

participatory and centralized.
its

It

is

participatory through

insistence on representative government and its

institutional encouragement of "bargaining on the rule,"
the self-conscious debate about the aim, meaning, and

implications of
because

it

a

piece of legislation.

surrounds

a

This debate,

formal legal procedure, is

particularly susceptible to public scrutiny and
participation.
it

The juridical

state is centralized because

limits the site of popular participation.

Access is

readily available during the formulation of policy, limited
at

the implementation stages.

in

Congress produces

a

The centralization of power

clarification of purpose and

consistency among public acts, yet
local

government.

it

a

does not disempower

Pecause national directives make clear

the responsibilities of local authorities,

self-monitoring

helps to reduce central control.

Federal oversight, when

necessary, is less intrusive,

judgments of success or

for

failure can be straightforward when standards have been
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made explicit beforehand.
to go together."

"[Llegality and efficiency tend

5

Put juridical democracy fosters more than efficiency;
it

also enables public consideration of social goals.

While the "juridical approach does not dictate

a

particular

definition of justice, of virtue, or of the good life," 6
the politics of government by law fosters

consideration of them.

The

underspecif ies the int ent of

a

healthy

American state today too often
a

policy, "expressing broad

and noble sentiments, giving almost no direction.

.

.but

imploring executive power, administrative expertise, and

interest-group wisdom." 7

This sloppy faith in good

intentions compromises liberal democracy.

Py assuming

the outcome of competition among organized

i

is by definition

just,

we eschew the

a

that

nter est- groups

p riori

formulation

of the principles that are to guide public actions.
c a nn o t be made unless
Considerations of j u s t i c e
conscious attempt was made to
a deliberate and
derive the [public] action from a preexisting
general rule or moral principle governing such a
Therefore, any. ..regime that
class of actions.
makes a virtue of avoiding suchgrules puts itself
outside the context of justice.
.

The juridical

.

.

state, through its partiality for formal

procedure over informal bargaining, also strengthens
Congress and the judiciary as sites of legitimate public

authority and reduces corporate influence.

Special

economic interests are not denied access to the policy-

making process but are limited to forums where they can be

1

69

recognized as corporate and not public interests.
Corporate lobbying power is also controlled through the

requirement of precise and overt policy intentions:

"In

many cases the powerful would be immobilized if they had to

articulate what they were going to do before they did it." q

Government by law similarly lessens the possibility of
covert bureaucratic power.

Careful laws with definitive

aims allow Congress to control

fiscal expenditures of

public agencies and to check administrative discretionary
power,

major source of policy incoherency and public

a

cynicism toward government.
is the broad grant of power without standards
that leads to bargaining, unanticipated
commitments, and
.confusions that are the
essence of bureaucratic irresponsibility and the
illegitimate state.
It

.

.

But, says Lowi, government by law is insufficient to

restore democratic liberalism.

As

the undesirable

side-effects of capitalism have grown, the liberal state
has been drawn into an economic role that has undermined
its commitment

interest.

participation and the public

to democratic

Lowi argues that the state's orientation to the

economy, as well as its orientation to legislation, must be

modified
In

.

order for

a

modern state to coordinate rationally

large range of programs,

it

must control or have great

influence over "at least some of the strategic resources
and

networks in the economy."

11

T he

American state has

a
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responded to this coordination imperative not by

socializing production or banks,

but by socializing risk.

Examples of the socialization of risk include regulations
that protect established firms by limiting new entrants
into the competition (the role of the Civil Aeronautics

Board)

and

federal guarantees of loans to private investors

(the role of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board in the

Lockheed "bail-out").

In

1978 the

American government had

potential obligations for 368 billion dollars'

worth of

private investments.
Low is highly critical of the American response to the
need

for economic

intervention.

Public economic

intervention through the socialization of risk creates
large class of private units in

receivership."

a

a

state of "permanent

Industries and other privately organized

groups deemed important enough are eligible to have their

organizational and fiscal stability underwritten by the
The socialization of risk typically requires

government.
no

immediate transfer of funds, only

a

guarantee that if

the enterprise fails, the government will deal with its

creditors.

First, the indirectness of involvement allows

the underwriting agency to escape official

Congressional clearance and there
public debate

in

the decision.

is

Treasury or

thus little room for

Second, the discretionary

nature of permanent receivership policies enable ostensibly
public agencies and committees to establish highly stable
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almost autonomous clienteles.

and

These clienteles have

a

structural advantage over smaller firms, for the initial
state intervention entails

certain obligation for the

a

state to protect its investment.

Thus, permanent

receivership discriminates against innovative or small
enterprises that could increase the competitiveness of an
economic sector;

it

allows "economically irrational uses of

resources by encouraging expansion beyond demand
or

.

.

.ret ent ion of inefficient

Neo- laissez-f air e

,

firms or processes."

1

3

Lowi's substitute for permanent

receivership, would combine "a substantial deflation of
government in general with

a

strengthening of certain

aspects of government in particular."

1

'I

Tt

would

...radicalize economy and society. ..by an...
Mul ti na t ion al
abnegation of government po wer
corporations could probably be jolted back into
more actual price competition if the hundreds of
protections .. .logged .j^n our public policy were
suddenly eliminated.
.

The state would be laissez-faire

in

.

.

its

.

.

.

introduction of

a

smaller set of specific rules designed to encourage justice
and

the public

interest as they have been defined

previously in the reformed political process.
Under

n

eo-

1

ai s

se z- f a

i r

e

,

many discretionary economic

programs would be abolished and others placed in

defensive position.

a

"on-discretionary fiscal policies,

such as shifts in the money supply, the level of government

investment, and tax laws, would be strengthened.

Federal

e
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police power to regulate economic activity destructive of
the public interest would expand, but such regulation would
be clear

intent and limited in scope.

in

unacceptable distribution of
resources

..

i n

c

ome

.

.

i

.

"If there is...

rr at

ion

.water or air pollution or racial

a1

use of

inequality,

then [we] ought to be able to identify rather precisely"

1

^

their sources and remedies.

A

P reliminar y

Critique

o f

t

he

Lowi's procedural democracy and

Juri dical

ne

o-

1 a i s

Ftate

se z- f a

i r

economy represent the individualist version of Enlightenment rationalism.

Habermas'

faith in the possibility of

rational consensus represents the collectivist version.
Before we provide

a

fuller account of Habermas'

theory of the state,

a

theory developed

in

affirmative

response to

positions like Lowi's, we will sketch how the consensual
state is
a

critique of the Lowian.

a

different set of flaws

in

the

Tn

order to then expose

Lowian ideal,

anticipate

we

briefly the critique by the theory of the attuned state.
This latter critique,
ideal

as

which applies to the Habermasian

well as the Lowian, focuses upon the Promethean

commitment to human mastery.
From

a

Habermasian perspective, Lowi's defense of

neo-laissez-f aire
Lowi

is

insufficient, even on his own terms.

calls his attack on permanent receivership

a

protest
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"against the existing state as supportive of organized

capitalism,"

1

7
a

recognition of capitalism's oligarchical

tendencies, and an assault on the bloated and irresponsible

bureaucratic state.

Yet

n

eo-

1

ai sse

z- f a

r e

i

preserves the

fundamental structures of capitalism and itself anticipates
a

large though altered state apparatus

If

Lowi

i s

willing to invest the state with extensive coordination and

planning powers, why does he exclude the possibility of
neo-social ism?

Lowi's first objection to socialism, that

a

socialist transformation of the political economy would not

necessarily remedy the problems of rule by professional
expertise and administrative discretion,

is

weak,

for

neither necessarily does capitalism, in ways that Lowi

himself has shown.

Why couldn't the juridical control of

discretionary power be applied to
His second objection
to

is more

a

socialized economy?

serious but still insufficient

reject all socialist alternatives.

radical nature,

Pecause of its

socialism would entail an interim and

unacceptable sacrifice of civil liberties, says Lowi.
Although he admits that state capitalism, through its

generation of economic privilege, itself compromises civil
liberties, he fears the socialist deprivation of civil

liberties more.

Tt

is

important, on Lowi's view, to

preserve certain niches for purely individual activity,
that is, activity structurally unavailable for deployment

1

as
c

a

means to

a

annot do this
But

from

larger political plan

and

7U

socialism

.

a

collectivist perspective, Lowi's

understanding of capitalist economics is woefully
inadequate.

Neo- laissez-faire allows

a

relatively free

reign to private economic units; juridical procedure is

supposed to limit corporate political influence.

Lowi

doesn't see, Habermas shows us, that exposing corporate

demands to the light of juridical procedures (while leaving
the capitalist structure of the economy intact) may result
in

the crystalli zatio n and justi fi cation of corporate

demands.

They may be justified as necessary to the very

existence of the social order rather than,

as

Lowi hopes,

subjected to the independent standards of justice and the
public interest and then rejected for falling short of
them.

The fiscal

burden placed upon the state to support

sectors of industry vital to the economy may force the
state to take measures to tighten up tax collection and to

reduce expenditures on social programs less obviously
central to the maintenance of the system.

If

the juridical

state allows the economic imperatives of corporate

capitalism and these imperatives require sacrifices on the
part of certain groups,

then juridical democracy might

function to specify, clearly and precisely, the ways
evaders
which those sacrifices must be enforced and

penalized

.

in
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Finally, the collectivist takes issue with Lowi's

conception of the state itself.

Conceiving the state

primarily in terms of the laws it makes, his analysis does
not give serious attention to

c it i

ze n- id en

t i fic at

the state or to the role the state may play as

collective freedom.

Lowi

problem of legitimacy.

a

io

n

with

locus of

thus underestimates the modern

Lowi

identifies two sources of the

legitimacy problem, both of which he mistakenly believes
his

ideal state can solve.

The first source is

perpetuation of permanent receivership:

As

the state

increases its support to the private economy

it

will have

trouble securing sufficient allegiance from citizens who

recognize that their government fosters the private gain of
already privileged groups.

This source of discontent is to

be remedied through

se z- f ai r e

n

eo-1

neo- laissez-faire entails

corporate economy.
bad

ai s

a

,

but we have seen how

state too weak to control the

The second

source is ambiguous laws and

procedures, for when no one can be sure whether

a

policy has been successful in carrying out an intention,
public actions seem pointless or
real,

private sources of power.

a

smoke screen for the

T his

second threat to

legitimacy can be remedied through juridical democracy, but
are
Habermas teaches us to wonder whether procedures

sufficient to induce allegiance to the state.
many o^
The theory of the attuned state concurs with
these objections to Lowi, but sees the flaws

in

his

e

.
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perspective as based
nature.

its Promethean orientation to

in

Thus, juridical democracy and

ne

o-l

ai s

se z- f a i

r

reproduce the flaws of the utility version of
Enl ightenment

Let us recall the basic defect of utility:

After its

rejection of religious or traditional bases of value,

Enlightenment stumbled upon utility as

a

standard of value.

This standard presupposed the centrality of the human being
and

required

a

great faith in the autonomy of reason.

The

problem with utility was that its realization undermined
its presupposition.
to view the

world

orientation spread

i

To
ns

to

tr

determine value through utility is
urn

en

t a1 1 y

,

and

this instrumental

include humans themselves, the very

beings Enlightenment exalted because of their unique

capacity for reason.
were equipped with

a

Enlightenment believed that humans
refl ective reason that prevented the

over-extension of utility, that we were designed such that
we

contained

a

natural barrier to immoderation.

Put as

"pure" reason triumphed over traditional supports and
limits, the assumption of the sel

f-

]

im iting

character of

reason was increasingly called into question.
Lowi

re-enacts this earlier failed drama

of the state,

in

his theory

says the theory of the attuned state.

In

his

shift from the moral level to the political one, the

utility standard and the faith

in

the self-sufficiency of

reason become, respectively, the hegemony of economic
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imperatives and
procedure.

a

faith in

Just as

a

self-correcting juridical

Enlightenment originally sought both

utility and respect for persons, Lowi now wants both an

expansionist economy and the public interest, both

a

perfected bureaucracy and limits on the regulation of the

private lives of citizens, both

a

high-tech state and

a

democratically-controlled state.
Lowi's thought works within the basic parameters of

Enlightenment:
un probl ema t ic

His
the

1

eg al- pr oc ed ur al

approach treats as

Enlightenment view of reason; his

conception of freedom as mastery has not explored the
underside of the attempt to rationalize society; and his

commitment to
of the

an

economy of growth expresses his acceptance

Enlightenment view of nature and human satisfaction.

This latter commitment requires further explanation.
For

harnessed

Enlightenment, nature is disenchanted matter to be
for human goals

—

for

Lowi the goal of upward

mobility and an increasing material standard of living.

If

nature is matter then the impact the pursuit of growth has
upon nature is troublesome only insofar as it interferes
with the pursuit.

Tf

Enlightenment equates human freedom

with being in charge of the world,

if the

world separate

from humans is thought to contain no intrinsic value of its

own,

and

if human

well-being is thought to be bound up with

the conversion of the natural

world

into useful

objects,
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then economic growth is likely to be seen as an essential

ingredient

in

human freedom and happiness.

From the perspective of the attuned state, then,

a

socialist organization of the economy is just as pernicious
as

a

Lowi

capitalist one if
is

it

is

committed to economic growth.

unaware that the requirements of economic growth,

like the standard of utility, tend to infest and dominate

other social realms:

The standards of efficiency,

competition, and profit infect the human relation to
nat ur al

t

hings as nature becomes

a

deposit of resources for

use; pol itics as it becomes dominated

by questions of

international competition and stimulation of consumption
rather than the good life to be shared

in

common; ethical

life as commercial success becomes its guide; education as
it

becomes technical training for employment

industry" rather than
it

becomes "leisure"

a

in

in

"sunrise

study of the liberal arts;

p lay

as

opposition to "work," something

that should be "spent wisely"; and family and community as

their stability is undermined by the geographical mobility
that is

a

condition of employment.

Lowi's commitment
seeing the danger

in

to

mastery also prevents him from

strengthening the bureaucracy.

Juridical democracy takes steps toward

bureaucracy:

a

"perfected"

one that runs according to the book,

with

a

minimum of inefficiency, administrative discretion, and
loopholes.

The

Congressional debates fostered by juridica
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democracy can result in normative standards for

a

policy

rather than loose and broad sentiments, but the power of

bureaucracy has sources other than discretion to interpret
policy intent.
an

It

stems also from its technical expertise,

expertise difficult to duplicate

citizens participating

in

in

Congress people or

"bargaining on the rule."

This

technocratic power, says the attuned state, is likely to
increase rather than decrease if we continue to seek

technological mastery of the world.
Lowi criticizes pluralism for its technocratic

conception of the public interest and for eschewing moral
concerns (thus rendering politics incapable of justice),
but his own affirmative position cannot redress these
flaws.

A

theory of the state concerned about the

antidemocratic implications of technocratic power
seek to reverse the need

for

c ould

increasingly complex

technologies, pursuing "appropriate technology," technology
more easily controlled, understood and afforded by most

citizens while still providing
life.

a

moderately comfortable

But this alternative requires changes -- in the goal

of economic growth,

in

the distribution of reduced

benefits, in the commitment to the large scale of
industrial organization,
and

in

in

the organization of production,

the acceptability of the largely unhindered

accumulation of private wealth and its concomitant social

1

stratification.

And none of these changes are on

80

Lowi's

agenda.
The last two, however, are on Habermas'.
to

We

turn now

the theory of the consensual state with an eye toward

the way it improves upon Lowi's theory and yet succumbs to

the critique of

a

Promethean state.

The

Consensual State

The central concern of Habermas'
is

legitimation.

There is

a

theory of the state

gap between the modern

capitalist state's need for justification of its activities
and

its ability to tolerate the democratic process

necessary to produce such rationales.

This gap is

increasing because the state's implication in economic and
cultural affairs is increasing.

official status (replacing
status)

(e.g.,

of many economic

a

"natural" or traditional

educational curriculum, city development, health,
has thematized

constituting them as conventions

or

in

and

transactions and cultural issues

family, and sex relations)

A

The new planned

in

them, thus

need of justification.

truly legitimate role for the state

in

the economy

cultural affairs would be just, rejecting policies

that contribute to the unequal distribution of socially

produced wealth.

But it

is

precisely on the basis of this

asymmetrical class compromise that advanced capitalism
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exists.

Hence, the capitalist state must try to install

convincing legitimating mechanisms that do not threaten to
expose this basis.

The state has three interconnected

strategies for this:

institutes

It

a

formally democratic

politics where institutions capable of substantive

judgments are replaced by mechanisms that retain only the
formal contours of legitimating procedures; it justifies

itself on the basis of the material rewards it provides;
(but, because rewards can

function as rewards only within

a

cultural context that defines them as such), it tries to
foster beliefs and

ideologies supportive of capitalism.

The capitalist state is

fairly successful in carrying

out the first two strategies.

Put this success is rendered

precarious by its failure in the last.

The legitimation

deficit, then, stems from the capitalist state's inability
to

fulfill the social need for ideas, beliefs, theories

that ex pi

and

a in

j

us t

i f

y

the

institutions of the

established order and mot iv ate citizens to endorse those
personal aims compatible with, and those sacrifices

necessary to, the social order that secures

stable

a

The state must also provide

environment for them.

*

understandings that convince citizens that there are

opportunities within the established order for

a

mean i ng f ul

life, one that includes the possibility of "a mimetic

relation with
f

am il y

; .

.

.

e x

ure

;

.

.

pe r ien c e

.

.

.

nat

.

sol id ar

g iv

ing

i t

y

o ut s id e

.

.

.

t

he

immediate

scope to imagination as well

1

as spontaneity."

1

Q

There must be available

a

82

rationale

that both legitimates the concrete state and provides the
ex

istential ly comforting hope that self-realization is

possible within the social order.

Theories of the state that endorse capitalism do so
because of its success

in

the realm of instrumental,

especially economically-rational, action.

masterful state.

endorses

a

Lowi

put

who

Habermas, too,

But he criticizes those like

too much stock in economic success and

overestimate the extent to which capitalism can sustain
motivational beliefs that legitimate its structures and

convincingly portray them as
conducive to sel

f- f ul f i

1

lm en

an
t

.

integral part of
We

a

world

turn now to Habermas'

account of the problems the capitalist state has in
securing cultural meaning supportive of itself.

Allegiance to the capitalist state had been secured

previously through two ideologies, "civil privatism" and

"familial-vocational privatism."

Civil privatism is an

orientation to politics where the sufficient condition for
a

legitimate state is its ability to provide the economic

pre-conditions for occupational achievement and private
accumulation of wealth.
"consists
in

in

a

Familial-vocational privatism

family orientation with developed interests

consumption and leisure on the one hand, and in

a

career

orientation suitable to status competition on the other."
Privatism focuses attention toward the efficient

1

83

administration of the state rather than toward the
legitimation of the system as

a

center of justice and

collective identity.
Allegiance to this privatism depends heavily upon

pre-capitalist or religious traditions.

"Capitalist

societies were always dependent on cultural boundary

conditions they could not themselves reproduce." 2

1

Privatism's indifferences to the substantive ends of
social order relies upon
to

a

pr e-bo urgeo

i

s

a

passive obedience

state authority; its attitude toward economic

achievement and material accumulation relies upon
r

el ig io usl y- in c ul

ca t

ed

values of honesty, fairness,

self-discipline, renunciation of immediate gratification,
fatalism, and the saving power of hard work.

Habermas

claims that because these supportive traditions now

co-exist within

a

relativist and scientific age rather than

within the solid worldview of Christianity or even

nineteenth century liberalism, allegiance to them and thus
to

the

Capitalism,

privatism they engender is fading.

then, is losing the cultural

beneath its

f

eet

and

motivational

ground

.

The dysfunctional

implications for capitalism that

Habermas draws from the decline of civil and
f

am il ial- voc at i o nal

Developments

in

privatism seem today too strong.

the culture of advanced capitalism since

Legitimation Crisis was written allow us

to

revise

1

Habermas'

account.
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Counter to that account, it seems clear

that the educational-occupational system of capitalism is

firmly intact.

Whether this is due to

robust civil and

a

familial-vocational privatism or to resignation to fate
amidst the decline of privatism is less clear, hut

I

will

argue the latter.
The clamor to participate in the most lucrative of the

available occupational roles seems stronger than ever.
while overt participation

Put

the educational-occupational

in

system continues, the character of this participation lacks

elements conducive to the legitimation of the optimal

capitalist state.
at

We

see

high degree of participation,

a

least among the American middle classes, but it is

participation without much

al leg iance

to

a

We may

the state.

be motivated to succeed in existing structures, but we are
also motivated

to

cut corners, evade standards, resist

directives, and cheat within them.

Individuals are disciplining themselves to fit

a

corporate mold and they experience (with varying degrees of
self-consciousness)
self, as
get along

a

that sel f- d i sc i pi in

e

as

a

reduction of

burdensome imposition, albeit one necessary
in

this world.

support of Habermas'

Tn

it does

about the legitimacy crisis,

self-disciplinary response
many participate

in

is

to

claim

seem that this

itself precarious:

Fven as

the system, they also have doubts about

the meaning fulness of their

participation, as the end

it

is

1

supposed to serve (a high-paying, high-status job)
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is

either unattained, and recognized finally as unattainable
by most, or experienced

as unsatisfying

by those

fortunate

enough to achieve it (or demeaned enough to have

disciplined themselves so thoroughly to achieve it).
To

summarize this revision of Habermas'

account of

privatism, participants

in

system are faced with

paradoxical situation. On the one

a

the occupational-educational

hand, they experience the economic organization of society
as contingent,

for they know it to be specific

historical time and place.

to

this

the other hand, this

On

contingency, because it is entrenched (in the consumption
possibilities, available occupational roles,
advertisements, etc.)

acts upon them,

purposes, with the force of

a

for

necessity or

practical

all
a

fate.

Members

of the capitalist state respond, then, with the response

appropriate to fate

—

they grudgingly oblige.

This revision, however, builds upon rather than

refutes Habermas'
his next move,

argument as

a

whole.

Tt

fits neatly with

which is to show how the capitalist state

has attempted to develop new grounds for the motivation it

requires.

These substitutes include, on the one hand,

modern religion, science, and utilitarian morality; and on
the other hand, modernist art and the pursuit of

self-conscious norms.

All

fail, says Habermas, as

functional equivalents to traditional meaning-giving

.

1

frameworks for capitalism.
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The first set are inherently

inadequate sources of existential comfort and human

fulfillment and the second set, while they do provide

a

reasonable interpretation of the world and outlets for

self-expression, cannot legitimate

a

cap italist state.

Instead, they expose the tension between capitalism and the
good life possible; the meaning they create is mostly
coun ter- cul tur al
We

turn now to

a

discussion of these two sets.

Modern religion, science, and utilitarianism all

contain defects which blunt their ability to provide

cultural meaning.

Modern religion is so rationalized and

privatized that it can exist only in the realm of

subjective belief.
is

so

removed

longer provide

It

becomes an ephemeral Deism where God

from ordinary experience that he can no
a

reason for being or grounds for action.

(Habemas is silent about the rise of fundamentalism

religions which do not appear to have these defects.)
Modern science, as an even further secularized substitute
for religion,

aspires to inspire allegiance comparable to

the commitment of

a

leap of robust faith, but

unintentionally undermines itself along with its object
(religion)

in

its attack on all dogma as mystification.

Utilitarianism was unable to insinuate itself as the modern
foundation for ethics, for
respect for persons.

it

was shown to conflict with

a

1
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Modern art is available as raw material for the

production of capitalist meaning when it is deployed as

commercialized mass art.

But,

modernistic art has also shown

deployment and function as

an

Habermas

,

modern art as

ability to transcend this

subversive avant garde.

a

Representational (pre-modern)
aspects of the social world

says

in

art portrayed the beautiful

which it was embedded; the

representational art of liberal capitalism said that beauty
was the constant if often invisible companion (even the

promise within)

bourgeois society.

Put non-represent-

ational modern art jars with the conventional vision of the

beautiful and presents itself as something produced rather
than as the mirror of

a

beautiful nature.

This art thereby

...expresses not the promise but the irretrievable sacrifice of bourgeois rationalization... it
strengthens the divergence between the values
offered by the socio-cultural system and those
demanded by the political and economic systems."

^

The aesthetic meaning of modern art is that bourgeois

society spawns

a

poverty of meaning.

The most important of the attempts by the capitalist

state to legitimate itself is the administrative productior

Insofar as capitalist state is

of norms.

a

modern state

with democratic and rational pretensions, it contains in

principle

a

commitment to self-government through

rat iona] ly-agreed-upon norms.
the demise of traditional

opportunity

to

The capitalist state views

sources of meaning as an

produce new norms that justify the state,

,

1
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but Habermas argues that this attempt fails because

meaningful norms cannot be "produced" administratively
but
must flow, in the modern age,

from truly rational and

freely internalized discourse.
In

pre-modern times, meaningful norms were the

province of the state, but that was because the state was
itself grounded

in

tradition.

Such unreflective tradition

was the source of legitimacy for the state at the same time

that it gave metaphysical meaning to life.

tradition conjoined; there was

an

The

state and

integral link between the

"instrumental functions of administration" and the "expressive symbols that release an unspecified readiness to

follow." 23

This holistic

integration is precluded for

advanced capitalism (and all its contemporaries),

Enlightenment

(1

)

undermined the notion of

a

for the

harmonious

world and de-legitimized as superstition all less than

precisely differentiated unities, and (2) inaugurated

modernity as the age of self-consciousness.
This historical

advance

however, makes possihle both

in
a

sel f- consc iousness

democratic state legitimated

through rational discourse (Habermas'

ideal)

and

a

state

where allegiance can be induced through official

manipulation of belief systems (capitalism).

Advanced

capitalism pursues the latter more than the former, or,
rather, attempts at the former are ultimately compromised
by economic

imperatives which demand the latter.
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1

Cultural meaning cannot be produced administratively,
says Habermas.

continuity of

A

legitimating norm must "guarantee the

history through which individuals and

a

groups can identify with themselves and with one another,"
but as soon as

a

norm is "objectively prepared and

strategically employed," 2 4

it

examples illustrate the point.
the norm "patriotism"

loses this ability.

Two

First, attempts to foster

through paid political advertisements

cannot replace feelings based upon rootedness in the life
of
a

a

community.

They are seen instead

for what they are:

manipulation of emotions that renders the emotions evoked
Second, the corporate slogan that without chemicals

empty.

25
life itself itself would be impossible
intends to convey

the normative message that there exists

a

coincidence of

corporate actions (the production of plastics, drugs, etc.)
and

the common good

(life itself).

Put this slogan reaps

cynical attitudes and heightens awareness of
will

a

particular

seeking to parade itself as the public interest.
Habermas'

account of the impossibility of

manufacturing "cultural meaning" as

a

commodity puts in

a

political context the critique discussed (Chapters IT and
III)

of utility and

When

a

the

the conventionalization of the self:

symbolic or expressive entity, e.g., allegiance

state, is treated

as

artifice, its potential as an

instrument of coercion is accentuated and its status as
mean ing-

in

fused

norm

is

to

jeopardized.

a

.

1
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Although the administrative production of meaning
fails, no n- tr ad i t ion al cultural meaning is possible, says

Habermas.

Successful

m ean ing- giv ing

norms must, in

modernity, meet two conditions:
First, they must speak to existential

doubts.

Habermas'

fears and

sensitivity to the human need for

consolation, for "interpretations that overcome contingency,"

for

a

comforting and comfortable relation with

nature, and for "intuitive access to relations of
sol id ar

i

ty

.

.

.b et

we en

individuals"

2 6

displays

an

understanding of the attractions of holism.
however, from espousing
to

is

reformulation of Faith.

far,
A

return

Faith, while rectifying the strain the modern state puts

on cultural meaning,
in

a

He

would do so through appeal to elements

tradition or religion that have to remain mysterious,

incomplete, and partially
And

un t h em a t i

z

ed

this will not do, for the second condition modern

norms must meet is that they be self-conscious, explicitly

endorsed, rationally understood.

Tt

is obvious

why these

norms, capable of generating cultural meaning, are

dysfunctional

for capitalism -- they would

subject to

political debate the inherent economic injustices of
c

api tal ism

.

Democratic norms in

a

self-conscious world (and,

Habermas contends, there can be no reduction

in

the level

of self-consciousness in modernity without repression)

must

1
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express the general izable interests of the public, the
common good.

These interests can be ascertained only

discursively, that is, through

a

democratic discussion that

identifies and interprets social needs and comes to

a

rational consensus about the norms necessary to fulfill and

regulate those needs.
refer to every and

"Discourse"

Habermas does not

for

any form of communication; it is the

form whose exclusive concern is to determine the validity

of certain assertions and whose participants have agreed

that only the force of the better argument should prevail.
Jn

discourse "all motives except that of the cooperative

search for truth are excluded." 27

Because

in

every existing advanced capitalist state

the conditions necessary for the emergence of

rational

a

consensus are absent or distorted, the first step toward

legitimate, meaningful society must be
Such

a

critique must be based upon

hypothesis,

a

a

c o un

a

negative critique.
ter f ac

t

ua

projection about which norms everyone

a

affected would agree to without constraint if they were to
enter into discourse.

The

key move in

Habermas'

argument

here is that norms formed under these conditions would be
rat ional

and

not simply those currently acceptable.

requisite rationality
--

it

is

inherent

communication.

In

in

is

the

The

provided by the discursive method

structure of undistorted human

other words, the possibility of the

]

.

9?

1

rationality of norms issues from the structure of language
itsel

f

[T]he expectation of discursive redemption of
normative-validity claims is already contained in
the structure of i n ter sub j ec ti v i t y
Tn taking up
a practical discourse, we unavoidably suppose an
ideal speech situation that, on the strength of
its formal properties, allows consensus only
through g eneral i z ab e interests.
.

In

.

.

short, the justifiability and therefore the "truth"

of norms is dependent upon their general

i

zab il ity

their ability to fulfill commonly accepted needs.

possibility of any such un

i

v er

sa 1

i

st i c

,

i.e.,
The

needs across such

a

diverse group as "humans" is always already guaranteed by
the

structure of communication.

communicate, humans must share
rational

an

order to be able to

interest in coming to

agreement.

theory of the state acknowledges the need

Habermas'
for citizens
It

Tn

to

identify with the norms that govern them.

aims to close the gap between individual will and social

order

—

in

Habermas'

terms to reconcile the tension

between private morality and public law.
iation is

a

consensual one:

The reconcil-

The products of public

discourse are to be internalized as the subjective will of
individuals.

Habermas'

theory also acknowledges that norms

are conventional, but rationally-grounded
Di sc ur s iv el y- fo rm ed

norms are conventional

conventions.
in

the sense

that they are conscious human artifacts (in opposition to
Faith) but not

in

the sense of arbitrary,

for

they are
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grounded in the rationality of undistorted communication
(in opposition

relativism).

to

form the basis of

and

they are

no

n- ar b

i t r

a

ar y

Such norms are meaningful

legitimate state precisely because

conventions.

Just as Enlightenment

reason was believed to limit the overextension of utility,

Habermas believes that discursive rationality will

limit

the overextension of convention.
The Habermasian concepts of rationality, truth,
g en er al

i

zabl

interests, discourse,

e

er n al

zabl

i

e

norms

legitimacy are each an integral part of the meaning of

and

the others.

Through

uncover Habermas'
is

i n t

an

out:

an

understanding of these terms we

ideal:

the consensual

state.

Put there

important element within this ideal yet to be brought
The consensual

imperatives of

a

state able to

masterful state must have
Habermas'

view of nature.

fulfill the coordination
an

instrumental

defense of an instrumental view

of nature is best explained through reference to his theory
of knowledge.

of the self and

T

turn now to this theory of

cognitive interests, paying particular attention to the
character of the technical
In

Kn o wl ed

g

interest.

e_a nd _Hu_m an__In

te

rest s,

? o

Habermas argues

first, that any philosophy of nature that omits the element

of human domination is both epi stemol og

untenable unless it takes refuge

in

a

ic al

y

and

ethically

re-enchanted

ontology, and second, that non-instrumental
deny the politics of technology.

1

views of nature

"

1

The theory of cognitive interests

there is

—

arose in opposition to

a

view of knowledge as

the objective description of the universe

order.

the argument that

fundamental link between knowledge and human

a

interests

—

9^

in

its law-like

Modern science, including social science, readily

falls prey to this objectivist illusion

...that naively correlates theoretical
propositions with matters of fact. This attitude
presumes that the relations between empirical
variables represented in theoretical propositions
are

s el f- ex i s t

en t

the same time, it

At

.

suppresses the transcendental framework that is
the precondition of t
of the validity
of such propositions.

Knowledge can never be objective description but is
always mediated

through

a

pr

e-und er stand ing derived

the knower's

initial situation,

participates

in

says

Habermas.

from

The subject

the construction of the objective world.

What makes knowledge possible at all (the "transcendental

framework")

are the cognitive interests or the

viewpoints from which we apprehend reality.

specific

Human

interests
...bridge the gap between the pr e- sc i e n t i f i c form
of life, science and the application of
scientific knowledge. "Human interests" are, in
the literal sense of the wor^ the " i n t e r- e s se
i.e. the "being-in-between
,

Cognitive interests stem from the fundamental conditions of
human life on earth

—

correspond to the techn
interests

.

labor,
ic al

,

interaction and power

—

practical and emancipatory

and

y

1

First, the practical interest

presupposes

a

95

Pecause all action

.

social and historical context, we have an

interest "in the preservation and expansion of the
intersubj ect iv ity of possible action-orienting mutual

understanding." 32

Pecause human action implies interaction

or coming to terms with other
in

actors,

we have

an

interest

attaining consensus, an interest in communication.

This

practical interest is rooted in an imperative of

sociocultural life:
is linked

to

"the survival of societal individuals

the existence of

a

reliable intersubj ectiv

it

of understanding in ordinary language communication."

Although Habermas rejects Ge i st

,

he adopts the

Hegelian point that the knowing subject must be

comprehended

in

its

historical development.

The modern

subject is the outcome of the self-formative processes of
both the species and the individual.

historical development of an

ev

er-

consciousness, the modern subject
himself and his deeds
self of Robust Faith.

communicative self.

in

a

d

Through the

ee pe

is

n i

ng

self-

the author of both

way that could never be for the

The modern self is an essentially

Habermas has

a

...firm commitment to the view. ..that people are
are
the sole judges of their own interests, which
the
on
formed and discovered through dialogue
part of all concerned -- a political commitment
to opening up public, democratic processes..^
described as "the conversation of citizens.""

1
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The emancip ator y interest is less intuitively

available.

is based

It

upon his theory of communication

that attempts to show that subjects already have, through

language use,

communication.
we make

a

idea of rational or non-distorted

an

We rely on this implicit understanding when

distinction, upon reflection, between oppressive

rational social

and

institutions.

distinction expresses our interest
from oppressive social

ability to make this

Our
in

structures.

rational emancipation

Another expression of

the emancipatory power of self-reflection is in psycho-

analysis where

patient, through talking therapy, is freed

a

from

internal repression.

sel f-

re f1

ec tio

n

and

Because we have the capacity for

language, we have an interest in

autonomy and responsibility that can free us from
ideological

and

psychological

illusions.

This emancipatory

interest, however, can find its ultimate realization only
in

a

social

domination

setting

itself free from institutions of

.

Habermas is domination,
survival requires
poses

a

a

for

the

imperative of human

defensive stance toward that which

threat to it.

plants and

The essence of technology for

interest:

The technical

"External nature" (natural

non-human animals)

is

a

forces,

source of danger.

Eecause humans must work on the physical environment

order to eat and reproduce, there is

a

in

built-in antagonism

between humans and external nature and humans relate, in

,

1
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part, to nature from the viewpoint of prediction and

technical control.

The history of technology, then, is the

history of the process whereby humans have devised means

to

lighten the burden of work and to improve the yield from

nature

.

The technical

human freedom.
sel f- fo rm ati v

e

interest is also

The technical

a

precondition for

interest is part of the

process and therefore contributes to

political liberation.

It

adaptation of an organism

involves more than the mere
to

its environment.

If we reflect on the process of s el f- f o rm a t ion
then instrumental reason, which leads to mastery
over nature, and the practical reason of intersubjective commun ication
.reveal themselves as
integral parts of our interest in freeing
ourselves from the arbitrary forces of nature and
the power structures ^at inhibit our capacity to
understand ourselves.
.

In

.

response to the holist claim that the technical

interest should be subordinated to our interest

in

preserving, fostering and releasing the potentialities of
nature,

Habermas replies:

c an only be traced back to a
Te c hn o 1 og y
and
"project" of the human species a s _a _wh ol_e
not to one that could be historically surpassed
...It is impossible to envision how, as long as
the organization of human nature does not change
and as long therefore as we have to achieve selfpreservation through social labor and with the
aid of means that substitute for work, we could
renounce technology, more particularly our
technology, in favor of a qualitatively different
.

.

.

,

one."

1
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Habermas further defends his instrumental view of nature by
(1)

defense of the distinctions between subjective

a

nature, objective nature, and

nat

ur e-

i

n-

i

t s el f

and

,

(2)

a

defense of the distinction between work and interaction.
Habermas makes the first set of distinctions in order
both the extreme objectivist position, whereby

avoid

to

nature is
and

a

thi n

g-

i

n-

i t s

and

el f

the ground of subjectivity;

the extreme relativist view, whereby nature is wholly

constituted object.

a

Habermas forges his position by

modifying these two stances.

On

the one hand, nature is

...an object ification of the knowing subject; it
subject to the general conditions
of purposive-rational action. ..as well as to the
specific conditions of historically variable
systems of social labor.
is constituted

On

self as subejct emerges only through

the other hand, the

natural history and the process of biological evolution.
In

some sense, nature is thereby the ground of

subjectivity.

To

try to clarify this apparently

contradictory position, Habermas differentiates between
subjective nature, objective nature, and nature-ini

t

se 1

f

.

Subje ctive nature

nature."

People have

is
a

what is generally called "human

subjective nature because they are

embodied, have senses, reflexes and

instincts and must
a tur_e

is

the earth, the

physical environment, but only insofar as

it.

exists as

engage

in

social

labor.

Ob j_ec t_^v e_n

a

complex of constituted objects, objects ready and available

y

y

0.

1

for use.
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But, objective nature does not exhaust all that

nature is.

Evidence of the externality of nature that

remains is the world's resistance to false scientific

interpretations of it.
n

atur e- in- itsel

it

What we can know of this

is very little, but

f

are enough to justify

the glimpses we get of

positing of its existence.

a

Natur e-in-itsel f does not refer to unknowable but
causally effective t h i ng s- i n- t h em s e 1 v es
it
refers instead to that moment of knowable nature
designated by the terms indepe ndence 0 p
f acticit y
exter nal ity
and the like.
;

,

,

Na t ur e-

abstraction,

i

,

for

Habermas is

transcendental

n-

i

a

requisite of any knowledge of nature,

t s el f

Although we must presuppose this

n at

a

ur e-

i

n-

i

t s el f

we

,

ourselves have access to it (and experience its
"resistance") onl

y

in

terms

o f

its instrumentality

We do reckon with the existence of a reality that
is independent of men who can act i n s tr urn en t a 1 1
Eut
and arrive at a consensus about statements.
"of"
catches
properties
of
what the predication
in the
this reality is constituted o nl
?

perspective of possible technical control."
Holists charge that Habermas introduces the concept of
natur e-in-itsel

f

only to strip it of any significant

meaning by establishing the technical
and

only power of disclosing nature.

the criticism:

interest as the one

Habermas describes

"My specifications of instrumental

communicative rationality are drawn too narrowly
an

for

and

nature as an end-in-itself

."

U °

permit

to

adequate distinction between external nature as
us

and

a

means

Habermas then

200

admits to this and other criticisms:

His distinctions

between subjective nature, objective nature, and
natur e-in-itsel

f

have not sufficiently clarified the

relation between reason and nature, for it is difficult to
see how

a

nat

also be

a

natural process that grounds the subjectivity of

ur e-

i

n-

i t s

that is an "abstraction" can

el f

the natural being man; he has not provided

a

of how one might relate from

i

to

a

a

no

n- ob j ec t i v

"thick" notion of natur e-in-itself.

good
st

account

perspective

However,

Habermas

goes on to argue that these problems do not stem from any

particular weakness

in

the theory of cognitive interests

but are the results of the limitations inherent in human

Habermas attempts an epistemolo gical

knowledge per

se

defense of

instrumental view of nature.

an

.

the view that nature is kno wabl

possible technical control
with

a

is

e

Furthermore,

only from the viewpoint of

the only position compatible

disenchanted view of nature.

The epistemological

defense of technical interest of

nature asserts that although we can have moral-aesthetic

experiences of nature as

a

non-ob j

ec ti v ated

environment,

these rapturous experiences must take the form of art,

transcendental meditation or un
the so ul

.

In

short

ar t i c ul

a

ted

stirrings within

,

...the phenomena that are exemplary for a moralpractical, "fraternal," relation to nature are
most unclear, if one does not want to have
recourse here. ..to mystically inspired
philosophies of nature.
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Any theoretically fruitful theory of knowledge cannot base

itself on these non-rational stirrings.
to

Habermas refuses

underplay the extraordinary success of modern science

explaining the natural world and
abandon its model

not now about to

the study of the relation between

in

reason and nature.

is

in

(The

participants

in

the relation

are

reason and nature for Habermas, not, say, the embodied self
the

and

Humans are so defined by their rational

earth.

subjectivity that reason can take their place.)
theoretical alternative to
nature is Habermas':

a

If

moment of
at

i

n-

re-enchanted philosophy of

The relation between reason and

nature must be conceived

only

a

The only

i

the level

instrumental ly and nature can have

t s el f ne

of

a

ss

.

theory of knowledge only an

objectifying view of nature

is

possible, can an

environmental ethic be had where

n

atur e- in- itsel

f

emerges?

Habermas says no and argues that any ethic must consider

relations, i.p., must be

a

"discourse

Intuitively, the attempt to open up

a

moral access

only inter- pers onal

ethic."
to

natur e- in- it sel

f

is not absurd, "but

we

should not

permit ourselves to be cajoled by these intuitions into
ignoring the difficulties that we encounter [in the

attempt]."

U 2

There are two fundamental difficulties with

holistic ethic:
First, basic
and

ethical

freedom rely on

a

concepts like justice, equality

type of relation that can arise only

a

?r>2

between human subjects engaged

discourse and this "in

in

principle egalitarian relation of reciprocity

..

.cannot be

carried over into the relation between humans and nature
any strict sense."" 3

Participants

in

in

ethical relations

must by definition have the capacity for autonomy and

responsibility.

Na t ur e- in-

j

t

se

may have elements of the

1 f

former but certainly not the latter.

Second,

no n- an thro poc en tr ic

a

ethic cannot mediate

between the human need to draw sustenance from nature and
the obligation to

possible,

respect it in itself.

How is it

example, to have sympathetic solidarity with

for

plants that one must eat?
In

the distinction between subjective nature,

sum,

objective nature and nature-in-itself allows Habermas to
show how

no

a

n-

i n s

t r urn

en

ta1

view of nature cannot be

"adequately grounded today without recourse

to

the

substantial reason of religion or metaphysical world
The attempt to retrieve the lost unity of

views."

reason,

and

to

abolish thereby the distinction between the

technical, practical and emancipatory interests, cannot
succeed.
a

The best his anti-Promethean critics can offer is

nostalgic appeal
The

to

a

distant pastoral

second key distinction

in

scene.

his defence of an

instrumental view of nature, the distinction between work
and

interaction, is made in response to the charge that the

domination of nature fosters the domination of humans.
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This distinction also allows Habermas to discuss the

legitimating function of modern technology.
Wo_rk

is

the sphere of instrumental, purposive-rational

action, governed by technical rules, based on empirical

knowledge.

J_n

tej^ac_tjL o_n

is

the

sphere of communicative,

institution-maintaining action, governed by consensual
norms, based

in

ordinary language.

ineliminable

in

the relation between reason and nature or

level of work, Habermas can focus on interaction

at the

where

because domination is

a

reduction in domination is possible.

domination present

in

Indeed, the

interaction is due to the

illegitimate extension of the technical interest.
of denying the necessity of instrumentality,
to

Instead

Habermas tries

explain how the distinction between work and interaction

has become blurred

in

modernity.

Habermas sees himself as

furthering the "rationalization" of interaction.

Rationalization of work involves growth of productive
forces and the extension of the power of technical control,
but rationalization of interaction involves emancipation
and

extension of communication free from domination.
A

full discussion of Habermas'

argument for these

claims refers back to the whole of his theory of

legitimation.

We

will

mention now only one of his more

important conclusions.
The

technical

interest has crowded

emancipatory ones because

it

the

has taken on

a

practical
new,

and

20H

legitimating function for the advanced capitalist state.
Whereas

in

traditional societies technically exploitable

knowledge did not threaten the authority of cultural or
religious traditions that legitimated political power, in
advanced capitalist states technology and science are

themselves called upon

to

legitimate

a

state whose main

role has become the guarantor of efficient production.

Although the forces of production once (in early liberal

capitalism) functioned
social

to

spur changes in outmoded

forms of

institutions technology now serves more as an

ideological justification of the state than as
of state ideologies.

technology

d

e- pol

i

a

critique

The legitimation of technocracy by

t ic

i

ze s

process that ought to be, in

a

a

democratic state, the province of communicative or
normative action.

H ab e

rmas

,

Lo wi_j

an d

th e

Fnlightenment Inheritance

Although Lowi shares with Habermas an instrumental

view of nature, it is clear that Habermas' consensual ideal
is

a

critique of Lowi's theory of the state:

espousal of

n

eo-1

a

i

s

se z- f a

i

r e

Lowi's

misconstrues the economic

imperatives of advanced capitalism; Lowi does not delve

deeply enough into the issue of legitimacy, which he

misidentifies as
rather than

a

a

matter of defective administration,

problem of cultural meaning or the
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illegitimate extension of the technical interest into the
realm of communicative action.
Both

Lowi and

Habermas "thematize" the discord between

the democratic rhetoric of modern Western states and their

actual

practices.

For

Lowi this takes the

form of an

expose of corporate influence on public policy, an

influence that procedural democracy can bring to light and
reform;

for Habermas it takes the form of

critique of capitalism as

a

system.

a

complex

The basic

problem

facing the modern state, for Lowi, is the distance between

bureaucratic power and

a

(severely limited) version of

"discursive will-formation" called "bargaining on the
rule."

This distance exposes the tension between

degree of administrative discretion and

a

a

high

commitment to

Habermas sees the basic problem

representative democracy.
as

the distance between the ability of the capitalist state

to

provide economic wealth (for some)

legitimate itself.

and

its ability to

This distance exposes the capitalist

tension between the need to have legitimacy and the

imperative to obscure

an

unjust class compromise.

Habermas, administrative discretion is not the
a

p_ro bl

em

capitalist state must overcome; it is the solution

need
and

to distract attention

economic justice.

democracy with
in

For

n

a

this cov er-u p

.

eo-1

to

that
its

from the question of legitimacy

Lowi's "solution" -- juridical
a i s

sez-

fa

ir e

economy -- participates
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a

is an

account of how the state, as

modern state, must actively seek to extend the reach of

public policy; while the state, as
fulfill

its coordination

cultural meaning.

Tt

a

ca pitalist

state, can

tasks only at the expense of

shows how the capitalist state

requires more legitimacy than it can muster and then goes
on

to

claim that the missing legitimacy

c

ould be supplied

(through consensual norms) with no sacrifice of

coordinating power, that is, with no reduction
of life requiring

Lowi,

in

the areas

public organization and control.

Like

Habermas does not thematize the need to relax the

drive for social coordination and economic mastery.
The extension of public

viable modern state with

a

Habermas.

i

As

the

h

om og en

policy is

a

requirement of

an y

self-conscious citizenry, says
za

t i

on

of consumer goods, the

increased sophistication of communication systems, and

population growth make the world smaller and more

interdependent, new responsibilities arise for the state,
i.e., the coordination of food supplies, distribution of

education and training, and the prevention of nuclear war.
Moreover, the modern state can rely only tenuously on the

organizational powers of religion, myth or tradition.
Habermas believes it imperative that equally powerful

substitutes be found.

Whereas the capitalist state

substitutes technocratic and commercially-controlled policy
for

these decayed

forces, the Habermasian state would
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substitute consensual, rational and internalized
norms.
Like

Lowi,

Habermas believes that

extensive planning
where
a

is

a

state capable of

positive good; it enables freedom,

a

freedom is the ability to exercise self-assertion

world

ordered

(individually or collectively)

in

by humans.

"Standard" critiques of Habermas take this view of
freedom

for granted,

focusing on the difficulties he has

bringing his quest for

a

theory of communication.
some variant thereof)
the rational

lose

consensual

its

meaning, and
its own

it

The ideal

in

tune with his

speech situation (or

is the ground of the

dental argument should
would

legitimate state

in

possibility of

state -- but if the qua si- tr an so en-

falter, they say,

Habermas'

state

prospective ability to spawn cultural
would thereby lose the ability to ensure

legitimacy.

Critics skeptical

about the success of the quasi-

transcendental argument ask not whether the extensive

coordination imperatives of the modern state could be
relaxed, but rather whether

a

general will or

a

set of

consensual norms can be identified with the reach and power

necessary

to

modern state.

the extensive coordination
Tn

order to differentiate these two

different questions,
standard

imperatives of the

I

will give

a

brief account of the

sort of critique of Habermas and

then turn to

a

critique wary of the equation between freedom and mastery.

According to an early version of the standard

critique, the key flaw in the consensual state was its

inability to distinguish between norms that express
general izable interests and those that express exclusive
interests.

Desiring

consensual

democratic state, yet fearful of

a

fascist one, these critics wondered

relativism within Habermas'

theory.

a

about the

Does not the viability

of norms depend upon an essentially arbitrary "decision

whether or not to let one's actions be guided only by
maxims"

tune with the common good?

in

Habermas'

response to this was to move to the meta-

theoretical level

in

order to find

a

rational

grounding for

norms; his answer is the consensus theory of truth.

theory then becomes the new focus of attack:

"understates the extent

reasonable answers

met a t heo r e t

encompasses

a

a

perplexing practical

to
i

c al

Tt

which our limited resources of

evidence unavoidably generate

reason and

Habermas'

to

This

plurality of

questions."

work, according to this critique,

notion of rationality that is subtle and

complex, acknowledging, especially when pressed by
h e rm

ene ut ic

i

st s

,

reason's inevitable blind spots.

does not seem to recognize the

implications of this

essentially limited reason for

a

wi

1

1- fo rm a

t

ion

But

politics of discursive

4 7
.

Habermas, in defense of his notion of rationality,

responds with two claims:

(1)

rational consensus is an

he
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ever elusive,

ideal, and

perpetually postponed achievement,
the

(2)

a

guiding

speech situation functions only as

ideal

proof of the theoretical possibility of consensus.

But

these claims still leave his theory open to the charge of

—

repressive utopianism
unattainable

in

principle, repressive

attain it fosters

to

Utopian in that it is an ideal
in

that the attempt

coercive consensus.

a

Yes, the

ideal

speech situation is the exception rather than the

rule;

granted, "negotiated.

.

.agreements based on the

inters ubjective necessity of criticisable validity-claims
are diffuse,

f1

ee

t i

ng

.

.

.

a

nd

fragile";

49

agreed, "not all

interactions fall into the category of action orientated to
reaching understanding"
fact that

Habermas'

own

50

— but

more serious indeed is the

qualification of the scope and

function of "communicative action"

reacts disruptively on

the theory of the state which provided the initial need
a

theory of communicative action.

a

symbolic locus of

knows, it is
An

a

i

n t

powerful

er

s

ub j ec

ac tor

The

t iv ity

in

;

state
as

is

for

not merely

Habermas well

the world.

anti-Promethean perspective on the state exempts

itself from these debates about the ideal speech situation
or
e

the

significance of Habermas'

tical level.

move to the metatheor-

Regardless of whether

a

consensual, rational

discourse is possible, it asks whether it is
desirable.
que st

for

It

in

itself

focuses upon the ways in which the very

it
rational consensus is destructive, with how
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excludes or distorts aspects of life that cannot be
expressed within the standards of rational discourse.
This non-standard critique begins by recalling

defect

in

Enlightenment:

The

a

faith in the autonomic

ability of reason to limit the overextension of utility was
shown

to

be unwarranted

increasingly subject
rationality.
in

as the

to

world and

the standards of instrumental

This faith, however, still finds expression

assumption that

Habermas'

a

fully normative and

normalized social order would be
Habermas'

critique of

c

free society.

a

theory of the state, by focusing upon

api tal ism

,

is designed

to

a

distance itself from

liberal theories such as Lowi's, but at
the

the self became

a

level deeper than

economic organization of the state it shares much with

Lowi's.

In

the most general terms, they share

a

great

esteem for human subjects around whom the world must be
made to fit.
job:

Reason is the primary tool

Reason applied

to

will

and

for

this tailoring

impulse must discipline

inner nature or the instinctual, chaotic self; reason

transformed
forge

a

into

social

science and public policy must

social order; reason as physical science and

technology must subdue outer nature or the non-human
deploy
environment; reason applied to collective will must
these rationalized materials in pursuit of the common good.

Reason,

freedom and mastery thus become terms which

21

engender and sustain each other

in

1

the underlying system of

thought guiding each theory.
Habermas'

theory of the state has helped

to

oppressive potentialities within Lowi's state:
restriction of the state

to

expose the

Lowi's

administrative and procedural

functions made it too weak to realize the public interest
it

promised

and

neo- 1 ai sse z-f a ir e would allow the corporate

structure to set the moral and political agenda for the
nation.
the

Lowi's attempt to strengthen the

state's disposal, in the absence of

capitalist production, serves only
publicize the social
the order)

to

need

to

a

w

i 1

critique of

organize life around the imperatives of

public them ati

discursive

powers at

highlight, and

detail

in

measures necessary to fulfill this need.
the

eg al

(for the sake of the stability of

corporate capitalism and to specify

for

1

punitive

Unlike Lowi's cry

of issues, Habermas'

za tio n

1- f o rm a t io n

the

need not have the effect of

legitimating corporate imperatives,' for the corporate
system is itself called

question.

into

Habermas frees the state from the domination of

economistic priorities, but he offers
so

implicated

in

social

a

state so strong and

life that it has oppressive

potentialities of its own.

The discursive state,

encouraged to be active and powerful

for the

sake of

fulfilling its role as the locus of collective freedom,
also courts authoritarianism.

Lowi's commitment to human

e

.

.
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mastery took the form of an obsession with

a

predictable,

precise, and legalized social order that left only trivial

economic choices relatively unregulated; Habermas'

commitment to mastery takes the form of the relentless
pursuit of the rational norm-governed
even

fewer areas of life untouched

areas protected

find

to

Habermas'

cultural
1 i

fe

—

state that leaves
one is hard

pressed

discursive themati zation

from

state threatens to colonize every refuge of

ideal

protest against the increasing rationalization of

.

Habermas is not unaware of this danger.

He

anticipates the criticism that when thematized norms cover
an

extensive slice of life, unorthodox ideas are imperiled

by the social tendency to accept "the interpretation of
needs.

.

.current at any given contingent stage of

socialization."

5

1

Habermas addresses this danger through

a

distinction between norm and principle (a metanorm from
which norms can be generated)

only be complete when the
principle of the justification of possible
principles (that is, the readiness to engage in
discursive clarification of practical questions)
was alone internalized, but in other respects the
continuous interpretation o^2 neec)s wa s given over
to communication processes.
In t ern al

The

i

za

t

ion

.

.

.

wo uld

Habermasian state must aim at

commitment

to

the pr

i

nc

i

principle that precludes

particular norm

.

pi

an

an

unquestioning

of rational

discussion,

a

unquestioning acceptance of any

Participants endorse the principle of

:

21

3

rational discourse but their views as to the particular

content of

norm must be decided only as the outcome of

a

the communication

process.

subjected to constant

commitment
to

to

the

r

Norms are conventions rightly

e- ev al ua t i o

n

on

the basis of the

principle of rational discourse.

This is

prevent the internalization of norms to such an extent

that cultural

change or critical thought is precluded.

Still, claims the anti-Promethean critique, according
to

Habermas'

entirely by

are judged

rational

theory, critical

in

a

a

thought and cultural

change

standard of what norms are

highly integrated and coordinated society.

There is little attentiveness to the limits of rational

mastery.

From

an

anti-Promethean perspective, the rational

mastery of social life
to

its

is

Sisyphean, not Herculean.

futility, however, the Habermasian social

seriously endangers cultural protest.

Natural

Blind

project

holism,

in

Chapter III, has already shown how the Habermasian

conception of nature is destructive of the natural
foundation of human existence.
The discussions of the

ideal

states of Lowi and

Habermas and of their flaws have prepared
of the

us

for

an

position we have been calling ant -Promethean

Charles Taylor's theory of the attuned

i

state.

account

21

The

In

Attuned State

the conclusion to his book on Hegel, Taylor asks

how Hegel's thought has remained

important while the

Hegelian ontology is quite abandoned.
in

H

Taylor's answer is,

essence, that Hegel's identification of the basic

structure of modern thought was correct even if his

philosophy could not transcend it.

It

is

fitting, then,

that the last theorist of the state to be considered here

Taylor, for he explicitly understands his thought to be

is

confined /defined by terms that are

development of those

a

portrayed by Hegel as Faith and Enlightenment.

And

if we

draw out Taylor's theory of the state, we see that it too
has

The subject of the

Hegelian ring:

a

comes to recognize Ge

i

st

,

Phen om e nol og y who

the spirit of reason in history,

becomes Taylor's embodied self properly attuned to its
world.

Taylor brings Hegel into the modern age.

According to Taylor, there are two conflicting strands
The

of modern thought.

first

disenchantment of nature with

strand
a

responds to the

faith in the ability of

technical control to re-secure and master the world.
have already spoken of this strand

Promethean urge.
ex

pressivi

st

.

It

The other
too

in

We

terms of the

strand Taylor calls

faces disenchantment but is critical

of the Promethean

ideal

institutions have

a

where "all our acts, objects,

use, but none expresses what men

.
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could be." 53

The voice of expressivism today is protest.

Unable to present itself as the voice of an authentic but

violated nature, it can only object to the predictable,

homogenized, rationally administered civilization
masterful orientation seeks to install.
protests
in s tr

urn

the name, then, of

in

en t al

i

zed

a

a

Expressivism

violated, repressed and

self.

[I]f the historical experience of objectifying
and transforming nature. ..is too powerful for it
to survive as an interlocutor; then the
expressivist current of oppositio^to modern
civilization has to focus on man.
the "focus on man"

But

carries with it the danger that

expressivism will become what

protests against

it

—

a

masterful orientation (limited only by human wil]) where
the sole standards of judgment are rationality and utility.

Taylor attempts to ground his theory of the state

in

an

expressivism where creative and political self-expression
requires attunement with (not submersion
the wo

a r g urn

r

1

in

or mastery of)

d

I

will consider the following dimensions of Taylor's

en

t

:

(1) The

Ste ad y St a te

t

an

account of the political

economy Taylor endorses;
(2)

P

rome the an

s

ocialism,

Taylor's critique of

a

humanist Marxist theory of the state that protests
against utilitarianism but nevertheless believes
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authentic human life requires mastery of

an

nor- hum an nature;
Atjtun_ed

(3)

Fx pr e s s

i

v i sm

,

an

articulation of Taylor's

non-Promethean expressivism through an examination
of his conceptions of freedom, ethics, language

natural science.

and
I

in

for

end

Chapter

IV with

the

identification of some flaws

Taylor's version of expressivism and their implications
the

ideal

of the

attuned

state.

This is analogous to

the critique of natural holism that concluded

T he

Stead

Tn

y

Chapter TIT.

State

"The Politics of the Steady State" Taylor rejects

the pursuit of economic growth and rejects the vision of
the good

life

that requires "an ev er- inc reasing command

over goods and

services and an

control nature

for

ev er-

i

individual ends.""5

ncr ea si ng capacity to
5

Instead, the steady

state pursues an economy built around

recycling technol-

ogies and moderate consumption levels,

where the normal

pattern of consumption is accessible to the least affluent.
While there can be minor deviations from the norm, the

possessions

a

normal, decent life requires would be

universally distributed.
standard need not be
for once

we

a

This universal consumption

colorless world of utility goods,

have abandoned the equation of consumption with

21 7

happiness, it should be possible "for people to elaborate
new and original ways of living in balance with nature"
and

express their creativity

to

in

ways other

than the

multiplication and variation of consumer items.
universal consumption standard contrasts sharply to

A

the orientation

of growth.

to consumption

The logic

easier, happier."

But

fostered within an economy

there is "more is better, freer,
in

order to evaluate whether one is

getting "more," one compares not only what one has now to
what one had last year, but also what one has relative to

others.

Once

a

society has provided

the

for

essential

material needs of its citizens, which the advanced
industrial
fur ther

nations for the most part have, the pursuit of

economic growth, because of the pressures to

maintain the existing structures of employment, corporate
power and

international relations, places

a

higher and

higher premium on excl usive goods -- goods that are valued

precisely because very few others have them, goods whose

enjoyability decrease
available.

The

as

they are made more widely

private automobile is an example of an

exclusive good (its sp^ed, efficiency and convenience
decrease as traffic increases').
The relative deprivation

factor

in

the

assessment of

one's achievement of the good life as socially defined
helps to explain why individual

economic

advance

in

an

as
economy of growth is experienced as disappointing even

21 8

it remains

a

compelling goal.

If one

doubles one's

consumption level while others already ahead on the income
ladder do likewise, the increase
will be less than anticipated:

freedom or happiness

in

"The ev er- inc reasing

expectations of consumers outrun the rise

in

production

with relative ease, and there is probably more resentment
today. ..than there was

a

c7

few years ago."

An

economy of

growth makes the good life ever-elusive except for those at
the very top of the consumption hierarchy.

Although this

relative deprivation factor is operative

all

a

in

societies,

society

in

pursuit of exponential growth, by defining the

life

so

heavily in terms of consumption, exacerbates

good
its

socially divisive effect.
Many of the flaws

in

the existing

steady state is designed to redress

—

state that the
the

power of large

corporations, the priority of exclusive goods, the

reduction of political freedom

to

the choice among material

objects or political candidates for consumption -- are also
collectivist perspective.

identified as flaws from within

a

For both the steady-statist and

the collectivist, the

to displace these orientations and

institutions is through

collective effort; so Taylor shares some of Habermas'
in

way

the ability of self-conscious human

faith

agency to foster

needed social change.
The universal

consumption standard, for example, would

require conscious public control of economic production;
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those consumption items necessary

to

a

decent life and

within the limits of environmental toleration would be

established politically and then enforced through

a

systematic policy of rationing and subsidies.
The goods of the standard would available to
everyone's budget, but. ..the goods and services
outside this range, being relatively starved of
resources and ^subsidized, would be much more
highly pr ic ed
.

The

problem that arises for Taylor at this point is that

state strong enough to shape the modern economy is also

a

a

state susceptible to the authoritarian abuse of political

power, especially as it finds expression in the

over-regul ation of its populace or the subjection of more
and more areas of life

to

bureaucratic regulation.

The

freedom rears its ugly head again.

paradox of political

Acknowledging that conscious coordination of the

economy is

a

form of power, Taylor attempts to diffuse the

danger of authoritarianism by making that coordination
function of deeply felt
imposed regulations.

no

All

rm

a

rather than officially

s

norms are connected to the

identity of citizens; steady-state norms must be tied to

understanding of

c it

i

self as essentially situated

enables it

and_

i

ty

that acknowledges the

in

a

cultural context that

ze n- id en t

gives it bounds.

an

This self can live in

harmony with its world if it respects these boundary

conditions.

To

have such an identity would entail

the

i.e.,
recognition that the enforcers of social boundaries,
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norms, are

reflection of and consonant with the limits

a

inherent to

an

embodied, finite, historical being.

Allegiance to norms

in

the ideal steady-state is not

because they are the product of

collective will (as
a

ttuned

Habermas)

the limits imposed

to

The human

being.

in

regulations)

on

jalJL

,

reflective, rational,
but because they are
self by its very

the

ability to adhere to norms (or

finds its limit in the requirement of

cohesive, wholesome identity.
for

a

parts of the self:

The

Such an

a

identity accounts

will-full, intentional,

mastering self that imposes its own useful regulations upon
social world

the

j3n_d_

historical self that
limited by it
ar tic ul atio

n

preserve

i^s

c

on tex t- bound

,

only through its life-world,

ways never fully susceptible to explicit

.

Although
to

in

embodied,

the

a

a

political

economy of growth also attempts

specific identity of its citizens (i.e., the

conception of self as

a

self-dependent being who can shape

nature to its freely chosen projects and who is entitled
ev er- inc

for

reasing property), this understanding of self is,

Taylor, narrow and alienating (lacks wholeness).

contrast,

a

steady-state requires that citizens have

In
a

potential
conception of themselves, their goals and their
good

as

essentially and integrally tied

potential and good of the community.

to

the

goals,

to
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The attuned

virtue.

state requires

vast amount of civic

a

Through his emphasis on social identity and the

cultural meaning derived from it, we see that Taylor (like
Habermas)

grounded

insists that any state worthy of endorsement be
in

the reflective allegiance of its citizens, even

though the attuned state does not require the endorsement
to be as

state

explicit as it must be

in

the rational-consensual

.

How does one begin to replace the social

supportive of

an

identity

economy of growth with one where "we

accept, and hence come

value,

to

a

balance of some kind

with our surroundings";^ where

we

sense of common purpose";

where we "respond to the

of growth. ..as

end

[and

and

challenging common task which binds

a

not as]. ..a disaster

safety on his own"? 61

in

which each must scramble for

The communitarian

Taylor's steady state embroils him
To

foster

a

social

have "a very strong

in

a

element within
classic dilemma:

identity of civic virtue it seems as

though one reauires beforehand the very condition that is
sought.

While Taylor

is

by no means confident that this

dilemma can be overcome, he does not rule out the following
optimistic scenario (most likely to emerge

in

"small

societies or societies which can be meaningfully
decentralized"):

initial

The

transition to

a

steady

state where the consumption level is radically equalized is
forced

upon us through

a

resource or population crisis.

222

Through "a kind of Dunkirk spirit," 63 we weather this

transition with free institutions intact ?nd

consumption standard tentatively in place.
experience of

a

universal

The very

universal consumption standard might then

a

evoke the civic virtue necessary to its institutional and

psychological perpetuation and refinement.
"The Politics of the Steady State" is the most

explicit statement of the political economy Taylor
endorses, but

alludes only darkly to the philosophical

it

convictions that ground this endorsement.
these convictions comes from
into discourse
to

a

a

a

What we learn of

vocabulary which insinuates

respect for natural limits.

discussion of socialism,

for

We move now

Taylor's critique of the

Promethean urge clarifies the philosophical basis of

steady-state

.

Prom e t h e £n_?ocJL al

.ism

Socialism has been
a

a

a

major vehicle of protest against

wretchedly contented civilization in its capitalist form.

The humanist Marxist tradition has opposed

f

he commodity

fetishism and alienatpd worker-self of capitalism and has
been

a

witness for the possibility of an existence that

reconciles the instrumental with the expressive, reuniting
humans with themselves, their fellows and ^hpir natural

surroundings.

Socialist theorists of the state who endorse
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this humanist Marxism, and this includes Habermas,

acknowledge that the reconciliation between the part of the
self that can act strategically and the part that longs for

creative expression necessitates

a

integrating the self with "nature."
to be whole,
be

to

larger reconciliation -Tn

order for the self

experience fulfillment, the individual

must-

able to locate its self within the generally accepted

definition of "human nature," identify with the social
roles available, and see its self as somehow connected to
the natural

environment.

This idea of socialism is Promethean in that it seeks
to situate humans

in

the larger scheme of things by

humanizing the larger scheme.

Personal and collective

identity are established by reshaping nature and society to

conform to the contours of human aims.

Harmony with

nature is achieved through molding it.

Promethean

transformation of the world becomes the solution to the
expressive deadness of modernity.
To

aim to transform the non-conscious aspects and

elements within nature is not exactly the aim to master
them.
is

a

Habermas is not reducible to Lowi.
conversion,

implying

a

A

transforming

change fitting something for

a

new or different use, an alteration in its outward form.

Transformation requires

a

more subtle relation to

non-conscious things than does mastery; the conscious self
must

invest itself creatively in the object to be

y

:
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transformed and

usually does this through labor, as

it

woodworker transforms

a

tree into

a

table.

a

contrast, to

In

master is to dominate, to overcome, to pre-empt, to
command.

To master

up the roots,
Tn

and

a

tree would entail

razing it, digging

paving over the soil.

practice, however, this distinction between

transformation and mastery is easily blurred, for

transformation and mastery have this in common:
fully acknowledges limits to change

i

neither

nhere nt in and

part icular to the things to be changed.

These limits

provide, as we shall see, the linch pin of Taylor's

affirmative position.

Within the

tr

an

s fo

rm

at i on/

m as

t

er

orientation, limits encountered stem only from the will of
the subject to carry out its intention.

transformation

So

slides over into the insistence that no n- conscious elements
be made over
So

to make

to

resemble the self-conscious subject of use.

Fabermas does share the fundamental drive of Lowi
the world over and make it our own.

We must

transform our instinctual, passionate, or irrational
selves, our faction- ridden society,

and our dangerous,

resistant natural environment to fit that part of the self
most under the control of reason or will.

transform nature

in

Thus, the aim to

order to express the self entails

science of self, society and nature that investigates
order to devise techiniques of control.

The

a

in

Promethean
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reconciliation of the instrumental and expressive strands
of modern thought fails,
A

says Taylor.

note on this science of self:

Although Habermas has

certainly tried, he has not come up with
to confine the

a

convincing way

Promethean or technical orientation to

non-hum an nature.

While "the example of the sculptor

certainly shows that man can have both an expressive and

objectifying relation to nature at once" 611 (the clay

an

is

transformed through the imposition of creative will and the
sculptor finds his realization partially through the

sculpture), humans are not clay and socialism
theory not an aesthetic project.

A

is

a

social

"science of man in

society which identifies the determinants of people's

behavior [means that]... some men are controlling or

manipulating others." 65
Habermas'

Thus, the expressive dimension of

theory is still always in danger of being

swallowed up by the instrumental; his distinction between
the technical interest on the one hand and the practical
and

emancipatory interests on the other cannot save him.
Socialist

ex pr essiv

i

sm

,

then, releases human

creativity from the bounds of utilitarian work and
instrumental thought
as

at

the price of

a

conception of nature

material upon which we work our will and express our

selves.

It

exposes the natural environment to the

destruction characteristic of post-Enlightenment

,
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civilization and

it

cannot prevent this destruction from

spreading to humans.

While the proposals of Taylor's steady-state have

significant elements in common with Habermas'

state,

this Promethean element he seeks to correct.

Taylor

it

is

strives to articulate an expressivism that can foster

self-realization and
bent of thin gs.
the

a__c

ert a i_n_s e n s i^tj^v i t_y_t o_t h_e_n a t ural

The manipulation of nature which governs

Habermasian ideal gives way here to

a

quest for

attunement to nature.
A

second difficulty Taylor has with socialist

expressivism

is

the view of freedom subsumed in its

Promethean stance.

Freedom is the ability to assert one's

will and express one's self creatively through

Freedom is situationless

transformation of nature.

requiring the release from the constraints of the world;
"to be free is to be untrammeled, to depend

actions only on oneself,"

overcome.

66

self-assertion

sufficient conception of freedom, even
It

one's

for only then can alienation be

Put this self-dependent

says Taylor.

in

in

is

not

a

socialist terms,

neatly captures one dimension of the

freedom of an isolated individual, but it fails to consider
the political dimension of freedom.

And

socialist freedom

aspires to collective sel f-expression which requires

dialogue, political discourse, i.e., more than the
technical proficiency of labor or craftsmanship.

Socialist
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freedom, the Fab erm as i an variant included, cannot respond
to this question:

"What constraints, divisions, tensions,

dilemmas, struggles and estrangements will replace those we
know today?"

f\

7

Socialist freedom,

in

order to fulfill its own

collectivist aims, must come to grips with the limits to
sociality, to human communication, to

a

rational

society.

Even if some see the masterful, rational state as an ideal

only, theoretical
at

odds with

pursuit of
Hegel,

^

a

accomodation to limits

is

fundamentally

Promethean orientation to natu re

a

.

The

situationl ess freedom, says Taylor with

will ultimately compromise any concern about

a

state with which citizens can collectively identify.

Taylor insists that freedom be situated.

But what

the "situation" that "sets goals for us... imparts
to

shape

rationality and provides an inspiration for creat-

ivity"?

69

To

explore what Taylor means by "situation" is

to give content
in

a

is

the self and

to his claim that
in

there is

a

natural b^nt

nature to which it is politically

possible to be attuned.
We

turn now to an account of Taylor's affirmative

position, an expressivism of

at

tun em en t.
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Attuned

Ex pr ess

i

v

ism

The ex pressiv ism of attunement shares with all

expressivism
not

a

a

ho

i

istic conception of self.

composite of "faculties," nor

soul, but

a

a

compound of body and

unified, integrated whole.

no n- ar b i t r ar y as

all that has

proper and internal to

it

alien and external to it.

and
A

The self is

Now,

anything as

properties and functions

properties and functions
holistic approach to the self,

contrasted to an atomistic approach, exposes

a

certain

telos in the object of inauiry, where telos is defined as

tendency toward certain natural characteristics.

a

To

understand holistically is to seek out interconnections
between the self and its social context; thus, different
ways of life can either enable or distort what we
70
authentically are.
An

authentic life does not work against the grain of

"identity," against the bent of what

it

means to be

a

human

person.

identity is therefore defined by certain
evaluations which are inseparable from ourselves
Shorn of these we would cease to be
as agents.
which we do not mean trivially that
by
ourselves,
we would be different in the sense of having some
but
properties other than those we now have...
that. ..we would lose the y^ry possibility of...
our existence as persons.
Our

—

What are these "certain evaluations" that define

personal identity?

Taylor has in mind

a

specific set of
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background understandings and abilities ineliminable to
human personhood; his argument is not simply that some

understandings, which could vary according to cultural
context and to the degree of political assent given to
are essential

them,
of
1

im

s

i

i t

t

ua t

ed

i

on 1 e s s-

/ defi n

ed

fre

to

human identity.

a

ed om

too,

,

a

his critique

the "situation" that

the common good of

arbitrary but linked up to

Tn

a

society was not

certain notion of the highest

Taylor's "certain evaluations" include the

human good.

ability to judge and be motivated by the difference between
"noble" and "base"; the capacity for responsibility,
agency, reflection; the pursuit of integrity (the

integrated-ness of the self)

and

its consequence, dignity.

Who is the "we" whose identity depends upon these

"certain evaluations"?

The "we"

seems to slide among (1)

"we who actively and self-consciously endorse these certain

evaluations," to (2) "we who are responsible, modern selves

regardless of any explicit endorsement of
of self,"

to

(3)

"we who

historical situation," to
to

(5)

"we who

a

holist theory

are intelligent heirs of our
(4)

"we who are modern humans,"

are humans."

These are not exactly "slides,"

for there

is

a

way in

as
which all of the "we's" coincide for Taylor -- humans

such (95)
on

are today more authentic the closer they approach

the scale,

the more they understand themselves to
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be

what they have already become

ex pr essiv ist-hol ist

—

deep evaluators on the

model.

important second feature of Taylor's discussion of

An

"situation" is the role articulation (or, more broadly,
language)

plays in human identity.

The linguistic

providing

a

facet of "situation" enables by

shared background of concepts and terms with

which we can communicate.

But it also limits,

for

we can

never be the masters of this rich and deep thing called

language.

Jn

his discussion of the self,

his position primarily through

a

Taylor develops

contrast with atomism;

here his opponent is the designative theory of language.

Language is not

an assemblage of separable
wh i c h can be used to marshall
ideas, this use being something we can fully
control and oversee.
Rather it is.. .a web...
Because the words we use now only have a sense
through their place in the whole web, we can
never in principle have a clear oversight of the
implications of what we say. ..Cur language is
always more than we can encompass.
n s t r urn e n t s

i

.

.

.

The inexhaustibility of language stems both from its

historical-cultural density and from the finitude of the
individual self.
express?

Language expresses.

Put what does it

The first answer is the self or rather the

highest human self, for the optimal self clarifies and thus

brings into being different human feelings or experiences.
It

is

a

self that can discern, upon reflection, the

differences between embarassment and annoyance or between
fatigue and discouragement.

The second answer is the

d

.
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wo r

1

for

«

in

expressing/realizing our selves we are at the

same time "responding to the reality in which we are set,
in

which we are included, of course, but which is not

reducible to our experience of it."

'

By

including the

second answer, Taylor attempts to correct for the human-

centeredness of the Promethean form of

ex pr e s

s iv i

sm

When we use language to interpret an event or to make

moral evaluation, we express neither subjective

a

preferences nor objective descriptions.

Rather,

articulations "are attempts to formulate what is initially
inchoate, or con f u s ed

.

.

.

[

T

]

h

i s

kind of formulation...
Put neither does it

doesn't leave its object unchanged."

wholly constitute it.

That "initially inchoate"

what we seek to attune ourselves

t_o_.

stuff is

One clear thing

Taylor can say, then, about "the bent of things" is that

humans help bring it into being by articulating it.

We

real-ize it by recognizing it.
This view of language and the role of humans as

interpreter of the world resonates with Pobust Faith's view
text.

Language doesn't simply refer to

of the world

as

something

"represents"; rather, it manifests something,

a

it

something that can be called being.

"[Tlhere is

a

distinction between distorted and authentic
sel f-understand ing

follow

a

direction

.

.

•

latter can in

.the

in

u
being.'..75
•

a

sense be said to

2?2

"Situation" then, for Taylor, has not only

human

a

facet, i.e., what is required for human identity and hy an

intersubj ective linguistic community, but also

a

non-human

facet, i.e., what is required by "the world," or "reality."
We explore

further this su pe r- i

evidence for

a

"direction

nd

iv i d

ua1

and super-cultural

being" as it emerges in

in

Taylor's view of natural science.
Taylor acknowledges with Kuhn and others that

interpretation is involved

natural science, that all

in

natural science explanation rests upon
fully articulated pr e- theor et

ic a]

a

background of not

understandings about the

natural universe, what it is and how it exists.

Still,

claims Taylor, that is not to say that reality is

subjective, or even
sound

i

n t er

sub

ec t

j

i

v e

.

" [ I

]

t

has seemed

a

principle of scientific explanation since the

seventeenth century that the world should be accounted for
in

absolute terms,"

76

that is, terms not dependent upon the

meanings the world has for human subjects.

For

Taylor,

natural science "really illuminates the natural

universe

"

77

.

The reason the Galileo-Descartes model of science

triumphed over the worl d-as-text model, says Taylor, is
because the former fit the universe better.

might have bepn the case that the theories of
wo ul d have turned out to
the high Re n a i s s a n c e
be better science... but that would have been
because the way in which things react and relate
which
to each other would have been of the kind
is characterizable in the concepts of
It

.

.

.
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correspondence, meaning, and so en.
would have been very different. y

The universe

Human powers of perception are better in tune with the

universe when they employ the Descartes-Galileo model of
science.

Fvidence of this is that it works better.

Attunement between science and nature is not

product of

a

convention for Taylor -- modern science did not triumph
simply because the scientific community came to
about it.

Rather, nature allows and disallows

scientific interpretations.

There is

consensus

a

range of

a

primordial, albeit

a

murky, connection between the world and us, between the
world and the appearance given to us.

Although Taylor rejects the pursuit of

purely

a

objective social science, where the social scientist seeks
a

language that segregates "reality"

understands its appeal.

"[Albsolute

offer the hope of intersub j ectiv

interpretive dispute." 79

relativism

in

from "experience,"

e

de

i

pt

i

on

.

.

.

se em s

to

agreement free from

Objectivism

social theory;

scr

he

is

one way to avoid

Taylor offers an expressivism

of attunement as another.
In

summary, the expressivism of attunement had to

convince on several fronts.
First, it had to show that any meaningful human

existence requires

a

"situation"

—

a

"certain evaluations" of language, of

background context
a

orientation to the natural environment.

cultural

oi

Second, it had to show that this "horizon of the

implicit, of unreflected life and experience" 80 is not
fully amenable to human manipulation (resisting some human

actions and interpretations and amenable to others), but

nevertheless is one to which we belong.
a

He

must articulate

"situation" with which we can be attuned but never with

which we coincide, and provide

a

"notion of

a

freed om

rooted in our nature, and yet which can be frustrated by
our own desires."

8

1

Taylor attempted to do this through

holism that exhibited

a

certain telos in the self and

a

through an appeal to the superior explanatory power of

modern sc i ence

.

Third, Taylor must convince us that the best way for
us

to relate to such

world is to make ourselves con sonant

a

Taylor's strategy for this task is to eschew

with it.

logical argumentation for suggestive metaphors.
is

our best

in

Because it

interest, we must seek:

-

"a deep endorsement of the course of things"

-

"an

82

affirmation of this defining situation as

ours"
-

"the notion of

a

bent in our situation which we can

either endorse or reject, re-interpret or

distort"
-

"a

84

conception of man in which free action is the

response to what we are
to

85
us""

—

or

to

a

call which comes

2?5
is my contention

Tt

that although Taylor succeeds

rather well with the first two tasks, he fails with the
last.

Put that is the one in which he must succeed to

vindicate his theory.

now examine critically the

We

expressivism of attunement.

A_Critique of the Attuned State

On

the one hand, Taylor's formulations strive to evoke

the resistance or moment of otherness of the world.

He

wants to retain ?n absolutist rroment in natural science

because there must be
us

to

be attuned

a

world "out there" in some sense for
when some philosophers of science

So

_to.

dissolve the world into

i n t

er

s

ub j ec t iv

i

ty

,

Taylor is

concerned to preserve the moment of truth in the

objectivism of the logical empiricists:

Natural objects
T hus,

are independent enough to resist or stimulate us.

when

Taylor speaks of "the appearance given to the
he offers

world

a

carefully crafted phrase.

not say "the appearance of the world,"
the existence of

a

give to the world,"

the world ex
we give

to

n

it.

does

for that could

imply

full-fledged independent "reality"

behind the "appearance."
we

He

for

say "the appearance

Nor does he

that could imply that we create

ihilo and the world is but the "appearance"
To

say that there is

a

peculiar appearance

given to the world is to suggest that although we
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participate in the making of the world (the world is
made
real by appearing to or being perceived by us), the world
is

also

in

sense already there, given to us with

a

certain appearance, presented to us with
On

the other hand,

T ay ior

a

a

specific face.

believes that this

recalcitrant nature need not remain alien and can be
transfigured into
we give it

amicable companion for humans if only

an

its due,

acknowledge it, and respect it in our

interactions with it.
to the world

can

Ultimately, an attuned orientation

enable us to "straddle the gap between

things and our experience of them."
Here we see what
must walk.

resistance

He

is

fine line Taylor's expressivism

concerned to defend

nature,

in

a

R7

a

a

moment of

moment indicative of the presence

of an inherent order in nature, but his assumption that we
can harmonize ourselves with this order without much

violence done to ourselves or to nature makes the quasiindependence of nature's structure weaker and weaker and
Taylor's expressivism,

more and more human-like.

exemplified by the phrase "the appearance given to the
world," implies two potentially incompatible claims:
the world
is

is

other to us, partly opaque and

accessible and can be

in

He

the world

harmony with us.

This tension is neither resolved
by Taylor.

(2)

M)

nor

further refined

convinces us that the world is never

transparent to us, but when we ask why the correct response

t

2 3?

to the world

is

attunement, he cannot provide

a

definitive

answer that would rule out all other orientations.

crucial
an

for his theory of the

It

is

state that Taylor supply such

answer, otherwise the attuned steady-state cannot

generate the civic virtue necessary to it.
Why ought we pursue an expressivism of harmonization''

Why do we "need" notions like "a natural bent to the

world"?

And

what in the world speaks to that need?

Taylor's answer seems to be that harmonization

superior

is

because all other modern orientations have serious
problems.

Taylor argues by elimination:

(1) The

unconscious unity of self and nature of Robust Faith is

impossible once the level of self-consciousness passes
certain point

its historical development;

in

instrumental, utilitarian orientation of

Fn

]

(2)
i

g

a

The

ht enm en

destroys nature and leaves humans alienated and open to
manipulation;

(3)

The pursuit of an unsituated, self-

dependent existence through Promethean transformation
reduces to (2) and carries authoritarian tendencies.
are left, then,

Ve

with an expressivism of attunement and this

approach alone holds the promise of an authentic existence:
We

will be most

free

if

we

acknowledge our situatedness and

attempt to harmonize ourselves with it.

The same structure

of persuasion applies to all of Taylor's articles, whether

they address the question of the best ethical theory, the
ideal state, the most defensible concept of the person, the
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relation of language to being, or the structure of the
natural and social sciences.

8 8

Taylor's critique of

alternative approaches to these topics evokes our sense of
their inadequacy and leaves us with the implication that an

orientation of attunement is the only viable path open.
Put,

even if Taylor could destroy all

possible

opponents, the argument by elimination would not

necessarily establish Taylor's position.
the opponents

It

could be that

foster faulty understandings of freedom and

politics even while Taylor's alternative is incapable of

realization.

Perhaps Baylor's expressivism expresses

longing rather than

a

a

possibility.

real

Perhaps the persistent urge

in

the self to be at one

with nature, the longing to believe that the world has an

inherent structure with which we can be

in

harmony and

which can guide an authentic human life, need not imply

anything but

a

natural bent

in

Perhaps it does not imply

human need.

a

the self or in the universe that can

satisfy that need.
Taylor first established
bent,

in

a

moment of objectivity,

a

the self and the universe in order that there be

something no n- sub j

ec t-

d

er

i

v

ed

to

guide subjects.

Put that

non-subjective something, while real, may be incapable of
the degree of guidance "attunement"

implies; it might be

touchable by human reason or unreason only sporadically and
incapable of unifying human existence.

There is, as Taylor
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himself admits,

a

"gap between things and our experience of

them," but that gap is not necessarily the exclusive

product of non-attuned orientations like utilitarianism.

Promethean theories of the state deny the integrity of
nature and the resistance of self and society to rational

organization.

They are like lions devouring their prey.

The attuned

state also denies the otherness of self and

world.

it

But

is

like an amoeba suffocating and

incorporating its victim into

a

larger unity.

In

the

theory of the attuned state, telos, perhaps nothing more
longing that there be

telos, has moved from belief

than

a

in

divinely inspired nature to belief in the possibility

a

a

of self-conscious harmonization of self and nature.
The expressivism of attunement underlies Taylor's

steady state.

Ts

there

a

theory of the state that neither

gives free reign to the Promethean urge nor seeks to

incorporate the world into higher and higher levels of

rationality?
directed

.

It

is

to

this inquiry that Chapter

V

is

...
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CHAPTER

V

UNTHINKING FAITH AND ENLIGHTENMENT

S

umm ar

This study was based on the assumption that Hegel's

account of the dialectic of Faith and Enlightenment

correctly identifies two recurrent orientations to the
modern world and contains profound insight into the play
between them.

It

has sought, therefore, to explore the

possibility that the terms of the dialectic continue to set
frame for contemporary political discourse.

a

What

insights and unusual kernels of understanding drop out as

a

result of interpreting contemporary discourse as the heir
of the

Faith-Enlightenment struggle?

To

pursue this lead,

the study has probed the environmental debate and some
Let us see where this

contemporary theories of the state.
exploration has led us.
It

has exposed

limitations

in

each of the proferred

perspectives and interpreted these limitations as

a

function of the dynamic between them -- each set of flaws
is

constituted in conjunction with the other set.

The

deficiencies of Faith prompt replies by Enlightenment that
become the strengths of the affirmative position of

Enlightenment; the inadequacies of
and

Fn

1

ig

htenm ent are noted

of
remedied by Faith and become the "moments of truth"
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Faith.

Put more broadly,

each position crystallizes in

response to its opponent as each dramatizes elements of an

orientation to the environment or to the state needed but
unavailable to the other.

By

focusing on the dynamic

between them, we reveal affinities and connections between

mutually acclaimed adversaries.
Toward this end, the analysis had to shift from the

domain emphasized by each theory to the "ontological space"
they share.

The phrase "ontological space"

is meant

to

suggest the broad historical context -- the unthought -that allows one complex of competing ideas and practices to

emerge and makes another nearly unthinkable.
enchanted world of Robust Faith constitutes

Thus, the
a

different

ontological space than the ho 1 ist-Pr om ethean complex of

modernity.
One way to map this space is to bring the orientation
to

nature implied

in

each perspective to the surface.

difference in conceptions of nature goes
accounting for the differences

in

raw materia]

to

be

used

long way toward

environmentalist

perspectives and ideals of the state:
as

a

The

and mastered

To conceive
is

nature

to be able to

advocate environmental management, juridical democracy and
the rational

state; to conceive nature as ordered in

fundamental harmony with human needs is to be able to
advocate ecological holism and the attuned state.
say that the conception of nature determi nes the

T

do not
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conceptions of self, knowledge, politics and freedom
associated with it; but, first, it helps to enable them,
and,

second,

it

is the one

least thematized in contemporary

political thought and therefore most interesting to pursue.
The conceptions of nature,

create

self,

knowledge, etc., together

porous setting which enables and disables

a

political discourse.

Chapters Til and
A

critique of

a

T

V

contained the following structure:

Promethean perspective was followed by

a

critique of the ontological assumption of harmony of
natural holism or the attuned state.

Let us review the

findings of these two sets of critiques.
Natural holism, the critique of the Promethean posture

toward nature, explained the inability of even the most

sophisticated version of environmental management to
reverse the trend of environmental deterioration and linked
this to the management view of nature as standing reserve.
The management

framework cannot generate

a

respect for

respect for its mysteries and unintelligibil-

nature,

a

ities.

When it does begin to recognize the difficulties

its conception of nature as standing reserve,
an

ethic of "responsibility"

for

it

in

elaborates

the environment.

Yet this

environmental ethic affords respect to animate life only to
the degree that

it

approaches the standard of human

subjectivity and physiology.

In

short,

environmental

management pursues the audacious project of reorganizing
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nature, denaturing those beings and processes
amenable to

domestication and

h

ni za

t i

that are not.

fails as

a

It

urn a

on

,

and

extinguishing those

ethic of being in the world,

claims natural holism, in that

it

cannot engender care and

respect for those elements of nature not easily explained

through modern science.
The expressivism of attunement offers

similar

a

critique of the Promethean understanding of the state.
Such an understanding tries to surmount the paradoxes of

politics by believing in the sufficiency of

legal-rational

a

framework; and its tendency to identify

political repression with pre-modern societies blinds it to
the alienating

elements

in

its own

practices.

its

Tn

insistence upon judging dissension and protest against the

narrow standard of instrumental rationality, it

delegitimizes them as "nostalgia" and "romanticism."
Masterful theories of the state do not explore the

suspicion that the increasing rationalization of social
life alienates, divorcing us from the spiritual,

imaginative and other non-rational aspects of ourselves and
our

world.

And

a

repressive state:

state that fosters alienation is

The untoward elements of the self,

social order, and nature are smothered

external (technocratic)
The masterful

a

or

in

a

the

sticky web of

internal (socialized)

control.

theories, claims the attuned state, aim to

install respect for persons, but their passion for
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coordination results in disrespect for those modes of selfexpression that do not or may not live up to the narrowed
standard of rationality.

Enlightened theories of the state

require such extensive management of its citizenry that the

commitment to people as end s- i n- t h ems el v e s is jeopardized.
The main thrust of the holist critique of
Pr

ometheani sm can now be stated more cogently:

Promethean-

ism first denies and then attempts to dominate that which

does not quite fit its categories.
This study has also explored and criticized holism's

attempts to remedy the flaws in the Promethean orientation
to the

non-rational.

It

claims that with philosophical

subtlety and existential humility the non-rational need not
be mastered but

can be accomodated.

But we saw how more

than subtlety and humility was required to sustain the

holist positions -- the assumption of an ontological

harmony was also needed.

And

the holist project maintains

an

eerie affinity with the Promethean one:

to

let otherness be,

to

tolerate

it

neither aspires

even after it has come

out of the closet, to allow it to find expression in its
own way.

For holism,

there really is no such thing as

"otherness" in its radical sense, there are only aspects of
being that lie beyond the limits of our capacity to know.

While there are aspects of being that modernity tends to
treat as "other"

—

spirituality,

imagination, mystery --

these are at base integral parts of

a

world to which we can
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somehow be attuned.

Holism says:

Although alienation will

always exist, it is an epi st emol og ic al

condition.

If

Pr om eth e a n

i

sm

not an ontological,

,

wants to master otherness,

holism wants to bring it into attunement with an enriched
self and

a

more responsive social world.

Chapters III and IV, then, left the reader with the

suggestion of this affinity:

Pr om eth e

an i

sm

seeks to impose

human form upon otherness, first denying and then

suppressing it; holism seeks to cajole it into binding its
identity to that of
and

a

larger unity,

first assimilating it

then defining resistance to assimilation as

inauthenticity, as an expression of "subjectivism."
too is an
is

imposition of form, if it is true that otherness

ineradicable and that the world was not designed to

human specifications.
holism, while correct
is

This

Chapters III and IV proposed that
in

its expose of

itself not nearly humble enough

humility only on the assumption of
world.

—
a

Promethean hubris
or

is

,

capable of

beautifully designed

Natural holism and the theory of attunement seek to

identify otherness but not to let it be.

While asserting

that the domination of the unordered remainder -- the

non-rational -- can only drive
themselves propose
For example,

a

in

it

underground, they

method for truly reducing it.
Chapter III, holism accused

environmental management of respecting nature only insofar
as

it

approached the standards of human rationality

—

the
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sin of anthropocentrism.
tal

management to defend

It
a

was difficult

for environmen-

non-destructive orientation to

that which lay beyond these standards and refused to be

humanized.

But we saw how natural holism'

s

"respect" for

nature depended upon the view that nature is designed for
us

and

we designed

to

fit

it.

can defend

It

a

non-

destructive orientation to nature only on the condition
that it be on t o 1 og i c
Is

a 1 1 y

a

place where humans are at home.

this not another version of the insistence that humans

be at the center of the universe?

If

the world were not

predisposed to us, if its facp were illegible, could
natural holism resist the slide to environmental

management?
on

Does its resistance to management not depend

its slender

For

faith in attunement?

another example, in Chapter IV,

holism charged the

masterful state with denying, and thus responding

inappropriately to, the limits
self and the polity.
is

what

in

to

the orderability of the

The shadowy land beyond these limits

another vocabulary is called otherness.

The

theory of attunement is less likely to pretend that

otherness can be eradicated through knowledge.
how its acknowledgement of otherness was

a

Put we

saw

targeting of

that which is in need of reconciliation with the natural

bent of things.
is

to create

a

Its (admittedly always

self that listens to

definition knows what

is

best.

project

world that by

a

Sel f-

incomplete)

f

ul f

i 1

lmen t lies in

.
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making ourselves as congruent as possible with this natural
structure.
a

It

s

presumptuous demand is that humans inhabit

world ontolog icall

y

predisposed to them.

This concluding chapter asks whether the holist and
the

Promethean orientations to nature and to the state, and

thus to otherness, exhaust the realm of the possible

orientations available in modernity.

At minimum,

we can

say that they are deeply entrenched orientations.

This

study has not attempted to establish that contemporary
political discourse

untenable positions.
its major voices

sterile, oscillating between two

is

It

has claimed, rather, that two of

interact in

predictable pattern:

a

Each

side asserts and re-asserts its primary thesis, each

continues to make the same critical points about the other,
and neither has been successful

in

articulating

a

position

that can address its limitations without compromising its

own primary insight.

Because we have explored
than offered proof for

a

a

thesis,

likely possibility rather
it

is

still an open

question whether or not contemporary political discourse
should (or can) move beyond holism and Promethean!
The interpretation

more than one project.

and

sm

analysis pursued here suggest

One might take issue with the

Faith-Enlightenment framework and develop

a

different

the
interpretation of these issues; another might accept
the
terms of the framework but reject the claim about
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ultimate insufficiency of holist or Promethean
stances,
pursuing further one of them.

The version of this latter

project most likely to succeed, it seems to me, is one

following the lines of Mer 1 eau -Pont

perception.

Py

a

'

s

phenomenology of

focusing on the essentially ambiguous

relation between
and

y

self simultaneously subject and object,

a

world simultaneously human-made and other, it may

avoid the teleological drift of other holist positions.
Tn

this concluding chapter, however,

I

mean to pursue

path leading beyond the debate between holism and

a

Prometheanism

Here, their debate sounds like an over-

.

played hit song

predictable.

—

once full of promise, now annoyingly

This path has only recently begun to be

cleared; it is only after working through Hegel's dialectic
that we can discern

thought.

its

existence at the edge of our

(This is revealed by the fact that all of the

leading clearers have been involved

the study of Hegel.)

in

cannot now guarantee that this path leads anywhere one

I

might want to go, but its appeal lies partly in the fact
that its promise,
d

isappo in ted
In

.

contrast to the thought -experiment that gave

primacy to the hoi

modernity,
at

still bathed in the shadows, has not yet

I

i s

t-Pr omethean representation of

will re focus the picture

a

first time and look

modernity after all traces of harmonious holism have

been erased by Michel

Foucault.

From such

a

perspective,
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the categories of the Promethean and the holist
appear less

encompassing than those content to remain
have us believe.

a

them would

This loosening of categories allows me to

refocus the picture
ethics:

in

a

second time and ask

question of

a

Can there be an orientation to the self, others,

nature that is not destructive of the non-rational,

nd

non-rational izable and non-intelligible elements therein
a

that does not,

nd

world to be us e rhoi

i

sm

.

implicitly or explicitly, assume the

fr i e

nd

1

y?

My

response is

a

"fractious

"

The

First

Refocus

While Pobust Faith was able to enchant the world,
giving

it

a

harmonious coherence with

could not sustain itself.

a

Foucaultian perspective,

fanciful super imposit ion upon

it

was

to

fulfill human fantasies:

a

From

divine source, it

a

a

world not designed

We must not imagine that the world turns toward
us a legible face which we would have only to
decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our
knowledge; there is no pr ed i sc ur s i v e providence
which disposes the world in our favor.

The flaws

—
a

in

Robust Faith identified by Enlightenment

its confusion of the material and the immaterial through

system of resemblances, its adoration of historically

contingent forms -- were not taken by Enlightenment as
evidence of the world's recalcitrance to human knowledge
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and control, but as evidence of

attempt to read

a

a

too passive and naive

world inherently legible through careful

observation and the slow accumulation of scientific
knowledge.

Enlightenment itself was not ready to draw the

more radical conclusion that world and self are multiple
and

would resist secular as well as religious unification.

(Despite its retention of

Enlightenment was

a

a

basically creationist ontology,

turning point:

decaying remnants of Faith, it began

By clearing away the
a

new order of things

enabling those like Nietzsche and Foucault to assert their
thesis of radical disharmony and explore its implications.)
The post-Enlightenment self became self-assertive.
The old confidence in God was replaced first by an equally

comforting self-confidence and later by the chilling
conclusion that self-assertion was the only thing available
in

for

a

world indifferent to our needs, opaque to our quest

knowledge, and resistant to our control.
Modernity, then, is an attitude of engagement with the

present,

a

self- assigned task, as well as

which one belongs.

themati zation

.

a

context to

The essence of this engagement is

Always alert for signs of that which lies

below the threshold of awareness, moderns forge "topics,"
"fields of study,"

"subject-matters."

self, others, nature,

are transformed

Modes of relating to
from underground

wanderings to categories and theories, for only

so

enclosed

in the open.
can these dangerous elements be brought

The
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relation between generalized understandings and
idiosyncratic thoughts can become the struggle between

"tradition" and "liberty"; group labor using available

instrumentalities can turn into the "relations of
production" and the "mode of production"; notions of death
or

the gods can be tested

for

coherence of "theology."

the efficacy of "myth"

or the

Themati zat ion permeates modern

"For the first time in history. ..the fact of living

life:

was no longer an inaccessible substrate that only emerged
from time to time, amid

fatality."

2

the randomness of death

and

The biological bases of human existence

human bodies, their collaboration as pairs and as

—

can

form

a

"sexuality"

Of course,

and

a

a

its

—
species

"population."

non-modern thought too placed life within

some frame, but the intensity (perhaps desperation)

of the

modern attitude and the extent of its thematic reach into
life set

it

apart.

The Fn

1

ig ht enm en t

debunking of Faith's

tradition, its application of what Hegel called negative
critique to religion, superstition and custom, entailed the

crystallization of "religion," "superstition" and
"custom"--for "tradition" itself
a

is

seen

the product of

as

certain thematic incorporation from this Foucaultian

perspective.

In

contrast to Platonic or Christian

systematic thought, modern thought employs

methodology of them at i
deploy critique

in

za

t

ion -- no

a

veritable

longer imperative to

the service of some ideal, digging up
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ground becomes liberating in itself simply because it may
open new possibilities.
But Foucault shows us that them at i za tion is

a

two-edged sword.
First, the surgical cut.

specificity to

a

To

clarify or give

process or an entity is not to leave it

unchanged, but to make an intelligible form out of

Organizing

one.
into

a

a

a

liquid

diffuse or loosely conglomerated mass

system, identity is bestowed, producing as an

individuated unity that which was inchoate or perhaps
stable but unrecognizably so.
t h em a t i za t

i

on

to

an

Moderns have raised

addressing the need to have

art,

a

comfortable, comforting world clearly related to us.
Themati zation has also extended the realm of public action,

enhancing the possibility of social change.

Gender, race,

the organization of the economy, the environment --

phenomena formerly the province of fate or the reflection
of non-gener ali zable interests

political

issues.

—

have been organized

into

Poth the cause and the effect of this

politici zation is an increasing awareness that the

categories and beliefs

we

employ, the roles we play, even

define
the cultural and natural objects against which we
our

selves, are significantly human-made.

find

if human

very
finitude and fallibility are insinuated into the

structure of our world, then that structure can be altered
It

is

more
possible that new social constructions will be

.
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equitable or just or less dangerous.
that the modern world
It

is

an

is

protest against

this sense

artificial, although real enough.

th

em

Let us recall the attuned
ati

za t

i

press iv

i

expressivist

before we explore the

on

Foucaultian position, for the latter is
ex

in

artificial reality.

Now the wound.

to

is

It

a

critical response

sm

Them ati zation

,

cries the theorist of attunement,

fosters an an thro poc entr ic humanism; too much in modernity
rides on human reason!

Understood throughout history as

difficult and elusive power,
transform reason into

an

Enlightenment tried to

edifice of rationality with

precisely distinguished compartments.
be

filtered through

a

a

grid

and

Reality would thus

emerge neatly ordered, the

relations among phenomena rendered predictable once again.
Put

Enlightenment, and we as its heirs, have stretched

reason to the breaking point, say the expressivists.

Straining

to

cover the expanded terrain, it shed some of

its substance,

trimming itself down more and more to its

instrumental and procedural functions.

The

pursuit of

society thus rationalized led to the supremacy of

technological and utilitarian mentality.

a

a

According to

Enlightenment's plan, reason's jurisdiction was to include
all

phenomena, but it could achieve universality only by

restricting its clientele.
non- cog

n i t

i

v e

Spiritual, aesthetic, or

dimensions of life that could not be covered
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by the terms of this reduced rationality were ignored or

repressed.

The not clearly intelligible became the

irrelevant, the unreal, and modern life lost much richness,
color and meaning.

Enlightenment's rational solution to

the retreat of Faith failed

to

re-integrate the world.

The loose th emati zat io n of

Robust Faith did not have

these problems, the expressivist continues, for it

integrated the non-rational as

a

This solution

cosmology.

is

not available to us in its robust form,

in

a

for the belief

divinely ordered nature is incompatible with the

acknowledgement, made necessary after Enlightenment's
success, of the extent of human participation
world.

Put Faith

seeks to replace

successor.

I

is
a

not dead!

in

self and

cries the expressivist as he

Robust Faith with

a

more modest

will conclude the summary of the attuned

expressivist critique of themati zation with an account of
the differences between this more modest successor and

a

robust teleological position.
First, the attuned expressivist says, although telos

cannot be understood as an actuality, it can be conceived
as

a

possibility.

there is

And

direction

a

in

why foreclose the possibility that

being capable of some degree of

discernment and guidance?

This possibility "doesn't

seem. ..to be in worse shape than its obvious rivals.

Second, the locus of telos must shift from

nature to

a

self with an inherent bent.

an

For

3

enchanted
is

it

not the
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case that we can discern

difference between more and less

a

authentic interpretations of self?

Third, while this telos

may be even more difficult to divine (since nature is no
longer filled with the signs of God's will), our

articulation of it must be clearer and more self-conscious.
That is, because moderns are no longer content to explain
the vagueness of an ontological bent as an inexplicable

mystery, expressivism must show how

a

weak telos in the

self is compatible with some version of science and

rational ity.
We

are now in

a

position fo continue the Foucaultian

critique of th ema ti zat ion
second

,

aiming eventually toward

a

refocus and the articulation of an ethics of

otherness

.

For Foucault, the theory of attunement misunderstands

the underside of

th

em

at

i

za

t i

on

The defect is best

:

understood not as an instrumental rationality gone wild,
but as the subjugation intrinsic to the quite sane pursuit
of self-conscious themati zation
and

Th

.

em ati za tion

politicizes, extending the realm of conscious human

management;

th

em

ati

enlightens and subjugates,

za t i o n

torturing the space for the no n-r a t i on
ment and holist modes of
and

enlightens

t

hem

at i

za

t i

al

on

i

zab le

.

Enlighten-

both cut two ways,

neither is sensitive enough to the wounds it creates.
Them ati zation is an imposition of form, doing violence

to

the otherness that resists the mold!

cries Foucault.
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Life in the enchanted world required loose th emati
zation

only,

for

its organizing

already in place.
it

categories were divine thoughts

The thinness of human

th

em

ati

za

t io n

made

less likely that otherness would stand out starkly, for

what appeared as heteroclite was as much

part of God's

a

plan as any other phenomenon; oddities that did exist, and

they always do, could be marvelled at as mysteries,

excluded, ignored, punished or exalted.

When life was only

superficially and sporadically brought into the sphere of
human administration, that which appeared anomalous, while
present,

was subject to less interference.

The effect of the Enlightenment canonization of reason
was not simply the devaluation of emotion or
as

imagination,

attuned express ivism implies, but the j_n_citement of

otherness, the insistence that

punishment or reformation.

it

expose itself to

Unreason, the non-rational-

izable, was not unclarified being, the victim of benign

neglect, but the irrational in need of prevention,

detection, inspection, intervention, treatment, defeat.
Th em a t i za t i o n

exacerbates otherness.

In

its

insistence

upon locating otherness within the categories of

rationality and normality,
the

Prometheani sm does not explore

suspicion that the increasing rationalization of social

life helps to

regulation.

foster more
In

its

forms of deviance in need of

insistence upon extending the sphere of

g
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legality into new areas of life, it helps to
foster new

illegalities

in

need of apprehension and punishment.

The Enlightenment expansion of them ati
the wrong means to the right end of

otherness.

It

was the targeting

and

r

e-

i

n t

za

egr

tion was not
a t

i

n

subjugation of an

otherness that would refuse to go away even were

spirituality and aesthetics to be valorized.

The

expressivist critique is on target with its focus on

Enlightenment rationalism, but fails to develop its

understanding of the link between rationalization and
normalization.

This link is

a

product of the fact that

life and world are always partially other to us and that

otherness is not fully susceptible to containment or

assimilation

.

Foucault's account of the modern deployment of

"sexuality" exemplifies this counterthesis.
an

"Sexuality,"

embodying construction that codifies the body and its

multiple pleasures, attacks the recalcitrant material
within.

"Sexuality" disciplines and normalizes

a

desiring

body conceived as "organs, somatic localizations,
functions, anatomo- physiological systems, sensations, and

pleasures."

The history of modern treatment (both

sensationalist and therapeutic) of bodies and bodily
desires that fall

out side

the

norm

—

nymphomaniacs, neuters, dwarfs, giants
the violence required

"sexuality."

by the

gays, hermaphrodites,

—

is

a

history of

institutionalization of
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"Sexuality" normalizes the self but leaves "sickness"
"deviance"

and
in

"

And

the subjugation involved

sexuali zation" is not confined to maltreatment of those

who do not fit.
for

its wake.

in

Fv en

are condemned

all

those who apparently do are interned,
to

a

wild goose chase in pursuit of

a

true nature, an authentic self that has been repressed.

"Sexuality" subjugates because it is false, or rather,
falsified because its status as historical construction

must be hidden for it to do its dirty work.

Through an

intricate system of psychiatric, therapeutic, medical,

commercial and religious institutions, we are lured to the

belief that "sexuality"

is

a

political prisoner and that an

authentic existence depends upon its liberation from the
confines of Puritan morality, Victorian prudishness or

bourgeois superficiality.
For Foucault, however, there is no true self to be

found, if truth is the discovery of some self-essence that

finally enables

"sexuality"
to

fall

into

is

a

harmonous identity.

The wet dream of

that all the pieces of the self are inclined

place.

Through its deployment,

...we have arrived at the point where we expect
our intelligibility to come from what was for
many centuries thought as madness; the plentitude
of our body from what was long considered its
stigma...; our identity from wha^ was perceived
as an obscure and nameless urge.

"Sexuality"

is

a

fictitious reality with imposing effects.

harmony must
because no natural harmony exists, any imposed
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be enforced by strategies like the Lowian, the
Habermasian,
the Tayloresque

by detailed

and

proliferating laws and

regulations and by insidiously internalized norms.
latter are especially pernicious, for

in

The

modernity norms,

like rationality, do not rest but constantly seek to expand

their terrain.

Foucault agrees with the expressivist that the Robust
Faith orientation to otherness entails too little self-

consciousness to be tenable today.
themati zat ion

once achieved historically, cannot be

,

dismantled without self-deception.

attunement

m

i s

level of

A

id en t

i

f

i

es

non-violent orientation

But

the theory of

the source of Robust Faith's
to

otherness:

Tt

believes that

Robust Faith was able to integrate and thereby dissolve

otherness into
violate.

In

harmonious cosmology, leaving nothing

a

to

reality, claims Foucault, otherness,

recalcitrant material, was not absent from the enchanted

—

world

it

was

s

impl

y

le ss

t

hematized

.

Thematization

increases the need to "do something" about otherness, it
does not cause otherness; Robust Faith allowed otherness to
roam

a

little,

Ex pr

it

did

it

essiv ism

1

s

not resolve it.

misinterpretation of Robust Faith gives

hope that some semblance of attunement can be

recaptured.

While Foucault shares

a

certain admiration for

Robust Faith, he cannot endorse any version of it today.
And

despite its divergence from

a

strong teleological
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position, attuned
in

pressiv ism still clings to what is most

ex

need of critique:

the notion that "self" and "nature"

are unifiable and truth- rev eal ing

still conceives life

Tt

.

too much in terms of

...man's concrete essence, the realization of his
potential ... The "right" to life, to one's body,
to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction
of
needs .. .be yond all the oppressions or
"alienation," the "right" te rediscover what one
is and all that one can be.

The

Second

Pefocus

Robust Faith's modest them ati

harmonious holism

stand

to

and

za

tion allowed

its

this in turn protected

otherness from the ravages of the Promethean urge.
po s t -Enl ig h

te

nm en t

f0 r

selves, however, the problem of

otherness cannot be solved that way, says Foucault.
Drawing loosely upon, but not confining myself to, this

Foucaultian critique of attunement,
more viable response

to

I

seek to develop

the problem of otherness.

question that guides my attempt is this:

a

The

How can we relate

ethically to otherness once we eschew teleological
pretensions and discern the ambiguous character of modern
themati zation?
My

concern

is

primarily with developing an ethic,

moral stance of greater tolerance for otherness.
ethic connects with

a

a

Eut an

view of the possibilities for ethical
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action given by the structure of the world, i.e., with
set of ontological assumptions.

I

a

call the set postulated

here "fractious holism."
Why holism?

non-human,
form

illegible and legible, elements of the world

whole,

a

endorse the view that the human and

T

a

web where

a

shift in any one element will

have its effect on every other.

exhibit some of the ways

in

This study has tried to

which we are engendered and

constrained by our linguistic, cultural, institutional,

bodily and natural context and how that context

in

turn is

drawn more deeply into existence through our work upon it.
Kohak, Compton and Taylor are right to insist on this
point.

Neither do

T

want to lose sight of the fact that we

can speak, very generally, of persistent always already

there conditions of human existence
home

in

—

technology it spawns,

the world, the sociality and

the bodily-perceptual

the need to feel at

field that is the condition of

possibility of time and space and subject and object.
Why fractious?
a

world

far

from

The ontological view

X

play out is of

chaotic, but perhaps even further from
Thus,

state of harmonious integration.

a

a

modifier that

spoke to the existence of otherness, of recalcitrance

within the world,

was needed

runner-up was "entropic," as

for the
it

is

term "holism."

used

in

The

thermodynamics

to mean "descriptive of

a

quantity that is the measure of

the amount of energy in

a

system not available for doing
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work."
was,

Energy in

system not available for doing work

a

thought, an apt description of that which escapes

T

our categories, refuses to be disciplined

our

to

satisfaction, and walks out on the job of meaning-provision
assigned to it.

But

feared that the term "entropy" would

T

suggest also to the reader this sense:

"The tendency

toward uniformity, toward homogenized disarray."

connotation is inappropriate, for it insinuates
both too disordered and too docile, lacking

defiance, dissonance or
the whol

e

an

ab il

i

of elements within

t y

assume is

I

fr

a

actio us holism,

for

established order," "interfere with its

smooth operation,"
ways."

To be

"are likely to

function

interrupt good feeling or harmony.
to

be expressive of it.

T

articulate such
An

unpredictable

an

ethic of

turn now to an

in

a

sense

attempt to

ethic.

itself

radically other.

^n

abide by this ontology,

ethic compatible with

try to ground

in

fractious is to be disposed to make breaches,

otherness would have

be

t

sense of the

always includes elements that "tend to cause trouble by

opposition to

to

i

world

a

.

Thus, the ontology
it

nd om

i

a

This

in

an

Otherness

awe
in

a

rejection of telos could
inspired by that which is
the self and

sought out and endorsed as_such.

in

nature might

This reliance upon awe

assumes, first, that humans are drawn to things strange and
fascination,
this attraction manifests itself in moods of
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wonder, awe; it assumes, second,

potential link between

a

fascination and respect, between wonder and admiration,
between awe and reverence.
first set of moods and

Such an attempt must evoke the

enable their development into the

second, morally pertinent set of traits.
An

ethic of awe can evoke the experience of

strangeness by identifying people, things, feelings, that
do not seem to

fit

interpretation.

any scheme, but surprise, defy or resist

Here, morbid fascination with weirdness

must be converted into

a

respect for otherness.

Or,

it

can

evoke strangeness by encouraging contact with nature in the
wild, allowing us to see gigantic mountains, to feel the

power of

a

mighty waterfall, to note the eccentricities of

Einstein's brain.
typical responses:
us

Here, it is necessary only to enhance

Wonder at nature, an awe that strikes

dumb, demands from the beholder

reverence, for stuff able
is

a

certain respect or

silence the locquacious animal

to

powerful indeed.
Because

I

will not assume

have the most power to act

—

a

neat fit between those who

humans -- and that upon which

they act -- bodies and nature -- one response to the

utilitarian ethic (i.e., We cannot understand nature

in

itself, so we value it according to its usefulness), might
be

an

we
ethics of awe (i.e., We cannot understand it, so

value it as alien and

human understanding).

as

an

index

of the limitations of
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But although awe can be an element in an ethic

expressive of fractious holism,
First,

it

is

precarious:

it does not

suffice.

Awe and wonder must be momentary

experiences; although potent they are too rare and

unpredictable to sustain ethical action.
suffice to inspire

t oler a

nce of otherness,

Awe does not
for the

experience of awe can be awful; things strange can repel
and disgust as well as

fascinate and attract.

Thus, the

link between the experience of strangeness and respect,

admiration or reverence

is

quite tenuous,

and

it

is not

clear why or how an ethics of awe would triumph over an

orientation of disgust and mastery once the insistence on
assimilating unharmonious elements was relaxed.
Second, an ethics of awe exaggerates the autonomy of

otherness, for it tends to understate the human

contribution

to

the production of otherness itself.

yet we have seen how,

in

order to live in

a

And

world not

designed to fit, humans must impose an alienating order
upon

it.

When the raw material of the body or nature shows

of
signs (natural catastrophes, madness, sexual oddities)

escaping our best attempts to order it, we see how
themati zation has helped bring otherness into being.

Otherness is both

a

product of and

in

conflict with the

human need for order.
drive
What is more, to be modern is to accelerate this
to

thematize and manage life, and

so

it

seem that an ethic

,

.

.

e
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of awe demands
to

a

backward turn to

a

a

pre-modern innocence,

more mysterious stance to things and events.

because themati zation
no longer

is

necessary and desirable

Put
in

world

a

infused with intrinsic meaning and telos

buttressed by secure traditions or authored by

a

caring

Designer, the ethic of fractious holism argues that

tolerance for otherness lies within the very heart of

modernity
The

first step is to turn them ati za tion back on

itself, making the essence of the modern project the object
of critique and

theoretical

s el

po

io

n

f- co n sc io u sn e s

s

1 i t i

c

i

za

t

The capacity for

.

nourishes the insight that

thematic and categorical unities contain artificialities.
Not only does the modern attitude involve more imposition

than did the attitude of Robust Faith, it can involve

a

greater recognition and appreciation of that imposition.
Thus,

and does,

it can

as

Foucault's genealogy of

"sexuality" has shown, disassemble the fixtures it
installs

.

Once we have exploited

potential of
them at i

za

sculpt

em

at i

za t ion

,

con str

we can

uc t

i v

a

is

to

affirm the dual nature of

niche for ourselves in

e/ d ec o n st

r

uc t

i

v

see the way in which

tion is necessary to modern life.

step, then,
We

th

the

a

The second
t

h em a t

i

za t ion

world partly at odds

with our projects and thus generate otherness in the self
and

the world

which resists the design.

Otherness becomes

.
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recognized as the inevitable product of life, of the human
attempt to live by creating unities.
which we have

share of

a

r

Tt

is

an

effect in

es pons ib il it y

Responsibility, combined with an acceptance of the

inevitability of otherness, can foster tolerance.

For

example, we give our selves an identity by regimenting

a

diverse and conflicting set of desires, drives, impulses,
thoughts, intentions.

oneself as one is

in

"To be modern is not to accept

the flux of the passing moments; it is

take oneself as the object of

to

elaboration." 7

But

if the

complex and difficult

a

identity of such

a

Foucaultian

"work of art" is understood as an edifice constantly under
ar

t

i

st- im po sed

expression of

_an_d_

a

m

ater ial- im po sed

renovation, not the

naturally solid essence, we will be able to

appreciate it for its refreshing changeability as well as
for
to

its comforting dimensions of stability.

tolerance of otherness

base

otherness,

a

No

longer able

innocence about

in

measure of tolerance can be had through

self-conscious acknowledgement of our unavoidable role
eng end er
A

i

ng

it

in

.

politics follows from this ethical orientation to

the self.

The social order is

contains sweat and dirt.

We

mortar might crack or where

a

collage whose mortar

never know precisely where the
it

experimental attitude is best.

can be made to crack,
We

so

an

cannot know in advance

the concrete political consequences of

a

political theory
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agenda,

or

for "the 'best'

theories do not constitute

a

very effective protection against disastrous political
choices; certain great themes such as 'humanism' can be
used

any end whatever." 8

to

Whether one's aim is to tear

down old institutions or foster new ones, we can express

fractious world best through an engaged attitude that

the

creates unities, judges the extent of the damage, and

begins again.
art makes
po

1 itic s

To

treat the political order as

possible

i

work of

lively, restless, contestable and open

a

.

Although this politics has
hoi

a

st-Promethean dynamic,

it

in

some ways out-grown the

also grows out of it.

does not repudiate all prior political

It

tacks, but does seek

distance from the claim of all to be cohesive, coherent
orientations.

The political

stance of this new path

dismantles the old systems, takes some elements almost
whole, gives others

a

new twist, and introduces elements

formerly considered illegitimate or not considered at all.
A

political stance

be experimental

any political
it

and

in

a

world of fractious holism must

tentative if it is to acknowledge that

stance enables as well as subjugates.

Thus,

should be reluctant to elaborate its governing
locally,

principles beyond the reauirement

to

act

experimentally, and tentatively.

At

the same time, the

desire to tie

a

political

stance very closely to specific

issues and to eschew universslistic claims of general
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principles is always betrayed

in

a

world of fractious

holism, for all concrete action is and must be guided by
some principle.

The

env ironmental ism

exemplify this complex play between

following discussions of freedom and

articulating this ethic as

a

politics and not fixing it so

firmly that it belies the specific density of the political

issues it engages.
Freedom

in

world of

a

f ractious

holism involves

breaking up reified unities like "the responsible agent" or
"the sexual

person" and transgressing hi stor

limits to what we can be.

Tt

is concerned

ic

ally- imposed

with the

possibility of uncovering the particular, the contingent
and
Tt

the

finite in limits defined as universal or necessary.

deploys

critique.

a

genealogical rather than

Put

a

transcendental

deny all limits to action or will, or to

to

reduce them to error, would open this freedom to Hegel's
critique of absolute freedom or Taylor's critique of

—

unsituated freedom

the

ideal of the general will makes

any affirmation, necessarily an instance of

will,

a

a

particular

threat to co n s en s u a 1 i t y that must be destroyed.

For fractious holism, the assumption of the possibility of
a

general will is

ontological

a

political manifestation of the

assumption of harmony.

stance

The experimental

we

seek shares with the ideal of the general will

to

expose social

a

desire

institutions as constructions and to

remold them, but diverges from it by seeing remolding as

always incomplete, as never resulting in

a

neat fit between

the self and the social order, and as involved

in

production of new otherness in need of remedy.

the

express

To

fractious holism, we must insist that any newly imposed
social structure will also have effects threatening to or

exclusive of or violent toward some aspects of some of the
entities enclosed within.
Thus,

freedom in

a

world of fractious hoi

i

sm

requires

taking responsibility for the edifices we are only in part

responsible for creating.

We are only in

part responsible

because some terms of our action have been set by history
and others by the recalcitrant material

bodies, nature.

worked upon --

Limits are not denied, but the particular

readings we give of them are probl emati zed

appropriate ethical orientation

material, then, is to place

it

to

.

The

this recalcitrant

within some frame while

trying to keep that frame loose and

fluid enough so that

that which does not fit has room to create space for

itself.
to

The

ambiguous commitment to ends and agendas and

that which strains against them provides the modern

space for freedom.
What can we make of this responsible dimension of

freedom?

Tt

is

clear how an ethic expressive of fractious

holism can, through genealogy, seek out and expose

contingencies and arbitrary constraints; it is less clear
what is meant by the term "recalcitrant material."

What

g
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can we say about the status of the raw material the human

artist has to work with?
or

Fhat can we know about the form

structure of the world that humans seek to act upon,

harmonize with, control or use?
is difficult

It

for

the ethic

T

seek to speak in

general terms about the contours of the "raw material" of
the self and world.

something

in

Its holism demands that

it

say

order to distinguish it from radical

subjectivism or the empiricism of discrete facts; its
understanding of the inevitablity of otherness demands that
it

say so much that it lapses back into harmonious

not

Perhaps we can take

holism.
Fo uc

a

ul t

a

cue on this issue

from

:

...there is always something in the social body,
classes, groups and individuals themselves
som et h i n
which in turn some sense e sc a pe s
which is by no means a more or less docile or
reactive primal matter, but rather a centrifugal
movement, an inverse energy, a discharge.
in

.

In

opposition

to

.

.

harmonious holism's view of the raw

material as "being," as having

a

definite, discernible and
has

diffuse

intelligible bent, Foucault can say that

it

resistance discernible only negatively.

That is to say,

the

a

limits to molding this raw material, while having

certain def initiveness

,

they have been violated

attunement.

I

will

the raw material has

are usually recognizable only after

after

it

is too

late

for

say (although Foucault might not)
a

a

that

resiliency even within its bent.
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When speaking abstractly, resistance is

blockage to will; this blockage receives
we move

from

—

it

then

a

force, an unnamed

a

philosophical discourse to

becomes "gays," "feminists,"

name only when

a

political one

a

"mental

patients,"

"rednecks," "fate," or "accidents" and "contingencies."
From within an ontology of fractious holism, any ethic

that seeks "respect"

for the raw material of life,

then, is

inappropriate, for it asks too much of us to "respect"
stuff whose accessibility is only diffuse resistance.
Human subjects are capable of regard for non-rationality
and

non-humanity, but this capacity must dwindle the more

the object of that regard

is

The environmental ethic

understood as alien, other.
I

endorse must not deny this

resistance or the necessity of the technique

it

engenders.

Fabermas is right to insist upon the "technical interest,"
even

if his

version of it resides within

philosophy of nature.

a

rationalistic

Because nature is not designed to

mesh perfectly with our needs, no matter how carefully and

closely we listen to it, there is always

a

gap between the

hospitality of nature and our demands as guests.
makes necessary at times an orientation

to

T his

gap

nature from the

point of view of technical control.
The

fate of the environmental management attempt at

environmental ethics is predictable:

To

insist upon an

ethical orientation that instills "respect" and "intrinsic
value"

for

those aspects of nature for self)

radically
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other engenders the opposite orientation -- the further

human! zation of nature or the rejection of an ethical

orientation

in

favor of an orientation of mastery.

To

ask

"How can we generate respect for nature?" is to ask "How
can we have order without otherness?"

question
answers:

in

and

to

put

the

this way implies two equally unsatisfactory

Faith's dreamy response that we can assimilate

otherness if only we believed

in

telos; Enlightenment's

pragmatic response that life requires order, order

generates otherness, thus mastery is justified.

ask

T

"What is the best way to have order with

instead:

otherness?" and answer that

we

must acknowledge the gap

between self and world, take responsibility for it, and
seek to tread
But
to

why?

express

nature be?

a

lightly upon nature where and when possible.
What justification can an ethic that seeks

fractious world give for its desire to let
Unlike the ethical systems generated

from

within Faith or Enlightenment, it must admit that only
partial justifications for its moral stance are possible,

justifications that lack the force of
We

should let nature be,

wisest orientation

to

a

world

T

a

moral

imperative.

claim, because it is the

upon which we depend

cannot fully comprehend or control.

but

Even after the

accelerated modern attempt, we have not mastered nature, so

maddening
why not relieve ourselves of the dangerous and

Promethean obsession^

Unless we do, we win

continue to
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risk nature's revenge in the form of environmentally-

induced cancers, water and

soil crises or

nuclear winter.

a

Human existence upon the planet is precarious, not

guaranteed by nature or providence;
lightly.

to

tread

in

nature be is the only sense

it,

is only

it

The judicious attempt to
in

politic

let otherness

which we can "respect"

for it is foolishness to exaggerate the extent to which

we either belong
an

so

Fnv ironmental

to

it or

can dominate it.

Impact Statement is

a

The notion of

good one precisely

because it discourages this foolishness.

Despite its

amenability to manipulation by foes of the environment and
its

implication in bureaucratic webs of control, the

requirement that nature be acknowledged

as

an

affronted

party encourages us to recall both the otherness of nature
and

our
An

dependence upon it.
ethic expressive of fractious holism furthermore

moves us away from

a

political economy dedicated to the

pursuit of limitless growth and consumption.
of the

steady-state could be detached

longings without then adopting

otherness,

it

would be

a

a

Tf

the theory

from its harmonious

technocratic denial of
Taylor's

more powerful critique.

steady-state relies too heavily upon the internalization of
of
civic virtue and/or the commitment to the ideal

community, and these draw too heavily upon faith

harmonizing capacities.

An

in

our

experimental attitude cognizant

of the normalizing effects of this ideal

could not place as

-
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much weight upon moral sentiments and would not
always seek
to deepen
a

global

as

a

and

aim,

guide

in

up this thing

extend them.
a

We ought to reject community as

universal desiderata, and deploy it instead

specific political actions.

We

should muster

called civic virtue when we can, but do so

with the acknowledgement that we lose as well as gain by

mobilizing this ideal.

Moral

course, of the motivation for
the political

economy.

ideals can form

a

part, of

shift in the priorities of

a

their normalizing and

Put

totalizing tendencies can be mitigated by the acknowledgement that they are prudent illusions.
Natural holism'

s

call

to "experience nature"

has

elements in common with the reliance upon awe that enters
into my position, but it

attune the self to

a

political redesign of
ment forms.
to

focuses too much on the attempt to

natural bent and not enough upon the
i

n st it ut i

on

a 1/ a

rc hi

t

ec t ur

a

1/ em plo y

For example, public buildings designed to open

the outside, with natural lighting, would encourage us

every day and

in

a

non-extraordinary way to face the

resistance that is nature.

Windowless, temperature-

controlled rooms are more costly than the heating bills
they are designed to reduce.
vast

i n

fr

astr uc tur al

And

the price tag

for

the

support for private automobiles should

include the social cost of discouraging another opportunity
to

experience the resistance of nature:

bicycling.

T he

obsession with comfort, with protection from the elements,

28U

has too often prevented an experience of otherness and of
our contribution to

more tol er ance

it --

experiences that could engender

.

Alongside the project to change the structure of the
growth- and consumption-oriented political economy,

I

believe that the attempt to enforce and create pollution

regulations and pollution-reduction incentives must
continue

in

some way.

The b ur eauc

r

ati zi ng

effects of

environmental regulation are less pernicious than are those
of regulations regarding criminality, madness, sexuality,
The espousal of environmental regulation must be

deviance.

accompanied by

a

call

for

the decriminalization of

victimless acts of abnormality.
claim that we are on our own to do the best we can

Our

strikes

a

responsive chord

in

modern politics.

This is,

I

think, the source of the endurance of versions of the

"muddling through" thesis
It

in

political science literature.

speaks to the contemporary experience that patriotism,

community, family, love are not unqualified goods

—

there is chauvinism in patriotism, authoritarianism

community, neurosis
in

love.

in

that
in

family life, and jealousy and rage

We may be ripe

for

an

ethic that explicitly

acknowledges that allegiances to country, community,
individuals (or schemes, theories, beliefs)

can never be

absolute, never quite as fulfilling as anticipated.
yet the

ethic

appropriate to fractious holism

is

And

doubly

reflexive, confessing that we lose something by

self-consciously acknowledging the underside of our ideals
-- we lose the ease of our conscience and

freedom to

the

act without tortured consideration of possible

implications, long-term effects, dangerous consequences.

Harmonious Holism and Fractious Holism

For harmonious holism or attuned

ex pr e s s iv

i

sm

foregoing discussions of freedom and env ironm en tal
The attempts to give content to

wash.

genealogical

freedom and

they require

duplicitous:
as

a

respectless

]

i

don't

sm

limited but

e n v ir o

nm en t a 1

i

sm

are

conception of self and nature

a

multiple, as essence- ess

a

the

,

,

and

to

conceive self and

nature in this way, to be so reticent about inherent

properties that pose limits to self-invention or
n

at ur e-

i

nv en t ion

,

disqualifies

a

theory from the right to

speak of recalcitrant material.

According

to

these critics,

a

fractious holism

Fvidence of

underplays the solidity of personal identity.
this solidity is our

ability to recognize gains

in

self-understanding, for this identification would be
impossible were there nothing substantial
standard of judgment.

Put the

use as

a

Thus, the very rejection of the

possibility of harmonious integration
experience.

to

position

I

is

at odds with lived

have developed here affirms
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that we can distinguish between better and worse
self-

interpretations, even while denying that
against an ideally-fulfilled self.

we

Rather,

must judge them
we judge

self-interpretation good if it contributes to

a

an

appreciation of the artful character of our achievement; if
it

supports

a

work of art whose standards of beauty are not

confined to "balance," "cohesion," "harmony," but include
also "eccentricity,"

place."

"hilarity," "vivacity," "things out of

These latter elements

form part of the

ideal

self

of fractious holism.

Neither can my position distinguish between better and
worse social orders, claims harmonious holism.

example, it endorses

a

a

society is truer in

expressive of, having

a

deeper affinity

for, the essential characteristics of human being.

does not have access to this standard after
of telos

in

self and nature.

T

not they provide enough space

body is "better"

to

the

it

reply that we can speak of

for humans

their order can never be attuned

And

repudiation

a

better or worse modern societies, according

normalized relation

for

less disciplined, less normalized

society, it can only mean that such
the sense of being

If,

to

to

them.

state, to the

A

to

whether or

be

even though

less

Earth, or to one's

precisely because no relation can ever be

deeply attuned, because the perfection of self and society
are impossible and

destructive dreams.

incomplete self-creation

is

possible,

n nly
a

perpetually

self-creation that

2R7
is limited

felt resistance of recalcitrant material

by the

and by an ethical concern

produce.

So

a

for

the otherness we help

society that admits this can challenge the

hegemony of (but not destroy) the imperative to concretize
the self and
not

a

itself.

a

better society, although

truer one.
In

short, the debate between

fractious holism is
world

^his is

is

unified

a

harmonious holism and

a

a

debate over the degree to which the
the degree to which we can recognize

and

inherent limits to action and will.

My study does not

settle this debate, for it cannot determine the truth of

ontological assumptions.
political

But it can

implications of each.

And

explore the ethicalsaying this,

T

can

agree with harmonious holism that the radical anti-harmony

Much of Foucault's work deploys such

thesis exaggerates.

exaggeration, thinking it necessary for playing out "the

an

possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we
are, do, think,"

10

paths of Faith and

i.e.,

for drawing us away from

Enlightenment.

Eut

the worn

fractious holism

diverges from the strong version of the Foucaultian
ontology.

The orientation

to otherness

endorsed here is

d^sji^rmonious in its espousal of the view that humans are

incomplete beings

in

a

world not created to complete their

essence or fulfill their needs, and

ex_pxe s

sj_v i_s t

in

its

view that the affirmation of this disharmony can inform
space to
life ethics, and politics by giving otherness more
be

.
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An

to

ethic of disharmony alone would magnify the extent

which self and world and self and self are incompatible.

Otherness within the self, i.e., thoughts that take one by
surprise, socially unacceptable urges, moods, rages,

unexplained pains and depressions, would appear as wholly

disconnected from that within the self better subject to
will and

i

be able to

n t en t

ion

a1 it

y

Likewise, the social order would

.

fulfill collective aims only by chance and

nature would be
the survival

a

bizarre set of processes indifferent to

needs of humans.

Such

a

picture of modernity

would be so clear that it would distort;

intentional and the
and language and

pr ed

i

sc ur

are still

and moods are still

s iv e

for

the non-

coexist with intentions

identifiable as "self"; pains

the pains and moods of beings human;

the social order does touch and enhance (even if it does
not complete or give ultimate meaning to)
the

human existence;

Earth is quite hospitable to perception and bodily

functioning when compared to the alternative natural

environment of Mars or the sun.

But these compatibilities

ought not to be construed as evidence of design or of the

possibility of overcoming or assimilating otherness.
We have found

thesis,

it

necessary to modify the anti-harmony

for harmonious holism is right

freedom non-sense from within

material of life
be blamed

for

is

a

to

call

any talk of

theory where the raw

wholly unintelligible:

any harm done to it?

Could we then

How could we take
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responsibility for our imposing creations?
is not wholly committed

thesis

Even Nietzsche

to the radical version of the

.

-- To 'give style' to one's
is need f ul
character
a great and rare art!
It is
practiced by those who survey all the strengths
and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them
into an artistic plan. ..Here a large mass of
second nature has been added; there a piece of
original nature has been removed
both times
through long practice and daily work at it.
Here
the ugly that could not be removed is concealed;
there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime.
Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been
saved and exploited for distant views; it is
meant to beck^tji toward the far and
immeasurable

One thing

.

—

—

.

Nietzsche's call to give style to one's character
appreciates the way we both belong to and deface the world.
And

the ethic of fractious holism

seeks to gesture in the

same direction, believing that we mess with the world,

constrained by "original nature," but never conquer it.
The beauty of this position is that it accepts that which
is

vague and resistant to shaping while giving it

within the work of art
not self-contained

or

—

as

a

a

place

reminder that the self is

self-sufficient, but exists within

a

context that includes "the far and immeasurable."
It

an

may turn out that harmonious holism is right that

to "let
ethic of fractious holism fails, that the desire

otherness be" cannot be embodied within
as

a

view of the world

no
ultimately intractible, that there can be

expressivism that

is

not attuned

to

a

world ready to be

290

heard.

Put

I

have pursued the possibility that there

i_s

some ground between harmonious holism and the radical

anti-harmony thesis, hoping that challenging the theory
that lends the status of truth to our need to be at home in
the world might make us more at home
r

esi stant

to

us

.

in

a

world

inherently
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